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ABSTRACT 
 
The predatory state has received considerably less attention than the 
developmental state in the development literature. In this thesis I probe three 
understudied questions on the characteristics of the predatory state and its 
construction. First, what are the underlying class forces and power dynamics of a 
predatory state and how does it function? Second, what are the modes of 
accumulation that characterise the predatory state? Finally, what are the implications 
for development outcomes? 
 
This thesis answers these questions by examining Zimbabwe’s power elite 
(state, military and business) anti-developmental accumulation patterns across key 
economic sectors: land and agriculture, mining, transport and energy, and banking 
and finance. I adopt an historical approach beginning in the colonial period to 
understand the key choices made to explain the changing role of the state in mediating 
accumulation patterns and implications for development in both pre- and post-
independence periods.  
 
Based on my empirical research, I suggest that the predatory state is a ruling 
class anti-developmental accumulation and reproduction project characterised by: (1) 
party and military dominance in the state; (2) state-business relations shaped by 
domination and capture; and (3) state-society relations shaped by violence and 
patronage. I differentiate the notion of predation from most political economy 
approaches on post-colonial Africa that emphasise the absence of central authority. I 
challenge the developmental state concept that views the predatory state as simply the 
opposite of a developmental state. Finally, I also show that contrary to suggestions 
that the predatory state is autonomous from society, the predatory state is also in fact 
deeply embedded with business albeit in a different way.  
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Chapter One: 
The Making of Zimbabwe’s Predatory State 
 
Introduction 
 
In the political centres of the twenty-first century global finance, policy 
debates have a disturbingly anachronistic thrust. In Washington, ideological 
tropes from early triumphalist neoliberalism are repeated in exaggerated 
form, perversely combined with regressive calls for destructive austerity 
measures…In China, South Africa or Brazil, policy makers and politicians 
assume that the state has an important role to play….Global practice, 
especially in the South, diverges from neoliberal theory and ideology, but the 
divergence appears to be pragmatic and situational rather that grounded in a 
coherent analytical vision (Evans, 2014: 220-221). 
 
 
Evans’ graphic depiction of the neoliberal crisis comes in the wake of a global 
financial crisis1 attributed to series of events that started with the collapse of the 
speculative bubble in the United States (US) housing market in 2006. The consequent 
effects threatened the stability of large financial houses that spawned into the 
Eurozone leading to a liquidity crunch in global credit markets by mid-2007 followed 
by a downturn in global economic activity. In the Global South, the overstatement of 
the role of the state in policy, practice and academic debates was strengthened, both 
by the crisis as an alternative to it and inspired by the Latin American and Asian 
developmental state experiences. Two books published during the course of this 
research, The End of the Developmental State? edited by Michelle Williams (2014), 
from which I extracted the introductory quote in Peter Evans’s chapter and Roger 
Southall (2013), Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa 
have proved formative.  
 
The End of the Developmental State? challenges policy makers and academics 
to rethink the role of the state in development in the twenty-first century. Beyond the 
wisdom of a ‘Weberian bureaucracy,’ ‘embedded autonomy’ and ‘industrial policy,’ 
the developmental state should contend with democratisation pressures, ecological 
                                                        
1 The global financial crisis has been considered the most severe crisis in history since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
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limits, ideological contests and epistemic shifts in development thinking beyond the 
supremacy of the ‘growth imperative’ (Williams, 2014: 8). 
 
Yet, away from the developmental state as an alternative ideal, Roger 
Southall’s Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa 
reveals the disappointing experience of Southern Africa’s liberation movements in 
power in terms of the character of governance and improving the quality of life for 
their citizens. While in the East Asian capitalist developmental states, ‘late 
development, war time mobilisation and revolution’ were instrumental in shaping a 
specific mode of developmental state-society and state-business relationship (Woo-
Cumings, 1999: 3), in Southern Africa, despite these similarly conspiring factors,2 
liberation movements as governments3 have shown variations of authoritarianism4 
and anti-developmental state-society tendencies5 that have led to severe economic 
implosion and political crisis in Zimbabwe and gradually declining productive 
capacities and economic performance in South Africa and Namibia. The façade of 
indigenisation and empowerment policies—the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Programme (IEEP) in Zimbabwe, Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) in South Africa and various affirmative action programmes in Namibia—have 
served the ‘parasitic’ accumulation interests of a politically connected elite at the 
expense of majority of citizens (Southall, 2013: 220-230). Southall’s book urges us to 
search beyond the ‘developmental state’ if we want to understand state failures, 
notably in Zimbabwe.  
 
                                                        
2 It is important to acknowledge two different factors between Africa and East Asia. 
Firstly, the global context of the politics of the cold war accounted for massive aid 
injection in some East Asian countries (notably South Korea), and secondly, the 
impacts of the inherited colonial mode of production on Africa’s development.  
3 Southall refers here to the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of 
Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and Zimbabwe 
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) of Zimbabwe.  
4  While Zimbabwe depicts outright authoritarian tendencies, South Africa and 
Namibia retain largely democratic politics although with intermittent features of 
intolerance and violent confrontation. 
5  Although South Africa and Namibia demonstrate cooperative state-business 
relationship, durability will depend on managing redistribution pressures and ‘the 
extent to which the state and business manages to forge alliances that transcend racial 
lines’ (Southall, 2013: 220). 
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The analysis here invokes the predatory state paradigm to understand the state-
military and business relationship in Zimbabwe and its nexus with development 
outcomes. It contends that, rather than it being a ‘developmental state,’ the state, 
military and business accumulation patterns qualify Zimbabwe as a ‘predatory state.’ 
Suffice it to say that although the notion of the developmental state has been well 
established in terms of its characteristics and functioning (Johnson, 1982, 1999; 
Evans, 1995, 2014; Chibber, 2002, 2014; Kohli, 2004; 6  Williams, 2014), the 
predatory state has remained a vague concept. In this thesis I propose a 
conceptualisation of the predatory state as characterised by (1) party and military 
dominance in the state; (2) state-business relations shaped by domination and capture; 
and (3) state-society relations shaped by violence and patronage. The power elite in 
alliance with international criminal syndicates extracts high levels of rents from the 
state and economy and in so doing undermine development potential. 
 
There have been few in-depth studies that focus on the characteristics of the 
predatory state and how it functions. In much of the literature, it has been treated as a 
polar opposite of the developmental state, lacking qualities of rule-based bureaucracy 
and a collaborative relationship with business (Evans, 1989; 1995) and civil society 
(Evans, 2014). Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) highlight deliberate ‘criminalisation of 
the state’ in Africa as a form of predation. For Chabal and Daloz (1999), a ‘new 
paradigm’ they call the ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’ helps to explain the anti-
developmental modes of accumulation in Africa. They argue that the African state 
shares general characteristics of patrimonialism and an instrumentally profitable 
political culture rooted in corruption, which works against institutionalisation. The 
ruling elite is thus able to exploit poor institutionalisation to accumulate wealth and 
maintain power. Bratton’s (2014) Power politics in Zimbabwe also examines the 
behaviour of the dominant political elites in authoritarian settings. In political struggle 
with rivals, the ruling group ‘rarely hesitate to unleash the full panoply of power 
                                                        
6 I must highlight that Kohli (2004) prefers the concept of ‘cohesive capitalist states’ 
to the ‘developmental state concept.’ However, for analytical purposes both concepts 
demonstrate substantial similarities in terms of variations of state structures and 
relationship with business. Therefore in this study I apply the concept of the 
developmental state. 
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politics, 7  including manipulation of the law, economic exclusion, political 
intimidation, covert operations and even physical violence’ (Bratton, 2014: 7). 
 
This work goes beyond Chabal and Daloz’s Africa works: Disorder as a 
Political Instrument, which uses cultural reasons for arguing that Africa is following 
its own unique developmental trajectory. So too, Bayart, Ellis and Hibbou, suggest 
that ‘the criminalisation of the state in Africa is natural to the history, culture and 
psychology of the continent’ (Abdi, 2000: 445). Lassiter (2000: 2) has summarised 
the problems facing this line of inquiry as follows: 
 
Many, in fact, consider such inquiry to be no more than unscientific 
stereotyping, usually with malevolent intent and effect. Some argue that group 
personality studies are an anathema to cultural relativism and the 
particularistic study of singular population and topics. Still others go as far to 
assert that culture and personality studies obscure the uniqueness of the 
individual, and divert attention and resources from the more fruitful lines of 
inquiry such as the dynamics of class struggle and scientific study of particular 
social structures and functions. At its worst, critics and social advocates say 
group personality studies and inquiry into broad patterns of cultural adaptation 
on the part of social scientists exacerbate racism and bigotry.  
 
In addition, although both the ‘criminalisation of the state’ and ‘Africa works’ 
approaches emphasise positive correlation between systemic corruption and 
development, subsequent theoretical contributions challenge orthodox assumptions of 
a negative correlation between corruption and low levels of economic development 
(Rock and Bonnet, 2004). Finally, this thesis also advances beyond the 
Criminalisation, Instrumentalisation of disorder and Power politics theses, which 
emphasise the political behaviour of elites. 8  Such approaches have mainly been 
criticised for granting undue prominence to the role of individual political leaders in 
shaping the governance and accumulation regimes.  
                                                        
7  The concept of ‘power politics’ derives from the realist school of international 
relations, which views states as locked in competition to achieve self-defined national 
interests (Bratton, 2014: 7). However, Bratton applies the same concept to study 
domestic politics within the state. 
8Bratton’s Power politics partly attempts to mitigate this dilemma by elevating elite 
coalitions and inherited political institutions. However, the analysis does not escape 
the role and dominance of individual leaders in shaping politics of ruling coalitions 
and configuration of politics. As Bratton’s analysis will show, although the individual 
leaders are not the root cause, they remain key actors in the political arena (Bratton, 
2014: 2, 5, 6, 55, 60, and 78). 
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This study seeks to contribute to understanding the predatory state, its core 
characteristics and how it functions. It does so by examining Zimbabwe’s state, 
military and business relationships in pervasive anti-developmental accumulation 
patterns across key economic sectors: land and agriculture, mining, transport and 
energy, and banking and finance.  
 
The concept of the predatory state has been associated with the Philippines 
during the years of dictatorship rule under President Imelda Marcos (1965 to 1986), 
(Quimpo, 2009). In Africa the predatory state concept has also been used to describe 
Nigeria under President General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (1985 to 1993) and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), then Zaire under the rule of President Mobutu 
Sese Seko (1965 to 1997) (Diamond, 2008; Lewis, 1996). However, earlier studies 
including Quimpo (2009), Lewis (1996) and Diamond (2008) have similarly focussed 
on the behaviour of the ruling elite without much attention on the underlying class 
forces and power dynamics that help us to understand the construction of the 
predatory state and its generalisable core characteristics that explain the predatory 
state’s anti-developmental trajectory.  
 
For Zimbabwe, a number of earlier works engaged with questions of power 
and accumulation to explain development tragedies (Bratton, 2014; Moore, 2012; 
2003; Sachikonye, 2011; Raftopolous, 1996; and Mandaza 1986). For Bratton (2014) 
and Sachikonye (2011), Zimbabwe demonstrates a prototype of power politics. Yet, 
others prefer the concept of primitive accumulation 9  to understand the nexus of 
violence and development (Moore 2012; 2003). Although the notions of predation as 
articulated by Evans (1989; 1995) and Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) are well 
established in Africa, few have applied these concepts systematically to Zimbabwe. 
These concepts have been mostly applied to African countries characterised as having 
weak or collapsed central authority: weak states, failed states or collapsed states and 
also having armed opponents. Indeed, it may be argued that although the elites have 
been on an anti-developmental path, Zimbabwe has continued to retain some residual 
                                                        
9 Primitive accumulation encompasses the transformation of pre-capitalist agrarian 
relations to capitalist modes of production and the formation of a capitalist class. The 
process is by no means spontaneous, but rather exhibits the use of both state force and 
other ‘non-market’ modalities (Moore, 2003:34).  
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state strength even during the years of its decline thanks to its settler colonial 
capitalist inheritance. Notably also, even in those treatments that have dealt with 
Zimbabwe’s political economy, much of the literature has tended to have an agrarian 
bias (Herbst, 1990; Phimister, 1988). Few have looked seriously at the military and its 
incestuous relationship with political elites in accumulation processes (Zimbabwe 
Institute, 2008; Kriger, 2012). This might be because, on the one hand, the complex 
nature of the relationships makes it difficult to unpack and on the other hand, the 
difficulty in accessing data for studies involving military due to the secrecy associated 
with the subject. 
 
Deconstructing Zimbabwe’s Predatory State 
 
By the dawn of independence in 1980 Zimbabwe had one of the most 
structurally developed economies and state systems in Africa (Hazlewood, 1967: 284) 
and was classified as a middle-income country. In 1980, Zimbabwe’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita stood at US$1,105.39 as almost equal that to China at 
US$1,551.9. 10  The country’s diversified economy was anchored on extensive 
agricultural production and an advanced manufacturing sector contributing almost 25 
per cent of GDP and 17 per cent employment by 1981 (Sachikonye, 2003:5). 
‘Zimbabwe came to life with everything; a good climate, well-educated elite, a 
balanced, mixed economy with abundant mineral resources and the full support of a 
global community that wanted us to succeed in every way’ (Cross, 2014). However, 
more than 30 years later, Zimbabwe had regressed to a low-income country with a 
GDP per capita among the lowest in the world, at US$770.4011 in 2013. The country 
had abandoned its own currency in the wake of severe hyper-inflation between 2000 
and 2008 until the introduction of a multi-currency regime in 2009. Unemployment 
rose to 80 per cent as the country’s manufacturing capacity utilisation declined to 57 
per cent by the turn of the first decade of the twenty-first century (Shumba and Jahed, 
2012:155). Zimbabwe’s once stellar agricultural sector had plummeted from net 
exporter prior to the controversial land reform in 2000 to a perennial net importer of 
staple foods thereafter – wheat and maize. The World Food Programme estimated that 
                                                        
10 World Bank, IBRD-IDA data. 
11 World Development Indicators (WDI), July 2014. 
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at least 2.2 million Zimbabweans needed food assistance in 2013 (Zimbabwe 
Situation, 27 November 2013). With these dark economic conditions, discussions 
concerning structural problems of a country once cited as Africa’s best potential are 
reignited. If Zimbabwe was the golden darling after independence, why did this 
happen? Was it inevitable?  What were the crucial choices made that led to it?  Did 
the ruling elite know that their choices would lead to Zimbabwe’s developmental 
decline? 
 
The settler colonial state, notably before the Unilateral Declaration on 
Independence12 (UDI) in 1965, enjoyed close collaboration with mining, agriculture 
and manufacturing capital which had substantial input in policy making and received 
selective incentives from the state (Southall, 2013: 217). The emerging 
bureaucratisation together with state intervention measures to boost local production 
through various incentives including repression of black labour and Import Substitution 
Industrialisation Policy (ISIP) were largely successful and appear to defy both the 
modernisation and dependency theory postulations. The economy recorded the world’s 
fastest growth rates averaging 9.5 per cent annually from 1966-74 (Bond, 1998:6).  
 
Bond and Manyanya (2002: 3) trace the origins of the statist development 
strategy to the failure by the colonial regime to discover large quantities of anticipated 
gold reserves at the initial settlement in 1890 against large sunk investments in land 
and telegraph development. This shifted the strategy from more speculative intent 
towards a more permanent, inward-oriented economic approach. This economic 
approach was reinforced by the transition to ‘Self-Governing Status’ chosen in 1923 
in a mainly white-voter referendum and cemented by the UDI in 1965 in response to 
international sanctions. Bond and Manyanya (2002: 2) summarise Zimbabwe’s 
development policy below, table 1.1.  
 
 
                                                        
12 The UDI was a decision taken by the settler colonial government on 11 November 
1965, announcing that Rhodesia now regarded itself as an independent sovereign state 
from the United Kingdom (UK).  
8 
 
Table 1.1: Phases of inward/ outward macro-economic policy in Zimbabwe 1920s - 
2013 
Period  Relevant policy  Economic conditions 
 1920s Protection for local manufacturers Beginning of industrial 
development 
 1930s-40s Relative isolation High growth and inward 
maturation of secondary industry 
 1950s Increasing financial and trade 
regulation 
Large inflows of foreign 
investment, but overproduction 
problems and unsustainable 
financial and trade relations 
 1960s-70s Heightened financial/trade 
regulation coincident with sanctions 
Initial dramatic recovery, 
followed by a crisis of 
overproduction and civil war  
 1980s Gradual loosening of financial/trade 
restrictions and strong export drive 
Enhancement of developmental 
state’s human capital functions, 
yet uneven economic record 
 1990s Rapid liberalisation of finance and 
trade 
Dramatic volatility and 
vulnerability in many markets, 
deindustrialisation, 
underdevelopment 
 1997-2008 Uneven return to dirigiste policies--
e.g., exchange controls, a currency 
peg, luxury import tariffs (but 
followed by a regional free-trade 
agreement), foreign debt default, 
uncontrolled budgetary growth, 
negative real interest rates--under 
conditions of desperation and 
capital flight 
Deepening crisis across all 
sectors of the economy 
2009-2013 Abandonment of the Zimbabwean 
dollar and adoption of multi-
currency regime under the Inclusive 
Government era, indigenisation and 
empowerment populist rhetoric  
Economic stabilisation, although 
indigenisation policies negatively 
impact on investment climate 
Post 2013 Termination of the Inclusive 
Government, restoration of ZANU-
PF dominance and continued 
indigenisation rhetoric 
Economic decline, increasing 
trade deficit and loss of 
competitiveness owing to the 
depreciation of the South African 
Rand against the US dollar. 
Adapted from Bond and Manyanya (2002: 2), with additions on the period 2009 to 
2013.  
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The contradictions of the colonial mode of development were to impose 
structural limitations and inexorable political pressures on the colonial state. For its 
part, the colonial capitalist mode of development relied heavily on indigenous ‘black 
cheap labour as a key asset in development’ (Wolf, 1974: 91), as this constrained 
growth of essential domestic demand and ‘generated stark inequalities necessarily 
resulting in pressures for social change’ (Good, 1976: 607). Stagnation eventually set in 
until independence under, inter-alia, constraints of civil war, international oil price 
hikes, foreign currency shortages and constrained domestic demand characteristic of the 
colonial state political economy. 
 
Following the attainment of independence, the ruling elite dispensed with its 
alliances with erstwhile partners during the liberation struggle, peasants and labour. 
Instead, the ruling elite, lacking the competencies to manage the economy, forged a 
new pact with white capital. As predicted by Rukudzo Murapa as early as 1977: 
 
After national liberation, the petit-bourgeois leadership can abandon its 
alliance with the workers and peasants and emerge as the new ruling class by 
gaining certain concessions from both foreign and local capital and, in fact, 
forming a new alliance with these forces which they will need to stay in 
power. Of course, lip service commitment, a la Kenya, to the masses, will be 
made (Murapa cited in Bond and Manyanya, 2002). 
 
The alliance with white capital proved vital to stabilising the economic 
environment and developing a path of industrially based accumulation, anchored on 
agricultural production and manufacturing. Meanwhile, the readmission of Zimbabwe 
by the international community provided gateways to productive investment and aid 
that saw the country achieving phenomenal rates of economic growth in the first two 
years after independence.  However, the alliance was not to last. By 1997, the state 
came under pressure over poor economic performance, abuse of the war victims’ 
compensation fund 13  and labour protests against effects of the adjustment 
programmes adopted in the 1990s. In turn the state increasingly assumed predatory 
characteristics, ‘economic policies turned increasingly capricious and the state 
fostered relationship with briefcase businessmen with political connections to the 
                                                        
13 A compensation fund set up to benefit those who were disabled following war 
service, with the amount paid determined by the degree of disability. 
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ruling elite’ (Taylor 2007: 132). The state abandoned its waning commitment to neo-
liberal reforms and instead embraced an authoritarian populist approach (Southall, 
2013). The relationship with white capital eventually collapsed in 2000 at the height 
of the land take-overs.14 Moore concludes: 
 
‘In general, it would appear that a bourgeoisie which might have been on the 
road to a productive and industrially-based accumulation in the early to mid-
1980s has been turned by neo-liberal policies and authoritarianism into one 
based on financial speculation, war economies, and the plundering of 
historically alienated agricultural spaces, but it will take much more 
investigation to determine its exact contours’ (Moore, 2003:39). 
 
The new accumulation patterns from the land reform and the business deals 
associated with the state’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
marked the ascendancy of the military evolving into a far more potent political and 
economic force. According to Campbell (2003: 231), ‘the war in the DRC and the 
land invasions to seize property of white farmers represented two poles of military 
strategy by an aspiring capitalist class willing to use warfare, coercion and violence 
for its growth and consolidation.’ Senior military officers were rewarded with 
multiple farms and business ventures in the DRC at the height of the war between 
1998 and 2001. The military and ruling party in cahoots with former Rhodesian white 
business elites15 were involved in transport, gold and diamond mining and timber 
logging operations, which provided lucrative sources of accumulation (UN, 2002). 
With deepening authoritarianism, the military gained prominence in both domestic 
politics and business, described by Sachikonye (2012) as the ‘state military complex.’ 
Other analysts including Ndlovu (2006) have argued that the ‘state military complex’ 
can be traced back to the liberation struggle. During the struggle for independence, 
the military enjoyed much influence over the civilian leadership. 
 
 Bratton (2014), analysing authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe through the lense of 
power politics and political settlements shows how a narrow ruling coalition 
                                                        
14 Although there are still a number of whites with business interests that have strong 
links to ZANU-PF. 
15 Notably, Billy Rautenbach and John Bredenkamp with vast business interests in 
Southern Africa, dating back from the period of sanctions busting businesses 
established by white Rhodesians to assist the war against African liberation 
movements.  
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systematically deployed violence and patronage to regenerate political power. For 
instance, when the party came under threat from the opposition, Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) in the 2000s, the military took charge of ZANU-PF’s 
campaign machinery, maiming and torturing opposition supporters to cow them into 
submission. In return the military elites were granted wide ranging lucrative business 
deals through state access to guarantee their loyalty and continued support. In the civil 
service, the party ensured control over key institutions by appointing loyalists from 
the nationalist struggle to top positions in Cabinet and the state security apparatus. 
Further, when many competent senior officials, including experienced permanent 
secretaries, opted for generous early retirement schemes offered under the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the 1990s, ZANU-PF chose to fill these 
and other vacant civil service posts with individuals whose qualifications leaned more 
toward party loyalty than technical skills (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011: 5). 
 
Kriger (2012), analysing the dynamics of power characterising the political 
transition in Zimbabwe under the Global Political Agreement 16  (GPA), observed 
blurred divisions between the state and non-state institutions, coercive and non-
coercive institutions, and the public and private organisations in the use of violence 
and patronage to sustain power by the ruling elites. She argues that the 
informalisation of politics cemented opportunities for accumulation by individuals 
linked to ‘informal networks.’ For instance, only companies with close connections to 
the ZANU-PF political and security elite obtained diamond mining concessions in 
Marange. These included two Chinese companies – Anjin Investments and Sino 
Zimbabwe Development (Pvt) Ltd and two South African companies – Mbada and 
Canadile (Veritas, 2011). An interlocutor who spoke to a foreign journalist quoted in 
Kriger (2012: 21) cited that ‘ZANU-PF party and security officials were running 
illegal trade in diamonds mined at Chiadzwa, and the armed forces also worked for 
the political heavy weights in ZANU-PF’. In May 2013, the Minister of Finance 
(Tendai Biti), told a Centre for Research and Development (CRD) workshop in 
Harare that the military was involved in a partnership with Anjin Investments, one of 
the diamond mining companies. Yet both the Ministry of Mines and the Zimbabwe 
                                                        
16 Agreement signed on 11 September 2008 by ZANU-PF and the two Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) parties – MDC-M and MDC-N to form an Inclusive 
Government (IG) following the disputed 2008 elections. 
12 
 
Mining Development Cooperation (ZMDC) have remained reluctant to confirm the 
speculated joint venture. Until today, the government has neither confirmed nor 
formally communicated a contrary position on this matter. 
 
In Zimbabwe’s lost decade: Politics, development and society, Lloyd 
Sachikonye (2012: 34) observes the ascendancy of the Joint Operations Command as 
the supreme policy decision-making body. Some analysts, according to Sachikonye, 
characterise the Joint Operations Command as a ‘kitchen cabinet’ due to its central 
role on the policy setting. The apex of the Joint Operation Command is constituted by 
the Zimbabwe Republic Police Commissioner General, the Commander of the 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces, the Commissioner General of the Zimbabwe Prison 
Services and head of the Central Intelligence Organisation. Further, in response to the 
deepening crisis post-2000 which led to poor remuneration and mass exodus of senior 
level bureaucrats, the government deployed serving and retired army officials and 
national youth service graduates to the public service. A number of military and 
former military officers were deployed to key government ministries and departments, 
parastatals, commissions and spearheaded several predatory policy initiatives such as 
‘Operation Reduce Prices’17 which harmed private capital. Indeed, it can be argued 
post-2000 that the military assumed an omnipotent role in Zimbabwe’s policy setting 
while at the same time competing with private capital with the risk of squeezing out 
the latter.  
 
The case of diamond mining in Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands is all too 
familiar by now. The mining sector is expected to boost constrained revenues and 
stimulate economic growth and development.  However, Saunders (2008: 67) 
observes three paradoxes: (i) despite buoyant markets for minerals, with few 
exceptions local production fell off sharply, (ii) despite the production downturn and 
disinvestment by several major mining houses, foreign investment into the minerals 
sector actually increased over the course of the 2000s, and (iii) while government 
claimed to have enabled greater black empowerment (or ‘indigenisation’) in the 
sector, in practice this was rarely achieved in the larger documented deals. If true, 
                                                        
17 In July 2007, the state, through the military launched ‘Operation Reduce Prices’ 
compelling businesses and manufacturers to slash the prices of goods by more than 50 
per cent in response to the hyperinflation.  
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these striking observations raise more questions than answers. For instance, who are 
the driving forces behind Zimbabwe’s empowerment regulations? Who are the 
beneficiaries and why? (Evidence presented by Saunders, seems to suggest that only a 
few Zimbabwean elites benefitted while more regional actors benefitted.) The 
Chamber of Mines, quoted in Magure (2012: 79), is not in favour of the 
indigenisation initiative arguing that the programme scares away potential investors in 
a minerals sector already struggling to recapitalise. 
  
The indigenisation programme has equally aroused suspicions against 
historical controversies in the implementation of redistributive reforms, notably the 
‘Fast Track Land Reform Programme.’ The latter has substantially benefitted top 
ZANU-PF elites and senior military officials who appropriated for themselves several 
farms including ‘inheriting’ crops and farming equipment without any compensation 
(although Scoones et al. (2010) argue that the programme benefited more than simply 
ZANU-PF supporters). The debate on this issue cannot be fully resolved in this study. 
Rather, the study will pursue the extent to which the political and military elites have 
benefited and with what consequences for development. 
 
Study aims, research questions and methodological issues 
 
This study investigates characteristics of the predatory state and how it 
functions. In this case, the study examines relationships between the party-state, 
military and business across the key sectors of the economy from 1980 to 2014. 
Specifically the study investigates the following questions: 
 
i) What are the underlying class forces and power dynamics of a predatory state 
and how does it function? 
ii) What are the modes of accumulation that characterise the ‘party, military and 
business complex’ in a predatory setting? 
iii) What are the implications for development outcomes? 
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In order to answer the research questions, the study uses a combination of 
primary and secondary material, observations and in-depth interviews. An intensive 
document analysis included data from the Ministries of Economic Planning and 
Investment Promotion and Finance on economic performance issues; Manpower 
Development reports on the civil service; economic policy documents (macro-
economic and monetary) on economic planning; regulatory instruments, inter-alia, 
from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, socio-
economic data from the Zimbabwe’s Central Statistics Office; company shareholding 
documents from the Registrar of Companies; local and international press and other 
relevant contemporary and archival material from the National Archives. The local 
press was particularly useful in providing pointers on key deals such as preferential 
granting of incentives. 
 
I followed up document reviews with participant observation and thirty-six in-
depth interviews to gain a deeper understanding of the issues, the actors involved and 
their interests as this kind of information often failed to make its way to the press. In-
depth interviews included managers from relevant companies or state organisations, 
accessed through personal and professional networks, including Mbada Diamonds, 
Zimplats, government department employees and former employees, ministers, war 
veterans, military officials, business association leaders from the Commercial Farmers 
Union and the Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines, former private bank managers and 
experts to gain insights on the nature of business and state relationships. Workshops 
and conferences covering themes related to the topic of inquiry also provided insights 
from presentations and discussions. Such meetings and workshops included civil 
society think-tank meetings and joint civil society and government conferences. I 
made use of extensive social and professional networks acquired during my tenure in 
civil society to gain access to key state respondents and civil society platforms.  
 
In analysing data, I used qualitative content analysis with data being coded 
after collection in line with themes developed during document research. The codes 
were developed in line with the research questions. Given the volume of data 
collected, I had to be ‘ruthlessly selective in focusing on what is relevant’ (Wisker, 
2001: 245). Basic statistical tools were also applied to construct graphs depicting 
sector performance and comparative analysis between the different periods. Finally, 
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prior knowledge, underlying personal bias and preconceived ideas can render 
disadvantages to this intimate type of insider research. I took extensive precautions in 
adherence with research ethics to ensure balance between personal networks used in 
the study to gain access to various data sources and my role as an insider.18 
 
Overview of the Study and Summary of Main Arguments 
 
Chapter two reviews the development literature to examine the role of the 
state in development. It builds on the developmental state literature, earlier studies of 
the notion of predatory state as well as relevant post-colonial state literatures and 
evidence presented in this study to develop the characteristics of a predatory state. 
Notwithstanding criticism, the ‘criminalisation of the state’ (Bayart, Elis and Hibbou, 
1999) and ‘Africa works’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) studies make a vital contribution 
to our understanding of the post-colonial state and its nexus with development 
outcomes in Africa. The predatory state shares in part, a lack of ‘Weberian 
bureaucracy’ and informalisation with these contributions amongst other 
characteristics notably: party and military dominance in the state; state-business 
relations characterised by domination and capture; and state-society relations shaped 
by violence and patronage. I argue that these characteristics mutually reinforce each 
other to undermine development. 
 
Chapter three discusses the methodology applied in the study focussing on 
qualitative methodology, sampling and research instruments and research ethics. The 
study combined use of primary and secondary material, in-depth interviews, and 
observations. It was often difficult to gain trust with respondents at the first interview 
conversations and often I had to go back to the respondents more than twice as part of 
the confidence building measures until the respondents were more comfortable to 
share their views freely. Understandably, due to the sensitivity involved, some 
respondents requested confidentiality and anonymity. In the case of informal and 
                                                        
18 I sit on the board of the Zimbabwe Youth Council (ZYC), which falls under the 
Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, and I am active in 
civil society in various capacities as an advisor, volunteer, and consultant. I am also 
involved with a number of entrepreneurial initiatives. 
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Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASSM), I used participant observations to gain 
access into the operations of highly guarded political networks. Participatory and non-
participatory observations and site visits were also useful to complement desk 
research on the graphical consequences of the land reform in the newly resettled 
farms. 
 
Chapter four maps the history of Zimbabwe’s predatory state. It looks at the 
colonial and post-colonial state and relationship with business, underlying power 
dynamics and development outcomes. It is argued that the settler colonial state 
displayed many, albeit racialised developmental features characterised by nascent 
bureaucratisation and collaborative state-business relationships. Contrary to its 
predecessor, both bureaucratic quality and state-business relations appear to 
deteriorate significantly further away from independence. Failure by the ruling elite to 
redress economic inequalities and declining economic performance instigated by civil 
war, corruption scandals and failure of the economic structural adjustment 
programmes followed increasing popular dissatisfaction and in response the state 
increasingly assumed authoritarian militarisation and predatory tendencies.   
 
Chapter five analyses anti-developmental accumulation patterns in the land 
and agriculture sector. It examines the role played by the military in mediating 
accumulation outcomes in post-independence Zimbabwe. Because the early post-
independence ZANU-PF government worked collaboratively with white agrarian 
capital, the state was reluctant to expedite equitable land redistribution until the late 
1990s when the ruling elites came under political pressure. In order to appease restive 
constituencies and regain political support base, the state hastily implemented a 
chaotic and violent land reform programme that destroyed a secure land tenure system 
and agricultural finance. Notably, the military has been an instrumental force in 
driving the land reform process and thus far its members (at high levels) have been 
prominent beneficiaries. 
 
Chapter six explores mining development during the colonial era and post-
independence state and mining accumulation. The chapter shows how the 
Zimbabwean minerals sector transitioned from a relatively developed although 
racially controlled industry at independence to one which now displays strong 
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informalised and militarised elite accumulation characteristics. With deepening crisis 
and facing a strong opposition, the state was ambivalent towards development of 
informal and small-scale mining. It allowed its growth initially as a survivalist 
strategy and later opened up avenues for rent seeking and patronage at the highest 
levels. Similarly to the land ‘reforms,’ the degeneration into criminalised, 
informalised and often-violent modes of wealth accretion spread to the mining 
sectors. Indigenisation and empowerment policies in the 2000s opened new 
opportunities for accumulation for the politically connected elite accumulation. In the 
diamond sector, the military is engaged in opaque deals with international capital, 
mostly Chinese interests through fronting companies.  
 
Chapter seven analyses accumulation patterns in the banking and finance 
sectors. The economic sectors are far more sophisticated business operations, which 
require great diligence to manage. Evidently, the post-independence state 
shareholding strategy in the banking sector soon fell prey to predatory accumulation 
tendencies. The liberalisation of the banking sector in 1990s and indigenisation in the 
2000s opened important accumulation avenues with devastating consequences for the 
economy. Although state policies inevitably instigated the banking sector crisis in the 
2000s, a number of indigenous banks shared practices of poor governance 
characterised by non-performing insider loans, implicating bank owners and powerful 
political and military elites. The harm to the country’s banking and finance and other 
economic sectors would be very deep and long lasting. Public confidence in the 
banking sector was eroded while international lines of credit dried up as investor 
confidence sunk to its lowest.  
 
Chapter eight looks at colonial state capitalism projects that saw 
nationalisation and heavy investments in the transport and energy sectors. The 
colonial state sought to promote the interests of a white class coalition, which 
included agricultural, manufacturing and mining business classes. By 1980, the new 
government inherited a developed transport and energy infrastructure that supported 
the best performing economy south of the Sahara, outside South Africa. However, the 
ruling elite gradually extended its predatory tentacles into transport and energy sectors 
with drastic consequences for the economy. Retired and serving military officials 
were rewarded with appointments to head key strategic parastatals. By the 2000s, 
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infrastructure in these strategic sectors had gravely deteriorated. The railway service 
collapsed, the national airliner failed to regularly service its major routes, while in the 
energy sectors the country failed to meet the electricity and fuel demands to support 
economic activities. 
 
Chapter nine examines the characteristics of the predatory state in the light of 
the Zimbabwean example. It does so by synthesising the nature of the state, military 
and business relations and accumulation patterns across key economic sectors, 
drawing conclusions as well as posing questions for further research. The predatory 
state is characterised by (1) party and military dominance in the state; (2) state-
business relations shaped by domination and capture; and (3) state-society relations 
shaped by violence and patronage. It is argued that the notion of the predatory state is 
central in understanding Zimbabwe’s development outcomes, logics of accumulation, 
underlying power dynamics and implications for the future. 
  
19 
 
Chapter Two:  
The Predatory State in the Context of Development Theory 
 
Introduction 
 
The vital role that the state plays in development has generated a vast 
literature to add to our understanding of the nature, scope and function of the state in 
Africa. Development theories have changed considerably from the early 1950s, when 
the role of the state was conceived of as ensuring correct policies to stimulate growth, 
to the rise of neo-liberal development thinking in the 1980s and 1990s. Subsequently, 
studies on emergent ‘developmental states’ have revitalised the role of the state in 
driving economic transformation and development (Wade, 1998; Woo-Cummings; 
1999; Evans, 1989; 1995; Kohli, 2004). More recently, the global financial crises in 
parts of Europe and the US have challenged the dominance of neo-liberal orthodoxy.  
It is argued that the role and capacity of the state in defining development priorities 
and close collaboration with private elites is essential in pursuing development goals. 
The chapter begins by reviewing theories of the role of the state in development. After 
examining the changing role of the state and shifting development thinking, I review 
the developmental state paradigm to understand state, business and society relations 
in shaping development outcomes. The review of the role of the state and the 
developmental state paradigm serve as a prelude to the conceptualisation of the 
predatory state.  
 
The chapter revisits literature on the nature of the state and the failure of 
development in Africa. The failure of development has been attributed, inter-alia, to 
neopatrimonialism (van De Walle and Bratton, 1997, Medard, 1991; Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999), criminalisation (Barat, Elis and Hibou, 1999) and predation (Evans, 
1989, 1995) often without distinction between these concepts. The concept of the 
predatory state has not been sufficiently interrogated. This thesis differs with other 
advocates of the term who have appropriated it to mean the opposite of a 
developmental state (Evans, 1989; 1995), special variant of criminalisation (Bayart, 
Elis and Hibou, 1999) or a form of neopatrimonialism (Medard, 1991: 391). 
Consensus from these contributions view the predatory state as characterised by weak 
bureaucratic capacity and poor institutionalisation, which allows the ruling elite 
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unconstrained access to and abuse of state resources. Yet ironically the natural logic 
of the term predatory inherently denotes strength, that is, it implies the capacity of 
predators to prey on their targets, this requiring the strength to subordinate their 
victims.19 The thesis departs from contributions that over emphasise the behaviour of 
the ruling elite and instead focuses on state organisation and relations with business 
and society to explain variations in development outcomes. Looking at state structures 
is more likely to be fruitful theoretically and practically in explaining different 
development trajectories across states (Evans, 1989, 1995; Kohli, 2004).   
 
The Role of the State in Development  
 
The term ‘development’ is contested in academic discourse. However, 
notwithstanding differing notions, each historical context is characterised by a 
dominant development discourse with differing state market configurations. Put 
differently, development thinking has varied over time in terms of the means of 
achieving development according to different conceptions of the nature and extent of 
state involvement in the market. I explore below the trajectory of development 
thinking in order to situate the role of the state within the broader historical context 
and current debates. The discussion starts with the post-World War II period. This is 
linked to the reconstruction of Europe and ‘decolonisation as new independent states 
joined the world community and the rush towards development’ (McMichael, 1996: 
9). In this context, development emerged as a deliberate ‘project’ of national 
economic transformation to improve standards of living measured through economic 
statistics such as per capita income and average consumption levels.  
In the post-World War II period, the United States of America (USA), eager to 
imprint a new liberal world order, convened the 1944 Bretton Woods conference in 
New Hampshire, US. Three institutions were founded out of the conference. Firstly, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was to be concerned with promoting 
the stability of the international monetary system. All countries’ currencies were fixed 
at a certain value to the US dollar redeemable at $35 per ounce of gold (Woods, 2001: 
3). Secondly, the World Bank (WB) was established, initially to facilitate the 
                                                        
19  For states, such strength arguably rests on bureaucratic capacity and 
institutionalisation through which the state is able to exercise control and ruthlessly 
prey and exploit society and business.  
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reconstruction of Europe and stimulate long-term economic growth through provision 
of aid and credit. In the minds of western economists, development required a kind of 
jump-start that could be provided through aid and credit. And finally, the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was to be concerned with promoting 
international trade through tariff reductions. The prevailing thrust of development 
thinking, combining liberal world trade with buffering welfare states has been later 
referred to as embedded liberalism (Knutsson, 2009: 10).  
In the 1960s, the decolonisation process brought about the recognition of the 
state as a unit of political organisation through which state building and development 
efforts would be achieved. The main perception of development during this period 
was captured in the concept of backwardness (Hettne, 1995: 35). Hence development 
was seen as synonymous with economic growth (Thorbecke, 2006). Development 
economists during this period widely held that a large injection of capital generated 
through savings or international aid was necessary to achieve economic growth. The 
backbone of these theories drew from Keynesian economics and the Harrod-Domar 
model, which held that Gross National Product (GNP) depends directly on the 
investment rate and inversely on the capital output ratio. However, an interventionist 
state as emulated by the national elite in industrialised countries, mainly the US, was 
seen as a central agent and guarantor of the development process (Knuttson, 2009: 
11). 
Meanwhile, modernisation theorists (e.g. Rostow, 1960) depicted development 
as a linear process through which all states in the world would pass. Modernisation 
was viewed as a process of modern transformations of social, economic and political 
systems. In this case, modern industrialised countries were viewed as a blueprint for 
development. Each state in this respect has a common path to follow and late-comers 
would eventually emulate and catch up with the developed west. Fangjun (2009: 8) 
summarised the interpretation of a modern society as follows. First, in the economy, 
improvements in science and technology stand out as notable features whose 
achievements are quickly and substantially transformed into direct productive forces 
leading to rapid industrialisation and automation. Second, in terms of state structure 
and organisation, modernisation exhibits high levels of institutionalisation and a 
rational decision making process. It is argued that as societies modernise, their 
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political systems become more open, leading to an increase in democratic 
consciousness amongst citizens. Thirdly, as the criteria that regulate interpersonal 
relationships are standardised and upheld, a bureaucratic system is developed. 
Modernisation scholars held that these three interrelated transformations would 
eventually lead to development similar to the advanced industrialised countries. 
The end of the 1960s saw the emergence of critiques that challenged the 
economic growth imperative and modernisation theories for their overemphasis on the 
role of values while ignoring institutional changes in development (Williams, 2014: 
4). The ‘dependency and world systems paradigms,’ which are generally viewed as a 
reaction to the modernisation school, gained traction, inter-alia, against the backdrop 
of increasing awareness of vulnerability to and dependence upon international events 
following the economic crisis precipitated by Europe having to confront sharp 
increases in oil prices. Evans, (1979: 27) defined dependency ‘as a situation in which 
the rate and direction of [capital] accumulation are externally conditioned…’ For 
Cardoso and Faletto, (1979: XX), ‘a system is dependent when accumulation and 
expansion of capital cannot find its essential component dynamic inside the system.’  
In other words, the economic development of the periphery was viewed as both 
dependent and constrained by the advanced countries at the core. The theory holds 
that imperialism influences the specific structural features (such as the character of 
capital formation and sectoral form of industrialisation) and institutions that impact on 
development at the periphery.  
Dependency theory has been criticised for its lack of appreciation of the 
agency of domestic political forces in the countries at the periphery in changing the 
course of their development (Smith, 1979: 758). In order to industrialise and develop, 
post structural determinism dependency scholars held the view that the developing 
world would need a strong interventionist state working in collaboration with capital 
(both domestic and international) and pursue more inward oriented development 
strategies.  
During the 1970s mainstream modernisation thinking and the dependency 
school suffered criticism for their emphasis on capital accumulation without regard to 
environmental problems and inclusion of diverse interests in the development 
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process. 20  Political ecology 21  questioned approaches to development without 
consideration for environmental sustainability (Peet and Watts, 2004). Other scholars 
argued that modern industrial development was unsustainable due to long-term 
environmental consequences (Hettne, 1995: 160). Development was increasingly 
redefined to include ecological sustainability, needs satisfaction, cultural diversity as 
opposed to homogenisation. The critique called for development to be contextualised 
and understood in relation to the needs of the local community. According to Hettne 
(1995), a set of perspectives could be identified within this emerging critique as 
follows: basic needs, self-reliance, ecodevelopment, women’s development and 
ethnodevelopment. The basic needs approach emphasised the importance of direct 
poverty alleviation and addressing inequality. Although these perspectives differed 
with modernisation and dependency theorists in terms of defining development, the 
state remained the main agent in guaranteeing development during the 1970s.22 
 
Towards the mid 1970s most of non-oil producing developing countries faced 
declining export revenues, deteriorating terms of trade and increased expenditure due 
to sharp increases in oil price hikes. The response in the developing world was to 
increase borrowing to finance deficits leading to skyrocketing domestic and foreign 
debts, debt defaults, economic stagnation and growing unemployment. In turn, these 
provided entry points for the IMF and WB sponsored Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs). The IMF and WB imposed conditionality in exchange for 
balance of payment support ostensibly to assist developing countries out of the debt 
crisis and provision for development assistance. The conditionality implied limiting 
                                                        
20 The departure of this critique was its emphasis on environmental problems and its 
breakthrough in connection to the report What now: Another Development, prepared, 
as an independent contribution to the Seventh Special Session of the UNs General 
Assembly, and it was further elaborated in the volume Another Development: 
Approaches and Strategies (Nerfin, 1977). Another Development would be 
interpreted to mean: ecologically sound; need-oriented; endogenous; self- reliant; and 
based on structural transformation (Knutsson, 2009: 19).  
21 Political ecology engages questions of access and control over resources (political 
economy), and their indispensable link for understanding both the forms and 
geography of environmental disturbance and degradation, as well as prospects for 
green and sustainable alternatives (Peet and Watts, 2004: 6).  
22 Knutsson (2009: 21) argues that although the state remained central, its position 
gradually weakened to the market. 
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the role of state and expanding the market through inter-alia, reduction in public 
expenditures, deregulation of financial markets and privatisation. 
 
The 1980s saw major policy shifts towards the right that would instigate the 
triumph of neoliberalism and monetarism as the new international economic paradigm 
following the election of conservative governments in the western world: those of 
Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain (1979), Ronald Reagan in the United States of 
America (1981), and Helmut Kohl in West Germany (1982). The state was now 
viewed as the problem rather than the solution. This neoliberal counterrevolution 
reversed the role of the state from being an interventionist agent of development to a 
laissez-faire facilitator of market actors. Another key feature of the neoliberal menu 
was the far-reaching trade liberalisation with the long-term objective of creating a 
single global market. The approach viewed deeper integration and macro-economic 
balance as the best way to bring modernisation and economic growth. 
 
However, the neoliberal shift in development thinking received widespread 
criticism due to the aggravated poverty and social deprivation related to severe budget 
cuts in education, healthcare and social welfare (Ewald, 1997, Bond and Manyanya, 
2002). At the same time, the sustainable development discourse offered an alternative 
focus on addressing social, economic and ecological problems. The objective of 
sustainable development was defined as, ‘to meet the need of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs’ (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: 8). This discourse shared in 
part the importance of the global perspective and economic and social concerns with 
the mainstream critique of the neo-liberal development thinking.  However, the 
sustainable development approach has often been criticised for its ‘lack of defining 
the needs of the present as well as those of the future’ that are contained in its widely 
popularised definition (Rist, 1997: 183). 
 
Meanwhile, economists, social scientists and development policy makers took 
on tremendous interest in the ‘developmental state’ of East Asian economies (initially 
associated with the Japanese development model and the successes of Newly 
Industrialising Countries (NICs) – South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) 
(Williams, 2014: 1). Defying the postulations of modernisation, dependency, world 
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systems development theories and market fundamentalism, this model was 
distinguished by the role and capacity of the state to intervene and direct companies 
acting in the market to drive social and economic transformation processes. However, 
with the once-emulated Japanese example thrown into disarray by economic crisis 
triggered by the real estate bubble and later the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis, the 
‘developmental state’ was eclipsed by neoliberal triumphalism. The latter 
consolidated its dominant position in development thinking in the 1990s with the 
disintegration of the United Soviet Social Republic (USSR), the opening up of China 
and the appearance of a huge amount of surplus labour on to the global labour market. 
Scholars such as Francis Fukuyama proclaimed ‘the end of history,’ i.e. that humanity 
had reached the end point of ideological evolution whereby Western liberal 
democracy and market economy had prevailed and would soon be successfully 
embraced by the entire planet bringing about peace and prosperity (Fukuyama, 1992).  
 
However, the devastating consequences of the structural adjustment 
programmes spawned vociferous critique from global social and economic justice 
movements. In academia, too, alternative development theories emerged such as 
North’s new growth theory and Sen’s human capabilities approach, which emphasised 
the centrality of human development in achieving development. Other approaches 
such as the basic needs approach, were also reinvigorated. Contrary to Fukuyama, 
although the 1990s saw remarkable progress in economic globalisation and 
democratisation, the crises in Mexico (1994), East Asia (1997), Argentina (2001) and 
more recently the recession in Europe and America cast doubt on neoliberal 
dominance. As the West scrambled for government solutions to salvage their 
economies from depression, Peter Steinbruck, a disgruntled German Finance Minister 
remarked:  
 
The same people who would never touch deficit spending are now tossing 
around billions. The switch from decades of supply side politics all the way to 
a crass Keynesianism is breath-taking (Farrel and Quiggin, 2011).  
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As the debate for solutions23 in both the global North and South moves beyond 
the confines of neoliberalism, Williams (2014: 1) contends that the once eclipsed 
concept of the ‘developmental state’ has in-fact retooled and ‘is still a viable and 
necessary institutional strategy to achieve development in the twenty-first century.’ The 
role of the state is once again brought back at the centre stage albeit within a more 
complex set of new conditions in line with changing development theory – 
democratisation pressures, shifting commanding heights of the economy from 
manufacturing to knowledge sectors, ecological considerations, new development 
thinking beyond economic growth to include social and human development and 
greater calls for renewable energy (Williams, 2014: 8).  
 
To conclude this section, development thinking has been shaped by historical, 
political and economic contexts with enduring contestations over means i.e. the role of 
the state versus the market and outcomes. Modernisation development thinking, which 
rose to prominence with the rising influence of the US in post-WWII, was challenged 
by the radical dependency school on its economic growth emphasis. Both approaches 
have been equally challenged for ignoring the ecological and cultural dimensions in the 
development process. In addition, the experiences of East Asian developmental states 
and late industrialising countries (including some countries in the Global South) have 
also defied the limitations of the structural determinism of the dependency school. By 
1990, the debt crisis crippling the developing world opened gateways for 
neoliberalism’s ascendency and consolidation with the collapse of USSR. However, by 
the turn of the first decade of the 21st century, the devastating consequences of the 
neoliberal prescriptions and the continued search of development have reinvigorated 
debate in favour of greater role of the state in the economy and investment in human 
capabilities rather than capital as a source of sustained growth.  
 
The next two sections interrogate the developmental and predatory state 
concepts to understand how state organisation, state-business and state-society relations 
may explain different development trajectories. However, as Kohli (2004: 12) reminds 
                                                        
23 Williams 2014:1 brings to the fore discussion on state capitalism engineered by 
authoritarian states such as China, Russia and some Arab monarchies and the 
resurgence of political capitalism from Max Weber to underscore some perspectives 
on this debate. 
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us real historical records of actual countries seldom reveal ideal types in their ideal 
typical form; states instead tend more toward one set of characteristics than another at 
a given time.  
 
The Developmental State 
 
The developmental state is associated with comparative studies in the 
development of East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; Latin 
American countries such as Brazil and South Asia, India (Johnson, 1982; Evans 1989, 
1995; Wade, 1990, Kohli, 2004); and some African countries notably, South Africa, 
Mauritius and Botswana (Williams, 2014; Sandbrook 2005; Mkandawire, 2001). 
These states, successfully pursued their commitment to industrialisation with 
consistent and meticulously executed state interventionism. The rationale for state 
interventionism to support the development and protection of domestic industry and 
exports stemmed from realisation that, left alone, local industry in developing and 
emerging economies would not easily compete with established multinational 
enterprises. The state therefore intervened to provide resources such as cheap capital, 
policy incentives and restrictions against foreign competitors to protect domestic 
industries from international competition. Evans (1995: 44) notes that such states are 
able to ‘foster long-term entrepreneurial perspectives among private elites by 
increasing incentives to engage in transformative investments and lowering the risk 
involved in such investments.’ Specific policy measures aimed at easing supply and 
demand constraints faced by private entrepreneurs. On the supply side, the state 
helped to facilitate availability of capital, labour and technology and even 
entrepreneurship, while demand side interventions include expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies, and tariffs and exchange rate policies aimed at boosting domestic 
demand (Kohli, 2004: 15).  
 
In terms of state organisation and relationship with society and business, such 
states share a considerable degree of ‘embedded autonomy’ defined to mean 
bureaucratic autonomy working in strong collaboration with broad society and 
business albeit insulated from the dynamics of social pressures. Embedded autonomy 
is ensured by the presence of interrelated characteristics including: internal 
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cohesiveness – effective bureaucracy and well-coordinated state apparatuses; and 
democratic, representational and accountable forms of governance. In the next 
sections I discuss synergies amongst key actors of the developmental state such as (1) 
bureaucratic state; (2) business; (3) society and (4) the ruling political party. 
 
Bureaucratic state and ruling party 
 
 Although some can be made directly at political level, bureaucratic 
appointments tend towards ‘Weberian’ rationality that is, meritocratic-based 
recruitment and promotion, impersonal and rational decision-making processes. The 
bureaucratic state is therefore autonomous and shares a degree of embeddedness with 
the party. However there are fairly large zones of autonomy between the bureaucratic 
state and the party that enable the bureaucratic state to pursue separate and even 
sometimes conflictual goals with the party. The bureaucratic state is therefore 
meritocratic, rule-based and relatively unconstrained to enable it pursue coherent 
developmental goals.  
 
However, Chibber (2002: 951) cautions that while bureaucratic quality and 
rule following are important to build developmental state capacity, they are not 
sufficient and may work against internal coherence altogether. By its nature the state 
is an amalgamation of agencies charged with distinct functions, having domains that 
frequently overlap and often compete for resources and therefore inter-agency 
relations can easily degenerate into contestation and conflict. Internal cohesiveness 
therefore ensures that state agencies rise above competition for scarce resources either 
driven by self-interest or disagreements over development priorities and ensure that 
state agencies collaborate effectively towards commonly defined state priorities. It is 
argued that in order to drive the development project, the planning agents— 
especially—must be endowed with the appropriate powers to discipline not only the 
private elites but equally important other state agencies to ensure they pursue 
common development goals.  
 
Analysing state intervention in India and South Korea during the second half 
of the twentieth century, Chibber demonstrates how the differences in internal 
cohesiveness accounted for greater industrial transformation successes in South Korea 
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than in India. In South Korea, under President Park Chung Hee the Economic 
Planning Commission (EPC) was created with institutional power to discipline other 
state agents while in India, the Planning Commission lacked real power over other 
state agencies and hence could not foster internal cohesiveness amongst the state 
apparatus towards state defined priorities (Chibber, 2002: 960; Evans 1995: 70). 
Therefore, properly trained individuals within a rule-based bureaucracy are important 
as much as effective coordination amongst state agencies for a country’s 
developmental process. In order to drive the developmental process states need an 
‘ideal type’ bureaucracy that will resist political and social pressures while 
mechanisms that manage inter-agency coordination will ensure conflict resolution and 
consistency in the implementation of development policies and programmes.  
 
 State and business: Embedded autonomy   
 
The state collaborates with the business sector, undertaking joint planning and 
resource mobilisation to finance development priorities. However, although the state 
is embedded with business, there are considerable zones of autonomy between the 
state and business. Evans (1995) has defined this relationship as ‘embedded 
autonomy.’ Embedded autonomy ensures a collaborative relationship between the 
state and private capital, beyond particularistic interests to national developmental 
interests, which allows the state to know and meet needs of capital while at the same 
time ensuring that capital invests in ways that the state deems important for the 
country. Evans (2014: 233) further notes that in the twentieth century model of the 
developmental state, embeddedness was important as a source of information, and 
because the implementation of shared projects depended on the private sectors. The 
involvement of the private sector elites enabled the bureaucrats to gain access to key 
information involved in assessing the feasibility of projects and identifying 
opportunities to leverage collaboration between the state and private elites to 
overcome collective action challenges. 
 
Embedded autonomy is also necessary for a developmental state to discipline 
private elites towards state defined developmental goals. As the state extends public 
resources to private elites in the form of subsidies and cheap credit, they must, in 
order to prevent illicit rent seeking, have the ability to demand that those incentives be 
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directed in productive ways and in sectors that conform to priorities (Amsden, 1989, 
1992; Kohli, 2004; Chibber, 2014). Indeed, post-war state interventionism in 
developing countries has been found wanting in relation to clientelism, corruption, 
and in the worst case oiling predatory elite practices (Wade, 1990; Woo, 1991). 
Chibber (2002, 2014: 33) emphasises the disciplining capacity of the state to ensure 
contracts do not turn into ‘gifts’ or ‘bribes.’ In this case, subsidies and other policy 
incentives to the private elites are treated as contracts and default is punishable for 
example through withdrawal of incentives. Weberian ideal type bureaucracy is 
considered a vital characteristic in the implementation of such developmental state 
policies without which such incentives can easily be captured and channeled towards 
private elite selfish interests.  
 
State and society: Democracy, participation and accountability  
 
Similarly, the state is deeply embedded with society, albeit there are large 
zones of autonomy. The state is therefore ‘autonomously embedded’ with society to 
enable it to gather information and yet unconstrained to make autonomous decisions. 
Evans (2014) contends that in the twenty-first century that the notion of ‘embedded 
autonomy’ should expand beyond private elites in line with the development thinking 
to include the broader society. He argues that in the twenty-first century the shift 
towards expanding capabilities both as means and development outcomes required 
information networks with the broader society in order to ensure that the development 
results correspond to the collective preferences of communities being served. Greater 
involvement of communities in the identification of investment priorities and 
implementation will result in the more efficient and effective allocation of resources. 
Ostrom (1996) also emphasises that capability-enhancing services (such as education, 
health) are always coproduced by their recipients. Thus developmental states must 
extend relations beyond capital and embed the state in society by strengthening the 
decision making role of ordinary citizens in local economic and political development 
of their communities (Williams, 2014: 14).  
 
In his book, Development as Freedom, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen also 
suggests that democracy is both a primary end and the principal means for achieving 
development (1999). Sen conceives development as enlargement of people’s choices 
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through mutually reinforcing capabilities, entitlements and freedoms including; 
political freedoms such as freedom of speech, economic facilities (e.g. freedom to 
conduct business, ownership and economic redistribution), social opportunities such 
as health and education, transparency guarantees and protective security such as 
social safety nets. Such a developmental framework calls for democracy as a goal and 
normative ideal to provide enabling institutions that structure state-society relations. 
Michelle Williams (2014: 14) argues that to achieve a democratic state, both 
representational and participatory forms of democracy must be strengthened through 
powerful and active civil society organisations, state level commitment, elective 
representative accountability and meaningful involvement of ordinary people. The 
state therefore needs to engage directly with citizens in order to ensure that 
investments produce desired effects. 
 
In sum, a developmental state shares general features of Weberian 
bureaucratic rationality, embedded autonomy with business and society and 
democracy. It is argued that the more the state proximates these characteristics, the 
greater its chances to drive the development process in the twenty-first century. In the 
following section I analyse and compare features of the predatory state. I proceed by 
reviewing contributions on the notion of the predatory state in Africa and finally 
propose its structural features and how it functions.  
  
The Predatory State  
 
The predatory state as an analytic paradigm arose from the continued search to 
make sense of what explains the failure of economic transformation in the developing 
world. According to Evans (1995: 44), states can be treated as varying along a 
continuum, from predatory to developmental. The predatory state in this case is the 
complete opposite of the developmental state in terms of variations in the structure 
and behaviour of state apparatuses to trajectories of national development. However, 
Evans does not provide the structural characteristics of the predatory state and how it 
functions. Chabal and Daloz (1999) and Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999), also 
examining the phenomenon of the post-colonial state failure on a continental scale, 
offer important contributions. Both contributions conclude that the essence of African 
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countries’ failure is that they have no concept of citizenship. They highlight how the 
colonial political institutions have either been consolidated or deliberately subverted 
by personal rule, clientelism and patrimonial systems. However, they also differ 
significantly. Whereas Chabal and Daloz argue that Africa is modernising in its own 
way i.e. making a new political system out of disorder (1999: 144), Bayart, Ellis and 
Hibou describe the process as outright theft and criminal. 
 
In their Book, Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument, Chabal and 
Daloz argue that ‘all African states share a generalised system of patrimonialism and 
acute degree of apparent disorder, as evidenced by high level of governmental and 
administrative inefficiency, lack of institutionalisation, a general disregard for the 
rules of the formal political and economic sectors, and a universal resort to 
personalised and vertical solutions to societal problems’ (1999: 2). The state lacks the 
fundamental attribute of a ‘Weberian bureaucracy’, (it has not been in the interest of 
the ruling elites to develop an independent bureaucracy). Chabal and Daloz argue that 
because the state is poorly institutionalised, the ruling elites are able to 
instrumentalise disorder and chaos for their personal gain. Such a state of disorder is 
propitious for corruption and reinforces continued informalisation, which in turn 
undermines prospects for economic transformation. However, the authors have been 
criticised for overemphasising a culturalistic and pessimistic way of analysing the 
condition of Africa as much as having exaggerated the crisis of modernity (van den 
Boom, 1999:1; Dorman, 2001: 181). Further, ‘neo-patrimonialism is regarded as 
providing a moral cultural gloss: which somehow renders corruption understandable, 
its victims complicit’ (Mkandawire 2012: 2) rendering Africa a case of irredeemable 
hope. Equally, the argument that corruption is necessarily a product of poor 
institutionalisation is not very convincing considering that the phenomenon is not 
unique to developing countries. Instead, it is a feature that manifests in both 
developing and developed countries.  
 
Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999), by contrast, see deliberate criminalisation as 
synonymous with ruling elite predatory behaviour in Africa. Criminalisation of the 
state and politics is defined as ‘the routinisation, at the very heart of political and 
governmental institutions and circuits, of practices whose criminal nature is patent, 
whether as defined by the law of the country in question, or as defined by the norms 
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of international law and international organisations or as so viewed by the 
international community, and most particularly that constituted by aid donors’ 
(Bayart, Ellis and Hibou; 1999: 16). The political elites effectively manipulate the 
state structures, including the use of violence to further their own private 
accumulation interests. The elites exploit the opportunities presented by an 
increasingly globalising world through collaboration or joint ventures at international 
levels to undertake self-serving business dealings. In so doing they undermine the 
capacity of the state to undertake meaningful economic reforms and spur economic 
transformation.  
 
Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999: 25) propose five indicators for the 
criminalisation of the state in Africa: (1) The use for private purposes of the 
legitimate organs of state violence by those in authority, and the function of such 
violence as instruments in the service of their strategies of accumulation of wealth; (2) 
The existence of a hidden, collective structure of power which surrounds and even 
controls the official occupant of the most senior political office, and which benefits 
from privatisation of the legitimate means of coercion, or is able with impunity to 
have recourse to a private and illegitimate apparatuses of violence, notably in the 
form of organised gangs; (3) The participation by this collective and semi-clandestine 
power structure in economic activities considered to be criminal in international law, 
or which are so classified by international organisations or in terms of moral codes 
which enjoy wide international currency; (4) The insertion of criminal activities in 
international networks of crime; and (5) The political and economic significance of 
such criminal practices in the overall architecture of a given society as distinct from 
the occasional or marginal role of such practices in other societies. However, at the 
time of writing their book, Bayart, Ellis and Hibou concluded that ‘only Equatorial 
Guinea, the Comoros and Seychelles could fit the classification of criminal states’ 
(1999: 25-26).  
 
Both the Criminalisation and Instrumentalisation of disorder theses 
overemphasise the behaviour of the political elite in shaping the governance and 
accumulation regimes. Bratton (2014:2), argues that although the African ‘big men’ 
set the tone for a regime of governance, they are almost never entirely alone.  Instead, 
to survive office, leaders rely on a coalition of supporters and together the coalition 
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seeks to maximise the group’s collective advantage, usually to the exclusion of 
political rivals and citizens. In predatory settings, the coalition relies more on 
coercion than persuasion and rewarding the group with supposedly collective goods to 
maintain the coalition support. This thesis departs from this earlier work by 
contributing knowledge on the underlying class forces and power dynamics that helps 
us to understand the emergence and instrumentalisation of legitimate coercive state 
organs to deploy violence for political power retention and private accumulation 
interest. The politics of social forces and the state must surely be central if we are to 
understand the logics and dynamics of a predatory state and their developmental 
outcomes.  
 
In order to discern structure and functioning of the predatory state, I look at 
the nature and interactions amongst key actors of the predatory state such as (1) party-
state; (2) military; (3) business; and (4) society. The notion of embeddedness exists 
albeit differently. The party-state shows deep embeddedness with business and 
society, albeit with marginal and diminishing zones of autonomy. The diminishing 
zones of autonomy exhibit in the tendency of the party-state to capture and or 
dominate society and business.  
 
The party-state and military dominance   
 
Unlike under the developmental state; the party, state and bureaucracy are 
conflated into the party-state. Several studies have observed the dominance of the 
party over the state in post-colonial Africa24 (Zolberg, 1966; Fanon, 1974, Turner, 
1971; Widner, 1993; Southall 2013). Zolberg (1966) defined the party-state as the 
conflation of the boundaries between the political party and the government. The 
blurred distinction between the state and the ruling elite diminishes accountability, 
thus enabling the ruling elite unfettered access to well paid jobs, state resources and 
control over national budgets which accords them parasitic avenues for personal 
wealth accumulation and to dispense patronage. The blurred distinction between the 
                                                        
24 However, while the dominance of the party maybe a pervasive phenomenon in 
Africa, it does not imply that all African states are predatory by virtue of this one 
feature. Instead, Africa reveals a great deal of variation in the significance of the 
dominance of the party over the state and relatedly the instrumentalisation of such 
dominance. 
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state and party is a common feature across both neo-patrimonial and predatory states. 
However, the difference is that predatory states may demonstrate a highly organised 
and institutionalised regime of control rather than the traditional neo-patrimonial rule 
characterised by very weak institutionalisation (as the case with the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Nigeria). In this case, Zimbabwe demonstrates semblance of a 
robust predatory state, with strong, although extractive institutions credited to its 
settler colonial inheritance.25  
 
In their quest to preserve power, the ruling elites turn to the military to prey on 
society.  In return the military elites are often rewarded by business opportunities to 
retain their loyalty and support. The military therefore assumes a non-conventional 
dominant role by defending the party state (or the dominant elites within it). Its 
boundaries, similar to the party state are elastic: the role of the military expands when 
the predatory state is under threat, to defend its idiosyncratic 26  and institutional 
interests.27 However, the military can also wield autonomous interests that may run 
against the interest of the party. In such a situation the military can effect a coup-
d’etat and take over political power.  
 
Fanon (1974) also viewed the party as an instrument of political organisation 
and class domination. He argued that ruling parties in post-colonial Africa have 
become nothing more than the instruments for political domination and economic 
accumulation. In order to control the levers of power, the ruling elite captures and 
controls key organs of the state such as the judiciary and the security services sector 
which enables the ruling class to deploy violence for private accumulation and to 
crush opposition forces with impunity. Southall (2013: 148-173) reveals the capture 
and control of the security services sector in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa28 
                                                        
25 The legacy of colonial rule included, not only a vast array of repressive legislation 
designed to silence liberation movements, but also exclusionary economic 
institutions. 
26  The military elite develops personal power and wealth interest, which often 
manifest in pervasive business interests. 
27 The military as an institution, like other government departments and agencies also 
aspires to gain more power and influence.  
28 It is apropos here to clarify, that Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa demonstrate 
substantial variations in terms of the party-state phenomenon and its instrumentality 
for private economic accumulation and patronage. Zimbabwe demonstrates 
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by the ruling elite through active deployment of party loyalists at senior positions. 
Supposedly constitutionally independent institutions are subordinated to the interests 
of the ruling class at the expense of neutral and efficient public service delivery 
system.  
 
Therefore, contrary to a developmental state in the sense that it does not 
possess a ‘Weberian type’ bureaucratic apparatus that is able to withstand 
particularistic interests, a predatory state is undifferentiated and captured by its elites. 
Public bureaucrats lack competence and professionalism and tend to have a weak 
sense of public purpose and capacity to discipline29 private elites towards the pursuit 
of economic goals, despite grandiose plans. Pronouncements of policy goals are 
usually screens for the pursuit of self- interests and those of powerful groups that are 
important for the regime’s electoral support. The ruling elite takes advantage of 
control over state resources to dispense patronage for political support. Parastatals and 
other government economic arms are converted to feeding troughs for the ruling elite 
and their clienteles.  
 
State and Business: Domination and capture    
 
The party-state is deeply embedded with business. However, the nature of 
embeddedness is characterised by contradictory features of domination and capture 
and a diminishing marginal zone of autonomy. As Leftwich (2009: 4) observed, 
predatory states are characterised by ‘negative synergy in the form of unproductive 
collusion between the state and business (leading to rent-seeking), predatory behavior 
by the state on the [autonomous] business sector and capture of the state by powerful 
interests in the private sector.’ The party-state exhibits expansionary tendencies to 
dominate business and or capture of the state by powerful business interests. Marginal 
zones of autonomy for business may exist, albeit often diminishing. The ruling elite 
fears and represses the emergence and growth of autonomous business, whose power 
                                                                                                                                                              
substantial political and economic significance of the party state phenomenon in the 
overall state society relations that is relatively distinct from the occasional or marginal 
role of such practices in South Africa and Namibia. 
29 Where the semblance of disciplining capacity is demonstrated, for example various 
anti-corruption crusades, they have been more often than not manifestations of 
factionalism and infighting within the ranks of the ruling elite. 
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poses potential threat to their aspirations. Meanwhile, the state pursues policies 
favouring state allocation of wealth and income, which the ruling elite supervise and 
manipulate to serve their own political and material ends. The ruling elite in alliance 
with crony businessmen are the prominent beneficiaries. The emerging regime of 
accumulation does not engage in productive investment and manufacturing. Instead, 
the ruling class preys upon resource based accumulation in land and minerals, an 
archetype rentier nature of the predatory state. 
 
Fatton (1992: 64) contends that various indigenisation processes across the 
African continent have essentially involved the state controlled transfer of foreign 
firms to those officials or businessman who are located in or connected to the over-
arching positions of state power. Callaghy (1984: 191), on Nigeria, points out that 
‘indigenisation symbolised the conversion of political power and position into 
economic wealth for the benefit of a few [elites] at the expense of many.’ The ruling 
elites are able to dominate policy making to favour their personal and often narrow 
immediate wealth and power interests at the expense of long-term development 
planning. In this way, the ruling elite undermine tenets essential in fostering 
productive relationships with private capital and supporting entrepreneurial 
development necessary for economic transformation and development. As Kohli 
(2004: 21) reminds us: 
 
If one thinks of the process of industrialisation as a chariot, one can imagine 
the states and entrepreneurs as two horses that may pull it. The chariot will 
move rapidly if both horses are strong and if both pull in the same direction. 
 
Kohli contends when both horses are feeble (as is the case with predatory 
archetype states), that is, when states are characterised by undifferentiated and weak 
public and private sectors, the horse, that is the power to propel economic change will 
be lacking and the economic chariot may not move very far at all. Thus by 
undermining the economy, ‘embedded domination and capture’ may over time 
weaken the predatory capacity of the state. That is, when the economy collapses, the 
predatory state is unable to meet basic obligations such as payment of the civil service 
salaries and to deliver public services. When the economy shrinks and patronage 
resources dry-out, it would seem inevitable that elite engaged in predatory 
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accumulation is likely to fall out, as the different players scramble for the little 
resources remaining. 
 
Typically, as the productive economic sectors collapse overtime, predatory 
state economies drift towards informalisation or high-levels of informal economic 
activities30 —lack markets, unregistered businesses, smuggling and tax evasion—in 
which the power holders are active participants with their courtiers and clients. Indeed 
all these activities are all impossible without the support and collusion of powerful 
state agents. On her findings on the then crisis in Zaire, MacGaffey (1987) concludes 
that the political-administrative class took advantage of position in the state apparatus 
to participate heavily in profiteering activities; its members were unable to exert a 
monopoly although they attempted to do so, primarily by using personal relations 
among themselves to restrict access of others to resources. They manipulated strategic 
positions within the state apparatus to enhance their opportunities indeed to become 
dominant entrepreneurs of the underground economy. Ninsin (1998: 273) similarly 
argues that the state has an interest in the persistence and growth of the informal 
economy precisely because it serves the accumulation needs of its social base – its 
key political and administrative cadres – for whom the formal sector does not provide 
adequate security.   
 
 State and Society: Violence and Patronage  
 
State-society relations are characterised by violence and patronage and a 
marginal zone for societal autonomy. Predatory states eschew the development of 
autonomous centers of power and by so doing they undermine the development of an 
autonomous civil society, which can provide a countervailing force to the ruling elite 
rapaciousness. The ruling elite relies on wide scale patronage to drum up electoral 
                                                        
30 The informal sector is includes both legal and illegal economic activities (Aguilar 
and Campuzano, 2009: 446).  While on the one hand, the informal sector is taken to 
mean legal self-employment or unregistered small scale legal economic activities 
(such as traditional agriculture, retail, street vendors, livestock and fisheries, home 
based workers and home production) it is being increasingly recognised as playing a 
key role in role in employment generation and poverty eradication (ILO, 2002; IIED, 
2011); predatory informal economies, on the other hand, share characteristics of 
‘criminalisation’ or illegal economic activities such as illicit trade in minerals and 
drugs facilitated in collaboration with state elites.  
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support and violence to intimidate the opposition forces. Stark inequalities in power 
and status thus create vertical chains of dependency, secured by patronage and 
coercion (Diamond: 2008: 41). Elections are only held to give the ruling elites a 
façade of legitimacy. The very minimal electoral avenue for citizens to decide on 
political mandate and supposedly influence policy preferences is undermined. The 
ruling elites employ electoral manipulation techniques to guarantee power retention or 
in cases where electoral manipulation fails to deliver access to state power, the ruling 
elites may reject the outcome altogether. In Nigeria 31  for example, President 
Babangida lost the June 1993 election to Chief M. K. O. Abiola. However, a few days 
later, Babangida declared the poll invalid citing purported electoral irregularities 
(Lewis, 1996: 95).  
 
However, the problem of this power retention strategy and accumulation 
model is that it undermines sound economic governance and sustainability of the 
predatory capacity of the state. And when, the fiscal capacity deteriorates, the state 
often turns to the printing press with drastic hyperinflationary consequences, which 
further hurt business and the poorest citizens, leading to growing opposition to the 
ruling elite. In turn, facing opposition, the ruling elite invests in the hyper 
development and consolidation of the repressive apparatus, which becomes the 
dominant political force and beneficiary of supposedly collective goods. As Bratton 
(2014:7) notes, ‘because autocrats rely on repression, they inadvertently strengthen 
the hand of the armed forces, who, in turn, are able to claim a share of both economic 
bounty and political decisions.’  
 
 Although, predatory states are built on strong foundation of political violence, 
and economic extraction, the ruling class may still try to use a comprehensive system 
of ideas and beliefs to justify their rule. ‘These ideologies may invoke either ancient 
traditions or a vision of revolution, but either purpose is to persuade people to support 
the political regime on a voluntary basis’ (Bratton, 2014:8). However, the regime of 
governance fails to deliver broad based economic and social goods, which requires a 
growing economy. In turn, the ideological appeals fail to generate and grow mass 
political support. The ruling class will often have little choice other than to resort to 
                                                        
31 The Nigerian state has been variously characterised as predatory, including under 
President General Babangida (1985-1993), (Lewis, 1996; Diamond, 2008).  
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violence. Popular protest movements and opposition parties that emerge to challenge 
growing inequality and poverty are met with violent reprisals. When the violence 
generates untenable diminishing returns to legitimacy, the ruling class may reluctantly 
embrace a ‘power-sharing’ coalition government32 with the opposition. Such coalition 
governments have often not succeeded as the ruling parties continue to pursue 
exclusionary politics.   
 
In sum, the power retention and accumulation logic of the predatory state are 
therefore inimical to democratic forms of governance. Democracy entails freedom of 
choice – political, social and economic – and above all respect for the rule of law, 
which limit the ruling elite’s voracity. Instead predatory states display more 
authoritarian tendencies and particularism linked to the ruling elite interests rather 
than national interest. By undermining democracy, predatory states fail to deliver 
citizens’ expectations for participation, freedom and justice, a better life and fair 
society, which are considered, as Sen (1999) suggests, both necessary means and 
development outcomes in the twenty-first century.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter looks at development literature analysing the role of the state in 
development by examining patterns of state construction, state, military and business 
accumulation relations and their developmental implications. Contrary to a 
developmental state, a predatory state is characterised by a dominant party and 
military over the state; state society relations shaped by violence and patronage; and 
parasitic state business relations, which undermine economic transformation and 
development. Indeed development would require the channelling of immense energy 
and resources by means of coordinated, institutionalised political and economic 
entities operating above, particularistic dynamics. As Weber noted long ago, the 
minimal conditions of predictability and judicial protection, which are the building 
blocks of a modern economy, are incompatible with a predatory state. The power 
                                                        
32 Power sharing coalition governments are increasingly recognised as solution to 
governing deeply divided societies and failed electoral democracies (Bratton, 2014; 
Leftwich and Wheeler, 2011). 
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elite33 in parts of Africa has failed to follow the ‘developmental state’ model as we 
have learnt from the East Asian experience. Their countries would undoubtedly stand 
to benefit from greater institutionalisation, but the elite are able to manipulate state 
structures to fulfil political power retention and wealth accumulation interests. In this 
vital function they have demonstrated not ineptitude but rather efficiency and 
remarkable success. The central question throughout the study is how one can best 
understand the underlying dynamics of a predatory state, its core characteristics and 
how it functions and implications for development. Since the state under 
consideration acquired some of its core characteristics under colonialism, the study 
will generally search deep into the colonial epoch.  
 
I argue that, for Zimbabwe, the post-independence state displayed anti-
developmental features the more it moved away from the moment of political 
independence. The developmental state core pillars – especially internal cohesion, 
embedded autonomy, and democracy – have been significantly eroded as the years 
passed, as will be shown in the next chapters. In this regard, Evans’ (1995: 45) 
depiction of predatory rule in the DRC is more apropos for Zimbabwe where ‘true to 
predatory rule, the control of the state apparatus is vested in a small group of 
personally connected individuals, in which the pre-occupation of the political class 
has turned society into its prey.’ Public officials engage in predatory economic 
activities and extract rents from public services. The state fails to provide even the 
most basic pre-requisites of a functioning modern economy: predictable enforcement 
of contracts and secure the much needed investment to stimulate economic 
transformation. 
  
                                                        
33 This phrase is used to refer to those who wield power within the ruling institutions 
of modern society, and who act, sometimes collusively, to preserve and enhance that 
power (Mills, 2000). 
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Chapter Three:  
Doing Research in Difficult Situations 
 
Introduction  
 
This thesis investigates characteristics of a predatory state and how it 
functions. In order to do this, the study employed a critical social science model and 
the extended case method. Critical social science combines, both positive social 
science34 nomothetic35 and interpretive social science36 ideographic37 approaches. The 
approach agrees with many of the criticisms that the interpretative approach directs at 
positive social science including failure to deal with meanings of real people and their 
capacity to feel and think, and to ignore the social context. However, it also disagrees 
with the interpretative approach for being subjective by looking at people’s ideas as 
more important than actual conditions. In addition, critical social research also sees 
the interpretative approach as too relativist by focussing on micro-level and short-
term settings while ignoring the broader and long-term context (Newman, 2006: 95). 
Finally, it aspires beyond simply discovering knowledge to uncover underlying 
sources of social relations in the material world in order to help people change 
conditions and build a better world for themselves (Fay, 1987: 27).  
 
Critical social research assumes that reality has several levels and that what is 
observed on the surface level does not easily reveal significant structures or causal 
mechanisms at deeper levels (Newman, 2006: 95). At the empirical level, we observe 
the reality with our senses. However, the empirical reality we see is generated by 
structures and causal mechanisms that operate at deeper levels we do not see at the 
                                                        
34 It is an approach to social research that seeks to understand and explain the sensory 
world in objective, factual, logical, and value-free observational terms.  
35 A type of explanation used in positivist social science in which the explanation 
relies heavily on causal laws and law-like statements and interrelations (Newman, 
2006: 84). 
36 It is an approach to social research that is composed of efforts to understand, to 
construct meaning, to tap into the subjective experiences that people have (Goodsell, 
2013: 3). 
37 A type of explanation used in interpretative social science in which the explanation 
is an in depth description or picture with specific details but limited abstraction about 
social situation or setting (Newman, 2006: 91). 
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surface level. Yet these structures do not produce an immediate and direct surface 
appearance at the empirical level: instead they can lie inactive or dormant and then 
become active and appear on the surface (Newman, 2006: 96). The causal 
mechanisms can also have internal contradictions and operate in a paradoxical manner 
creating structural conflicts, which may explain variations at surface level dynamics. 
Discovering and understanding structures and mechanisms and their interaction to 
explain social relations is the central task of this research. The rest of the chapter 
outlines the choice of research method, techniques of empirical investigation applied 
and how the data gathered was analysed to construct meaning and conclusions. 
 
The Extended Case Method  
  
 The extended case method applies reflective science 38  to ethnography39  in 
order to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro’ and to connect the present to the past in 
anticipation of the future, all by building on pre-existing theory (Burawoy, 1998: 5). 
In applying reflexive science, objectivity is not measured by procedures that provide 
accurate mapping of the world, but by the growth of knowledge; that is, the 
parsimonious modification of theory to explain variances (Kuhn, 1963; Lakatos, 
1978). Moving beyond canons of positive sciences, Burawoy summarises four 
features of reflective science as follows:  
 
1. The researcher interacts with research subjects. Disturbances that develop out 
of their mutual interaction do not inhibit, but rather help to expose and better 
illuminate social life. 
2. The researcher adopts the research subject’s view of the world in specific 
situations, but it does not stop there. The researcher adds together many views 
from individual subjects and specific situations, aggregating them into larger 
social processes. 
                                                        
38  Reflective science is a type of critical social science that embraces dialogue 
between the researcher and the people being studied as the road map to knowledge 
(Newman, 2003: 101). 
39 Ethnography is field research that emphasizes providing a very detailed description 
of a different culture from the view point of an insider in the culture to facilitate 
understanding of it (Newman, 2003: 381). 
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3. The researcher sees the social world simultaneously from the subjective 
viewpoint of the people being studied and from the viewpoint of external 
forces that act on people.   
4. Finally, the research constantly builds and modifies theory. This takes place 
through interaction with people studied and other researchers in the scientific 
society.  
 
In this study I have worked through the Zimbabwean case, examining the 
state, business and society relations in dialogue with theories of the role of the state in 
development and the developmental state notion of embedded autonomy to contribute 
to the development of predatory state theory. At independence, the Zimbabwean 
economy, although contending with dilemmas posed by colonial legacies, seemed to 
possess emergent developmental state characteristics. A strong interventionist state in 
collaboration with white agrarian and international mining capital accounted for 
industrialisation and diversification that could be traced back to the 1950s. However, 
more than 30 years later, the economy looked in dire strain, state capacity degraded 
under the heavy yoke of the party-state, and the relationship with domestic white 
agrarian capital had collapsed acrimoniously, while the international capital looked 
hesitant to invest in the country. Understanding why this happened and how it 
happened are part of the key questions explored in this study. However, exploring 
these questions in an environment gripped by fear especially during an election 
season has not been an easy task.40 In the context of fear, respondents are not free to 
express themselves. To illustrate the extent of fear, an Afrobarometer survey with a 
sample size of 1200 conducted annually between 2009 and 2012 asked: How much do 
you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence? Figure 
3.1 below presents trends for fear of political intimidation or violence in Zimbabwe 
for the period 2009 to 2012.  
 
 
 
                                                        
40 In the year 2013, Zimbabwe held elections to terminate the life of the coalition 
government born in February 2009. My fieldwork stretched from early 2013 to end of 
2014. 
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Figure 3.1: Trends in fear of political intimidation or violence in Zimbabwe 2009 - 
2012 
 
Source: Afrobarometer, Policy Paper No. 25. August 2005 
 
 
An overwhelming majority of 68 per cent in 2009 and a near majority of 48 
and 45 per cent in 2010 and 2012 respectively bemoaned fear of political intimidation 
or violence.41 Indeed, many Zimbabweans felt ‘Not at all free’ to express what they 
think, with minorities of 20 per cent in 2009 and 23 per cent in 2012 and 2014. Only a 
minority of people—25 per cent in 2009 and 22 per cent in 2012 and 2014—feel 
‘completely free’ to express themselves. Below Figure 3.2 below presents 
Afrobarometer survey responses with sample sizes of 1,200 in 2012 and 2,400 in 
2012 and 2015 on the question: In this country, how free are you to say what you 
think?   
 
  
                                                        
41 My own study, amongst other, sought to understand and explain forces driving fear 
and intimidation. Relatedly some the questions I explored were politically sensitive. 
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Figure 3.2: Trends in 'freeness' to express what Zimbabweans think 2009 - 2014 
 
Source: Developed from Afrobarometer data bank available at 
http://afrobarometer.org  
 
I have mainly used three sources of primary data: archival research primarily 
newspaper articles and government policy documents; observations; and in-depth 
interviews. These were also complemented by workshops and conference 
participation. 
 
First, I gathered and analysed key state policy documents and media articles 
from newspapers including on-line sources on debates surrounding state policies, 
state-society relations, military operations, and socio-economic performance. 
Government documents included: policy documents from the Ministries of Economic 
Planning and Investment Promotion; and Finance and Economic Development on 
economic policy issues; manpower development reports on the civil service; Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe monetary policy statements; reports and regulatory instruments, 
socio-economic data from the Zimbabwe’s Statistics Office and company 
shareholding documents from the Registrar of Companies. Government policy 
documents provided descriptions of different types of state interventions and their 
intended goals. Meanwhile, online and newspaper articles provided insights on 
perspectives from broad sections of society and business. These were drawn from 
both the state and independent media, chiefly The Herald and The Financial Gazette 
respectively. The triangulation of state media and independent sources was used to 
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counter bias. The Herald is Zimbabwe’s leading state-owned daily print newspaper 
with the largest circulation in the country, estimated at 266, 884 by October 2013 
(Zimbabwe Advertising Research Foundation, 2013). Meanwhile, the Financial 
Gazette is one of Zimbabwe’s consistent and leading weekly independent business 
and financial newspaper since independence in 1980. 
 
Most importantly, media articles brought to the fore contestations over policy 
choices that helped me to frame probing questions for my respondents about the 
nature of relationships between the state, society and business overtime. Meanwhile, 
the commentaries on military operations shaped perceptions on the increasing role of 
the military in politics and business. I have also been fortunate to have three key 
studies conducted on the state and business in Zimbabwe: Roger Southall (2013), 
Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa; Scott D. Taylor 
(1997), Business and the State in Southern Africa and Horace Campbell (2003) 
Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation on the 
role of the military in politics and business. Taylor’s book was more relevant on the 
changing nature of state and business relations in post-independence Zimbabwe. 
However, Taylor’s work is mainly focussed on relationships between the state and the 
white agrarian and manufacturing class from independence to 1997. My thesis 
extends beyond this work in terms of range of economic sectors considered and scope 
by examining implications on the nature of the state. Roger Southall and Horace 
Campbell’s books also bring to the fore the symbiosis of violence and elite 
accumulation in Zimbabwe. I examine the phenomenon across economic sectors over 
time to explain the changing role of the state in mediating patterns of accumulation. I 
also collected and analysed national statistics on economic performance to illustrate 
the developmental implications. Statistics accessed and analysed across economic 
sectors include production, investment, national output and employment. 
 
Spending much of my time in the National Archives reading newspaper 
articles and government policy documents enabled me to formulate specific interview 
questions to gain a deeper understanding of the motivations behind policy decisions 
through interviews. The sample universe included officials from government, 
business and civil society which were further subdivided into five categories: 1) 
military; 2) mining; 3) land and agriculture; 4) banking and finance; and 5) transport 
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and energy. I developed a sample frame that included key institutions and actors on 
each category. Potential respondents were selected using purposive and snowballing 
techniques. Purposive sampling was applied to access respondents on specific cases 
and mainly applied to business associations and state parastatals. While the sampling 
procedure worked well in respect of the business sector, there were some stakeholder 
groups for which it was difficult to gain access to potential respondents. In such 
instances, I used snowballing techniques in which interviewees were asked to 
recommend other potential respondents. This technique was applied to gain access to 
serving and retired government and military officials. However, in most instances it 
was not easy to gain the trust of some respondents at the first meetings. I found 
myself having to meet some respondents two or three times to explain my project and 
gain trust before a full interview. This applied mostly to civil servants and military 
officers, both serving and retired. Some business officials and analysts too required 
gaining trust. It can be frustrating especially when one has to re-adjust planned 
fieldwork timelines, as was the case. Yet once trust was gained, it proved so useful to 
be patient as I gained access to valuable insights and leads to explain key choices and 
their developmental implications.  Table 3.1 below presents a breakdown of 
respondents by sector.   
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Table 3.1: Breakdown of respondents 
Sector Total 
(36) 
Breakdown 
Military 
(and broad 
security 
sector) 
Mining 
(including 
manufacturing) 
Land & 
agriculture 
Banking 
and 
finance 
Transport 
and 
energy 
Government  16 3. 
(Included 
former 
ministers, 
military 
officers 
and war 
veterans) 
5. (Officials 
from ministry 
of mines, 
Zimbabwe 
Mining 
Development 
Corporation) 
3. (Officials 
from the 
Ministry of 
Lands and 
Rural 
Resettlemen
t and local 
government 
officials 
2. (Former 
minister of 
finance, 
central 
bank 
governing 
board 
members) 
3. 
[Zimbabw
e National 
Roads 
Authority 
(ZiNaRA) 
Zimbabwe 
Electricity 
Supply 
Authority 
(ZESA)] 
Business  17 2. (Former 
military 
officers 
who 
served in 
parastatal 
boards) 
6. 
Confederation 
of Zimbabwe 
Industries 
(CZI); 
Zimbabwe 
Chamber of 
Mines (ZCM), 
Artisanal and 
Small Scale 
Gold Miners 
4. Farmers 
Union 
Association; 
Resettled 
farmers 
2. Bankers 
Associatio
n of 
Zimbabwe 
(BAZ), 
former 
bank 
employee 
3. Private 
transport 
and energy 
operators 
& 
associatio
n of 
transport 
operators 
Academics 
and 
journalists  
3 Including academics from the University of Zimbabwe, political 
science and economics departments, the African Public Policy 
Research Institute.  
 
I took extensive precautions in adherence with research ethics to ensure 
balance between personal networks used in the study to gain access to various data 
sources and my role as an insider. 42  Before someone takes part in a research 
interview, there is need for consent43 to do so. From the researcher's point of view this 
is particularly important in relation to research ethics. I ensured consent was secured 
                                                        
42 Insider research is that which is conducted in a social group, organisation or culture 
of which the researcher is also a member (Greene, 2014: 1). I have served in civil 
society and government, as a board member for the Zimbabwe Youth Council, 2010 – 
2015.  
43 Informed consent is a fundamental ethical principle of social research. Newman 
(2003: 135) state that ‘it is not enough to get permission from people; they need to 
know what they are being asked to participate in so that they make informed 
decisions.  
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from all my research participants. Given the sensitivity of the research, some 
participants requested confidentiality. In keeping with research ethics, confidentiality 
of participants was upheld by privately linking individual names through coding44 to 
specific responses.  This was also done to ensure research participants’ safety during 
and after publication of the research report.  
 
Bonner and Tolhurst (2002) identify three key advantages of being an insider 
researcher: (a) having a greater understanding of the culture being studied; (b) not 
altering the flow of social interaction unnaturally; and (c) having an established 
intimacy which promotes both the telling and the judging of truth. However, there are 
also disadvantages associated with an insider. Greater familiarity can lead to loss of 
objectivity. For example, unconsciously making assumptions about the research 
process based on the researcher’s prior knowledge can be considered bias (Hewitt-
Taylor, 2002). The research made used of a wide range of perspectives (from both 
state and no-state sources), to produce a balanced and in this sense, a more objective 
account of the gradual development (May, as cited in Porteli, 2008). 
 
In a context of fear, interviews from ‘outside’ may be less insightful due to 
suspicion. Some respondents may not be comfortable to discuss, especially on 
subjects deemed politically sensitive. According to Garfinkel (1957), if the discursive 
dimension of social interaction can be reached through interview, the non-discursive 
sometimes referred to as practical consciousness, which underlines social interactions 
calls for more. It may be discovered through analysis or participation, that is, doing 
things with those who are being studied. I was involved for 18 months45 on a part-
time basis working on business development in a small-medium enterprise with 
exploits spanning across small-scale contract mining, tobacco farming sponsorship 
and technology solutions. In this role I focussed on small-scale mining and tobacco 
farming contracting business units, which enabled me to gain access and understand 
the different actors in the product chains. From observations and interviews it was 
possible to trace the product value and trade chain as it moved through various stages 
                                                        
44  Respondents’ names were coded against responses during data collection. The 
coding system developed identifies interviewees as Respondent 1, 2, 3 etc.  
45 From September 2013 to April 2015. 
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from the ground to runners46 and buyers – what Gereffi et al. (2001) calls the product 
chain analysis.  
 
In the agriculture sector the highly politicised and partisan land distribution 
channels made people suspicious of any forms of ‘outside’ investigation. Denscombe 
(2003) notes that a good participant observation demands that the researcher devotes 
considerable time to the fieldwork. Time on site is needed to gain trust, to establish 
rapport and foster insights that are the trademark of participant observation as a 
research method. I found myself visiting often more than twice to gain trust of the 
resettled farmers in Marondera, 47  and Goromonzi located in Mashonaland East 
province. Similarly, the involvement of high-ranking political elites and often 
criminalised operations of small-scale and artisanal mining operations made it 
difficult to easily gain access to product-chain actors. Indeed, some of the illegal 
aspects of small-scale mining operations such as illegal gold trade made the society 
highly secretive and suspicious. I spent much of my time visiting, likewise more than 
twice, the different artisanal mining sites including: Shamva 48  in Mashonaland 
Central, Gokwe49 and Mberengwa50 in the Midlands Provinces. Figure 3.3 illustrates 
participant observation sites. 
 
  
                                                        
46 Popular term applied to intermediaries who are involved in acts of buying and 
smuggling on behalf of some high profile actors behind the scenes.  
47 Marondera was one of the centers of Zimbabwe's large forestry and farming district 
and markets timber, tobacco, corn (maize), beef, and dairy products until the seizure 
of white-owned farms and redistribution of land began in 2000. 
48 Shamva is an area rich in alluvial and reef gold deposits located in Mashonaland 
Central province, 90 kilometers from Harare. Shamva hosts one of Zimbabwe’s 
largest gold Mines, Shamva Gold mine. It also hosts the government initiative to 
support small scale miners, the Shamva Mining Centre (although the center had shut 
down at the time of the research owing to viability challenges). 
49 Gokwe is located in the Midlands province. The research was conducted in Zenda 
area, home to one of the largest gold rush sites in the post 2000s with an estimated 
over 2,000 informal gold panners. 
50 Mberengwa is located in the Midlands province. The existence of a number of gold 
mines in the Mberengwa region attests to the general presence of gold in the 
geological formations of this region (Chazovachii and Basure, 2013: 47). The area’s 
rich alluvial deposits have attracted a proliferation of informal gold mining activity.   
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Figure 3.3: Participant observation sites 
 
 
I could not have been better placed than in this role, as a participant observer. I 
gained insight on the product chain actors through managing contract negotiations 
with the mine claim and farm owners. In the case of gold mining these included: the 
millers, gold buyers (at the surface level known as runners) and the actual principals/ 
benefactors. As part of my function, I was exposed to the politics of ownership and 
dispossession. I listened to stories of some miners who were dispossessed of their 
claims, to understand the mechanisms and macro-level factors. This is by no means 
unique, ‘field researchers usually complement observations by interviews or 
conversations, both structured and unstructured’ (Burgess, 1986: 2). My interest was 
to understand how patterns of ownership and dispossession at the surface level 
explain the mediating mechanisms and macro-level structures, From the company’s 
perspective, the interest was to understand potential risks and remedies in their 
business operations. In the end, I was able to fulfil my research and professional 
objectives jointly. 
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I also took advantage of my active involvement in civil society 51  and 
appointment to the Zimbabwe Youth Council (ZYC), a state parastatal under the 
Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation, and Empowerment – the central ministry in the 
implementation of the country’s economic indigenisation policy in the post 2000s. 
My position in civil society enabled me to gain access to business association 
representative organisations such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 
Bankers Association of Zimbabwe, Commercial Farmers Union and the Zimbabwe 
Chamber of Mines. Meanwhile, my position as a board member in the Zimbabwe 
Youth Council gave me access to other state parastatals such as the Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority, Zimbabwe National Roads Administration, Zimbabwe Electricity 
Supply Authority and government ministries.  
 
 Interviews with respondents who were involved in the government for the 
most part of post-independence Zimbabwe gave me access to longitudinal 
information that helped in explaining the different choices made at different junctures 
that I would have otherwise missed. To this end, serving and retired civil servants and 
military officers provided rich interviews to explain key decision points. Potential 
problems of bias were overcome by comparing explanations from government 
officials with interviews from business representative organisations and findings from 
archival research. In conducting the discussions, I used a guide approach, which was 
intended to ensure that the same general areas of information was collected from each 
interviewee; but still allowing a degree of freedom and adaptability in getting 
information from the interviewee. Interviews with business associations were held 
with people who occupied positions in the business sector organisations such as the 
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines and the 
Commercial Farmers’ Union. Interviews also involved members who served the 
business associations in both pre-independence and post-independence Zimbabwe. 
Such interviews were able to assist in tracking and comparing the incentives availed 
by the state as well as the nature of business relations with the state over time.   
 
                                                        
51 I began my active participation in civil society as a national students’ leader, 2001-
2003 and later in professional capacity for 10 years in various capacities with the 
Combined Harare Residents Association, Institute for Democracy in Zimbabwe and 
Transparency International Zimbabwe. 
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 The study could have been enriched by incorporating a survey opinion to 
capture the views on how Zimbabweans perceived the state. However, fieldwork was 
carried out leading to and post the 2013 election period, which, as explained was not 
conducive for the application of the survey technique due to high risk of intimidation 
and potential for high margin of error due to fear. As shown in figure 3.1 above, 
citizens were not free to express their views on political subjects. This is particularly 
so with increased victimisation and fear around the election period. The study made 
good use of triangulation of mainly archival sources with expert opinion interviews to 
mitigate the risk of potential ‘elite opinion bias.’  
 
I also participated in workshops and conferences covering themes related to 
the topic of inquiry. Presentations and discussions provided rich insights. Such 
meetings included civil society think-tank meetings and joint civil society and 
government conferences. I attended three major meetings: (1) Southern Africa 
Political Economy Series (SAPES), Zimbabwe in Transition Conference, held in 
Harare on 6 May 2014 at the Crown Plaza Hotel, (2) Centre for Research and 
Development (CRD) workshop on the National Diamonds Policy held on 6 May, 
2013 in Harare at the Holiday Inn and (3) regional conference on ‘Building 
democratic developmental states for economic transformation in Southern Africa’ 
organised by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Southern Africa 
Office in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
South Africa; Southern Africa Trust and the Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA) held on 20 to 23 July in South Africa, Johannesburg, at which I 
presented part of thesis in the paper titled ‘State-society relations and prospects for a 
democratic developmental state in Zimbabwe.’ 
 
Qualitative Content Analysis  
 
In analysing data, I used qualitative content analysis with data being arranged 
into conceptual categories and developing themes. The codes52 were developed in line 
                                                        
52  Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or 
inferential information compiled during a study. They are usually to chunks of 
varying sizes – words, phases, or whole paragraph, connected or unconnected to a 
specific setting (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 56). 
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with the research questions. Coding generates two simultaneous activities: mechanical 
data reduction and analytic categorisation of data. Walcott (1994: 24) notes that ‘after 
weeks and weeks in which the researcher is engaged in mechanical processing, truly 
analytic moments will occur during bursts of insight or pattern recognition.’ My own 
bursts of insight during the study led to continuous iterative moments of revisiting and 
challenging my initial arguments, polishing and moving forward. In addition I also 
applied basic statistical tools to construct illustrative graphs depicting key trends 
including, economic sector output, investment performance and ownership. The 
illustrative trend analysis made easier comparative analysis between the different 
periods and understanding the implications of key choices especially on economic 
performance.  
 
My extended observations revealed that violence and patronage stand out in 
mediating the patterns of accumulation. The mechanisms of control included political 
deployment to key state organs and the use of the military to deploy violence and 
control citizens. In business personal and political relations provided avenues for 
capital security, meanwhile autonomous businesses, which could pose a threat to 
ruling elite power interests, were repressed. Overtime, the state digressed by far in 
terms of proximate developmental characteristics with disastrous developmental 
implications. The thesis argues, as we shall see, that the Zimbabwean power elite not 
only had class interests that inhibited economic transformation and development but 
also, its voracious accumulation and political reproduction transformed and sustained 
Zimbabwe’s predatory state.  This study contributes knowledge on the underlying 
class forces and power dynamics that reproduce and sustain attendant social relations 
and outcomes. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter discussed the research approach, choice of method and data 
collection and analysis techniques. Reflective science and extended case method was 
applied to collect and analyse data. Taken together, the analysis of state policy 
documents, the media articles, interviews and observations in dialogue with 
development theories and post-colonial state literatures made it possible to ‘extend 
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out’ and understand the characteristics of a predatory state and how it functions. In the 
following chapters, I examine in detail the underlying class forces and power 
dynamics and the choices that explain the development and reproduction of 
Zimbabwe’s predatory state. In order to do so, I examine the nature of the state, 
business and society relations across the key sectors of the economy: land and 
agriculture, mining, transport and energy, and banking and finance. Chapter four 
maps Zimbabwe’s predatory state to set the research scene.  
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Chapter Four:  
Mapping Zimbabwe’s Predatory State 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This chapter traces the historical development of the state from colonialism in 
1890 to post-2000 in order to understand the evolution and the nature of the post-
independence state, military and business relations. As argued by Kohli (2004: 2), 
patterns of state authority often exhibit long-term continuities. Colonialism in the first 
half of the twentieth century, especially, shaped the state institutions that emerged in 
developing countries, and then in turn moulded their economies in the second half of 
the century. For Zimbabwe, the arrival of the Cecil John Rhodes sponsored Pioneer 
Column in 1890 in search of mineral fortunes ushered in the dawn of the colonial era. 
Despite the failure to discover mineral deposits on the scale of the Witwatersrand in 
South Africa, the commercialisation of agriculture led to the development of an 
autonomous white settler class and diversification of interests from Rhodes’ British 
South Africa Company (BSAC). The white settlers conquered the indigenous blacks 
in the 1896/7 war (known as the first Chimurenga53) and laid the foundational stone 
of a nascent ‘Weberian’ although racialised white colonial state that would remain a 
potent force until the country’s independence in 1980.  
 
This chapter engages the politics of the nationalist liberation movements to 
discern the influence of national liberation movement ideologies on the nature of the 
post-independence state. I argue that although the liberation movements embraced a 
socialist ideology, the latter remained an instrument of political mobilisation, which 
the post liberation state elites did not translate into any meaningful political 
programme after independence. The quintessence of the military is traced to the rising 
power of the military in the colonial state during the liberation war and politics of the 
liberation movements. In the post-independence period, the new black elites 
Africanised the civil service to gain control of the state. In order to suppress the 
                                                        
53 Shona linguistic coinage meaning a revolutionary struggle, originally derived from 
Murenga, a name of a spirit medium who was believed to be actively involved in the 
1896-7 war of resistance, providing ideological support to the African fighting forces. 
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opposition, the elites commonly turned to the military, which would emerge as a 
powerful force in the state, economy and politics. The ruling elites kept the military 
close by rewarding retired and serving senior military officers with key positions in 
parastatals and other government departments. The inherited bureaucratic norms 
gradually waned further away from independence; more state policies came to retain 
power for and to serve the interests of the political elite. 
 
The Colonial State: 1890 - 1979 
 
In 1890, Cecil John Rhodes bankrolled a Pioneer Column to occupy the 
territory that would eventually become Southern Rhodesia and then Zimbabwe. The 
settlers were interested mainly in exploring for gold. However, the failure by the 
setters to discover the large quantities of gold on the scale of that found on the 
Witwatersrand led to the diversification into other commercial interests, mainly 
agriculture (Bond and Manyanya, 2002). The white settlers dispossessed the 
indigenous population of their land and cattle leading to revolts that culminated into 
the first chimurenga war. After crushing the 1896-7 black African revolts, the settlers, 
on the strength of their repressive capacity, began to move blacks away from the best 
farming lands into newly created tribal reserves to make way for white agricultural 
activities and concentrate blacks into unproductive lands and relegate their economic 
role to the provision of cheap labour. Herbst (1990: 14) notes: 
 
The absence of mineral resources on the scale of South Africa meant that 
Southern Rhodesia would never have a large enough white population to 
introduce the kind of institutionalised separation of the races that was to 
become known as apartheid in South Africa. However, because there was a 
significant settler population, which was able to initiate many diverse 
economic enterprises, a white political community developed in Rhodesia, 
which had its own interests, independent of any controlling power, be it 
British South Africa Company (BSAC), South Africa or Great Britain. 
 
Herbst’s observations are key to understanding the political economy of the 
colonial state. It is in stark contrast to the system of indirect rule, for instance in 
Nigeria, where colonialists were primarily government officials carrying out the 
interests of the colonial power. The implication for Southern Rhodesia would be the 
gradual development of an autonomous white colonial regime. This was based upon 
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the steady increase in viability of white settler economic enterprise. This allowed the 
settlers to politically out-muscle the British South Africa Company, which had to rely 
upon their cooperation to make its business exploits profitable. Finally, after years of 
political contestation, the Company ended its administrative role in 1922, with the 
British government granting the settlers a choice, via a referendum, to either become 
part of South Africa or acquire self-governing colony status in 1923. Their opting for 
self-government (albeit limited by Britain’s ultimate sovereignty) set them on the path 
to acquiring very significant political and economic autonomy. 
 
The defeat of the British South Africa Company, and the need by the white 
settlers to protect and guarantee their interests, led to the gradual building of a strong 
state apparatus. Herbst (1990: 16) notes that after the referendum, the British 
government maintained an extremely low political profile, preferring instead to grant 
greater political autonomy to the settler government. In order to assert their political 
and economic dominance, the white settlers needed to build a state capable of both 
supporting the development of white business interests and guaranteeing the security 
of external investments. The size of the state quickly grew. By 1923, the settler 
government employed 2,000 whites in six administrative offices across the country. 
The colonial state’s attempt at bureaucratisation can thus be traced back to this period. 
Although totally disregarding black communities, the emerging bureaucracy, largely 
served white interests. Blacks were barred from joining the civil service; likewise, 
senior positions in the white owned companies were reserved for the white minority 
groups. Racial segregation was institutionalised through laws such as the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1934, which explicitly excluded Africans from the definition of 
employee (Leys, 1959).  
 
The small economic base of the colony also meant that it was extremely 
vulnerable to changes in the world economy, for example the Great Depression in the 
1930s. In order to protect white settler interests against international economic 
turbulence, the settler state began to pursue an inward looking economic policy with 
various protective measures including price determination, subsidies, tariffs and other 
administrative protections. In addition, the state moved aggressively to develop public 
enterprises in areas it deemed vital but unattractive to private investors such as 
electricity power stations, and the formation of the Rhodesia Iron and Steel 
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Corporation (later Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Corporation after independence) in 1942. 
The significance and successes of these public enterprises is clear. More than thirty 
years after independence, these public enterprises would remain critical in the post-
independence state economy.54 
 
The development of an economic system based on private enterprise 
supported by an interventionist state led to the acquisition of core characteristics that 
would claim significant features of a racially limited developmental state. Business 
developed formal lobby groups such as the Chamber of Mines and the Rhodesian 
Farmers’ Union (later Commercial Farmers’ Union) whose policy influence, through 
more direct channels accorded by the state was profound. White agrarian capital grew 
phenomenally even while black agriculture was experiencing continual economic 
decline in the unproductive reserves.55 The opportunities provided by the post-war 
boom and later joining the Federation56 with Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and 
Nyasaland (now Malawi) sustained the necessary demand for the growth and 
consolidation of white businesses in agriculture, manufacturing and industry. The 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland formed in 1953 was part of the British 
government’s strategy for keeping Rhodesia outside South African Afrikaner control 
while expanding demand for Rhodesian industry.  
 
At the same-time, electoral politics was ‘democratic’ within the white 
community although not so competitive to destabilise the unity of purpose against 
imminent black opposition. The non-competitiveness of electoral politics within the 
white community was illustrated by the fact that the colonial state remained 
predominantly a one-party state throughout the colonial period. The colonial state 
only experienced intense competition in 1962, triggered by differences within the 
                                                        
54 For instance, a report by the Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research 
Unit (ZEPARU) on engineering and metal industries value chain analysis showed that 
the closure of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Corporation in 2008 due to gross 
mismanagement was estimated to cost Zimbabwe, US$3 billion annually (Daily 
News, 9 July 2014). 
55 The reserves were unfertile areas in limited rainfall regions allocated to blacks as a 
strategy to place limits on commercial African agriculture, as at least in earlier times 
it was a serious competitor. 
56 The Federation was dissolved on 31 December 1963 following the granting of 
independence to Zambia and Malawi. 
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white political elite over the Federation and autonomy from the British government. 
In that year, the opposition Rhodesian Front, which had called for dissolution of the 
Federation and full independence from the British government, won elections against 
the ruling United Federal Party. In response, the British government seriously 
considered granting political independence to Rhodesia. 57  Indeed, just before the 
Federation was dissolved, the whites received a constitution in 1961 from Britain 
which removed even the ineffective clauses which previously gave her Majesty’s 
government veto power over policies affecting Africans (Bowman, 1973: 6). 
However, the new Rhodesian Front government opposed the 1961 constitution (which 
provided for modest black voting rights and representation in parliament, albeit 
without seriously endangering white minority rule) and proceeded to declare 
unilateral independence on 11, November 1965. The declaration led to international 
ostracism and comprehensive sanctions against Rhodesia.  
 
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence significantly influenced 
Rhodesia’s development trajectory. Its implication was that the settlers considered 
their rule to be permanent, a factor which was to shape economic and political 
strategies, especially industrialisation, and to differentiate the territory from non-
settler colonial states. The settler political elite needed to develop the state and 
economic capacity to withstand international sanctions. In this quest, the white ruling 
elite coalition pursued a deliberate state-led political and economic transformation. 
The essential elements of the high growth political economy discussed below can be 
summarised as (1) creation and sedimentation of a centralised state in order to 
advance political control and (2) deliberate state interventions aimed at enhancing 
agricultural productivity and industrial growth. 
 
In order to navigate the threatening international economic environment 
induced by sanctions, the ruling elite responded by further strengthening state 
capabilities to protect the whites against economic uncertainties and danger. The 
necessity of sanctions-busting efforts led the state to intervene in every arena of 
economic activity, building on the strength of institutional structure developed in the 
                                                        
57 The British government wanted to gradually transfer power to black majority in 
conformity with global realities and demands after the second world war (Kurebwa, 
2000). 
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early years of colonisation. This included the implementation of a battery of sanctions 
busting measures, including working with South African, Swiss and Australian banks 
and some white businessmen to evade trade sanctions.58 In addition, the mobilisation 
of black resistance via the liberation war necessitated the state to deepen its coercive 
capacity in order to repulse black liberation movements and exert firm control over 
the black population. The establishment of the Joint Operations Command  – formally 
integrating operations of the police, army and air force—by the Rhodesian Front 
government was part of a cardinal strategy meant to crush black majority liberation 
movements (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005: 332). The Joint Operations Command 
establishment concentrated enormous power in the hands of the Commander of 
combined operations, General Peter Walls. Indeed, by the time of cease-fire, the 
civilian leadership of Rhodesia had given over total control of the military to Walls, to 
the extent that he was part of the delegation that negotiated the transition to 
independence at the Lancaster house conference in Britain (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007: 
54).  
 
The Rhodesian state demonstrated considerable capacity, managing the impact 
of sanctions on the one hand, and war on the other. Herbst (1990: 26) observes that 
‘even in 1979, after fighting the war for many years, evading international sanctions 
for fourteen years, and reeling under the effects of a deep global economic depression, 
the state still demonstrated substantial ability to project authority.’ For instance, up to 
half a million people were placed in ‘protected villages’ by the Rhodesian state in an 
attempt to demobilise support for the liberation movements (Cliffe, 1981: 27). The 
state demonstrated both substantial repressive capacity supplied by its military force 
and economic capacity supplied by the bureaucratic apparatus and close association 
with white business to withstand economic collapse and contain the liberation 
struggle. However, by 1979, the impact of the war, the global recession of the 1970s, 
the effects of trade sanctions and increasing white emigration forced the Smith 
government to seek a negotiated settlement to end the war with black nationalist 
forces, through the Lancaster House agreement. The Lancaster House agreement 
                                                        
58 For example, white businessmen connected to the regime such as John Bredenkamp 
arranged export of Rhodesian tobacco and import of parts and ammunition for the 
Rhodesian military using opaque international networks to evade sanctions (The 
Guardian, 09 June 2006). 
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signed on 21 December 1979, covered a ceasefire, the Constitution of a newly 
legitimate independent state and transitional arrangements.  
 
The Politics of the National Liberation Movements 
 
Two influences of the politics of the liberation movement on the post-
independence state and military are worthy engaging in brief here. The first is the 
political organization and the second, the ideology of the nationalist liberation 
movements. Dating back to the liberation struggle, a thin line separated military 
establishments from the civilian political leadership. The political organisation of the 
liberation movements, both the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), included military leadership in supreme 
political and policy decision-making structures. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) note that 
in order to bridge the gap between the politicians and the military, the military 
commanders of the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), Nikita 
Mangena and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), Josiah 
Tongogara were incorporated into party supreme policy decision-making structures, 
that is, the ZAPU and ZANU politburos. Indeed, this tradition would remain 
influential in shaping the state and military relations of the post-independence period. 
The Zimbabwe military would remain deeply embedded into the political elite and 
state, influencing and implementing key policy decisions.  
 
In terms of ideology, ZANU, which was to become the dominant party in 
post-independence Zimbabwe, espoused socialism as the party ideology. During the 
liberation struggle, socialism was used to explain what the blacks were fighting 
against and to make it easier for the nationalist army to receive support – especially in 
the form of arms but also in the form of diplomatic backing – from communist and 
radical third world countries (Herbst, 1990: 32). However, as Barry Munslow (cited in 
Herbst 1990) notes: 
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Although the party [ZANU] fought a long liberation struggle, in certain ways 
along similar lines to those in Vietnam, China and Mozambique, the crucial 
distinction was that no permanent alternative production system was 
established in the liberated zones. In this sense, outside externally based transit 
and refugee camps, little experience of organising any production, let alone 
socialist production, was gained by the party. 
 
Thus despite a visible commitment to socialism, the ideology remained mainly 
an opposition mobilising instrument. Socialist ideology was not developed into a clear 
political programme of action after independence. The compromise Lancaster House 
negotiations and ruling elite avariciousness – discussed in chapters five to eight - ran 
against socialist liberation ideology. For its part, the Lancaster House negotiations did 
not grant the liberation movement outright victory. The compromise agreement would 
contain formal clauses that effectively limited the power of the government to 
redistribute land.  
 
Post-Independence State, Military and Business Relations: 1980-1990 
 
As argued by Kohli (2004: 17), once established, core institutional 
characteristics acquired during colonial rule are difficult to alter. When the new 
ZANU elites took over state power in 1980, they inherited a strong authoritarian state, 
deeply embedded with white capital, which was predominantly agrarian. The 
inherited state capacity and a strong cooperation with white agrarian and international 
capital supported modest growth rates, averaging 5.5 per cent growth between 1980 
and 1990. The state also effectively deployed inherited capacity to undertake 
numerous social and economic tasks with remarkable success: developing rural road 
infrastructure (discussed in chapter eight), and expanding the number of schools and 
hospitals.59 However, the cooperation with white capital and stability came at a cost 
of far reaching compromises between the whites hostile to the new regime’s policies 
and a new black elite under pressure to deliver promises for redressing colonial 
                                                        
59 The state expanded the number of primary and secondary schools by 80 per cent 
from a total of 3 358 in 1980 to 6 042 in 1990. In the heath sector, the state built 316 
new primary health care centres while existing 450 primary care clinics which were 
essentially curative were upgraded to function as rural health centres (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 1991). In addition, ten District hospitals were constructed between 1980 
and 1989. 
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imbalances. Meanwhile, the internal power struggles within the liberation movement 
led to a destabilising civil war.  
 
Herbst (1990: 30) observes: 
 
In 1980, ZANU-PF did not gain control over a weak colonial state that had 
been hurriedly improved for independence and on which they could quickly 
out their imprimatur [typical of most African states that gained independence 
in the 1960s]. Nor did the guerrillas win an outright victory as Frelimo had 
done in Mozambique, where the old state collapsed creating a vacuum into 
which new governmental structures and practices could be placed. Instead, the 
black government took over a bruised, but not defeated state, which contained 
powerful anachronistic elements that were hostile to the political project of the 
new regime  
 
The colonial state in Rhodesia, unlike in most parts of Africa, although not a 
fully developed Weberian state, had deeply penetrating authority structures to control 
the black population in order to supply cheap labour for white business interests in 
agriculture, mining and manufacturing. In terms of bureaucratic structure, there were 
40,000 civil servants at independence, of whom approximately 29,000 were blacks 
mostly teachers and clerks. Of the 10,570 ‘Established Officers’, some 3,368 
constituting less than a third, were black, but no black held posts above senior 
administrator level (Southall, 2013: 139). In order to consolidate its power base, 
fearing the desertion by the skilled white bureaucrats, and suspicion of the white 
business elite, which still controlled the economy, the new rulers pursued cautious 
Africanisation of the civil service. The cautious approach to Africanising the civil 
service included expanding the size of the civil service and waiting for white civil 
servants to retire.  The civil service was expanded from 40,000 to 80,000 to increase 
the number of blacks in the state apparatuses (largely teachers). The state also sought 
to alter racial composition at senior level through a presidential directive requiring 
Africanisation of senior government positions (Southall, 2013: 140). The new ruling 
elite took advantage to develop a patronage system through appointments based on 
loyalty as opposed to competence. On the military, the ZANU government 
immediately rewarded its military leaders with senior positions in the military, while 
Rhodesian and ZAPU forces were sidelined or resigned in frustration (Chitiyo and 
Rupiya, 2005). Senior military commanders were predominantly drawn from 
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President Mugabe’s Zezuru tribe including the commanders of the Defense Forces, 
Rex Nhongo and Air Force of Zimbabwe, Perrance Shiri.  
 
The new ZANU ruling elites found themselves comfortable with institutional 
legacies of the colonial state, collaborating with white capital while indigenous 
autonomous domestic capital was suppressed.60 State polices favouring white agrarian 
capital interests were maintained, for example preferential foreign exchange 
allocation and a fixed price regime to guarantee profitability.61 Raftopoulos (1996), 
Taylor (2007) and Nicolas (1994) all observe that the ruling elites feared the 
emergence of an autonomous domestic bourgeoisie that would challenge their 
interests. A small clique of indigenous entrepreneurs who emerged in the post-
independence period had strong connections to the ruling party.62 Taylor observes: 
 
Zimbabwe’s most ‘successful’ black business people are thus notable for their 
close ties to the state….and whose rise from ashes to riches is most 
suspicions…Since they are already co-opted into the state network they pose 
no political threat to the government…in fact they will likely be the heirs of 
the ZANU-PF political machine (1999:258). 
 
There was not significant structural ownership transformation of the economy. 
The Lancaster House negotiations, too, imposed procedural safeguards against seizure 
of white property, notably land and special clauses to prevent constitutional changes 
for ten years after independence. The state remained deeply embedded with white 
capital and the economy generated stability and modest growth rates especially in the 
immediate post-independence period. In 1980 and 1981 the Zimbabwean economy, 
recorded growth rates of 12.7 per cent and 12.5 per cent respectively (Shumba, 2010: 
49). However, the structural limitations imposed a restraint that saw the economy 
                                                        
60 Indigenous entrepreneurs who did not toe the party line met obstacles. Meanwhile, 
ZANU-PF aligned businessmen were smooth sailing. Most prominently, Strive 
Masiiwa, a dynamic telecommunications entrepreneur, battled for five years to obtain 
a license to open a mobile phone company. Yet, Leo Mugabe, the president’s nephew, 
acquired a similar license within months (Selby, 2006:252). 
61 White agrarian capital was happy with the new government. Commending the CFU 
relationship with the government, in an interview, CFU president, Jim Sinclair, said 
‘the government has displayed more commitment to agriculture than any other sector 
of the economy, and the union considers that it has done more for commercial 
farming than the RF did in 16 years’ (Financial Gazette, September 4, 1981: 12). 
62 Notably, Philip Chiyangwa, Leo Mugabe and Roger Boka.  
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averaging declining levels of growth63 and not enough to repair the socio-economic 
dents caused by war and institutionalised racial discrimination. The economy 
remained largely controlled by a small white elite while the majority black population 
remained marginalised, limiting both the growth of domestic demand and black 
entrepreneurship. 
 
However, just as the new government was born, it had to deal with sporadic 
outbreaks of violence emanating from the guerrilla Assembly Points during the 
demobilisation programme. Both ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants, sometimes 
against civilians and quite often against each other, committed this violence (CCJP, 
1997). Some have blamed the conflict on tribal hostilities dating back to the arrival of 
the Ndebeles in the 1830s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008), while for others the historically 
embedded hostilities between the liberation movements is the dominant hypothesis 
(Sithole, 1999; Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005; Bhebhe, 2004). Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) 
argue that once political campaigning for the 1980 national election began, the fierce 
competition that characterised the nationalist eras in the 1960s erupted into open 
warfare.64 Party activists from both sides (ZAPU and ZANU) marshalled into ‘war’ 
the forces from thousands of armed ex-combatants either still in waiting areas or in 
the newly integrated battalions. For Bhebhe, the violence was an inevitable 
consequence in the way the nationalism had evolved and how the nationalist armies 
had been formed (2004). He argued that, the young men and women recruited into the 
separate armies were trained to hate each other by their leaders, who wanted to justify 
the separate existence of their parties.  
 
 The consequence of the unstable situation was that by early 1982, Zimbabwe 
had serious security problems in various parts of the country, particularly in the 
western half. Opposition ZIPRA top military leadership, Lookout Masuku and 
Dumiso Dabengwa and eight other ranking senior officials were arrested (CCJP, 
                                                        
63 By 1990, the Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development Dr B. 
Chidzero lamented that an average annual growth rate of 3.2 per cent since 1980 was 
barely above population growth rate of 2.9 per cent and unsustainable (Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Planning and Development, 1990). 
64 It was widely expected that the liberations movements would combine to campaign 
under one party, however, Robert Mugabe and ZANU refused to join with Nkomo’s 
ZAPU opting to go it alone in the 1980 elections.  
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1997: 65). In February 1982, ZAPU officials were removed from Cabinet and other 
influential government posts. By March 1983, senior ZAPU officials, including 
ZAPU leader Dr. Joshua Nkomo, experienced unrelenting harassment and 
assassination attempts, forcing them to flee into exile (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005). The 
running away of some ex-ZIPRA combatants back to the bush, the exploitation of the 
antagonistic situation by apartheid South Africa via ZAPU, and the ‘discovery’ of 
arms caches in ZAPU owned farms around Bulawayo, gave the ZANU government a 
pretext to use state power to crush ZAPU once and for all (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008). A 
State of Emergency declared under the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
1965 was extended and the government deployed the army units, 4th and 6th Brigades, 
the Paratroopers, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the police support 
unit allegedly targeting the ‘dissidents’. 65  Through support received from North 
Korea, the government also established special units outside conventional command 
and control, the 5th Brigade (armoured regiment) and the Zimbabwe People’s Militia 
(ZPM) to quell the perceived insurgency, in a military operation known as 
Gukurahundi.66 
 
Politically, the consequences of the civil war were that the opposition was 
repressed and opposition supporters were denied vital avenues for political 
representation and participation in the new state. The government's attitude was that 
support for ZAPU was equivalent to support for dissidents. Chitiyo and Rupiya 
(2005) contend that the Zimbabwe Peoples’ Militia appeared to have been tasked 
primarily with rooting out local political competition presented by ZAPU, and was 
therefore an appendage of ZANU to weed out opposition. Mike Auret (formerly of 
CCJP), at a presentation at Chatham House on 4 September 2007, argued that Mugabe 
firmly believed in the one-party state system and the ‘dissidents’ provided a disguise 
for crushing ZAPU opposition. ZANU rallies in Matabeleland during this period 
attest to this claim. Between March and February 1982, ZANU held campaign rallies 
in Matebeleland at which people were warned not to support ZAPU, and captured 
dissidents were paraded, declaring their ZAPU allegiance. More than 20 000 ZAPU 
                                                        
65 Term used to describe ex-ZIPRA combatants who had defected from the Zimbabwe 
National Army (ZNA) to embark on a life of dissidence. 
66 Shona word which means the rain which washes away the chaff before the spring 
rains (CCJP, 1997: 13). 
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supporters surrendered their cards to join ZANU (Nehanda Radio, November 30, 
2012). 
 
The Gukurahundi was a major turning point in the militarisation of state and 
politics in post-independence Zimbabwe. Whereas the existence of the ‘dissidents’ is 
acknowledged, only a tenuous link could be established with the ZAPU political 
leadership (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). In fact the ZAPU leadership denied this and 
refused to associate with ‘dissident’ activities. However, the ruling party mobilised 
government security agencies and collaborated with ZANU youth brigades in 
denouncing and harassing ZAPU leadership and opposition supporters. The conflict 
itself never gained legitimacy outside the narrow political interests of ZANU in 
dealing decisively with ZAPU opposition. The anti-developmental nature of the 
conflict implied both economic and political costs. The political and military violence 
resulted in huge losses for the citizens of Zimbabwe in terms of human life, property, 
and economic development in affected areas. An estimated 20,000 civilians were 
killed.67 Many communities suffered massive material loss in the initial onslaught, 
losing huts and granaries. The conflict also ushered in a culture of state sponsored 
attack on the opposition with impunity, which continues to characterise the 
Zimbabwean state society relations.  
 
In the end, ZAPU acquiesced and entered into a Unity Accord68 that in 1987 
merged the two parties into ZANU-PF. Then, facing the 1990 elections, the party 
galvanised the repressive state apparatus targeting new opposition from the 
Zimbabwe Unity Movement, formed by Edgar Tekere (former ZANU Secretary 
General). ZANU-PF targeted a clean parliamentary sweep to pave way for the 
introduction of a one-party state to assure the ruling elite complete dominance over 
the state. State security agents were deployed to crush the Zimbabwe Unity 
Movement opposition. Sithole and Makumbe (1997: 135) argued that the violence 
                                                        
67  The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe’s Breaking the 
Silence: Building the Peace (1997) noted in its introduction that the figure of ‘20,000 
dead’ originated with Joshua Nkomo’s autobiography with ‘other sources putting the 
figure as low as 700’, and suggested that ‘[t]here is a need to resolve these disparities 
by methodological investigation.’  
68 Agreement signed between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the 
Zimbabwe People’s Union (ZAPU) to end the conflict and merge the two parties into 
the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). 
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perpetrated against Zimbabwe Unity Movement in the 1990 election was the worst in 
an election year since independence in 1980. Patrick Kombayi, Zimbabwe Unity 
Movement Secretary for Information and Publicity, contesting the Midlands, city of 
Gweru, parliamentary constituency against Vice President Simon Muzenda was shot 
by state security agents. The perpetrators were later pardoned by President Mugabe. 
ZANU-PF won the elections controversially claiming 117 out of 120 parliamentary 
seats and 82 per cent of the presidential vote. The violent clampdown on the new 
opposition, although differing in terms of magnitude with the clampdown on ZAPU, 
revealed a strong determination on the part of ZANU and continuity of repression and 
state violence against opposition politics.  
 
State, Military and Business Relations: 1990 – 2000 
 
By the 1990s as the economy failed to generate the necessary higher levels of 
growth, the ruling elite abandoned its waning commitment to its liberation socialist 
rhetoric and embraced the Bretton Woods institutions’ structural adjustment 
programme. The 1991 ‘Framework for Economic Reform’, better known as the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), entailed a reduction in the size 
of the civil service, social spending (education and health) as well as many 
government subsidies. The economic and social consequences were devastating. Most 
manufacturing industries which had emerged under the regime of protection during 
the colonial period and sustained by the post-independence protectionist measures 
failed to cope with foreign competition leading to closures and job losses.69 In the 
immediate post-independence period, the ruling elite alliance with white capital had 
maintained a regime of colonially bequeathed privileges such as protective tariffs and 
import quotas to protect domestic industry against foreign competition. Meanwhile, 
the state did not provide incentives to reform the economy towards export orientation. 
Company closures, increasing unemployment and poverty levels triggered mass 
protests. In response, the state intensified patronage based programmes and repression 
to suppress opposition and dissent.  
                                                        
69  Chipika (cited in Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1998) reported that retrenchment of 
workers was severe, with 32,440 formal sector jobs lost by December 1995.  
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By the late 1990s the ruling elites abandoned their commitment to neoliberal 
reforms and state policies became increasingly capricious, often to appease key 
constituencies in order to maintain popular support. For example, the regime 
rewarded the war veterans with unbudgeted bailout packages in 1997 after more than 
three months of protests over poor welfare further pushing the economy into disarray. 
As the regime lost popular support, President Mugabe increasingly looked to the army 
for protection against discontent from the masses and from inside his party. In 
particular, he managed to keep the army leadership close to him by making them 
prominent beneficiaries of the land reform programme (discussed in chapter five), 
offering them lucrative mining contracts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
following the government’s controversial intervention in the DRC war and granting 
them diamond mining concessions in the country’s Eastern Highlands (discussed in 
chapter six).  
 
The formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 
February 1999 as a pro-poor broad coalition of labour, students and civil society was 
met with violent retribution. This broad coalition was certain to present the most 
formidable challenge hitherto to the ruling ZANU-PF in the June 2000 parliamentary 
elections. As the tide of the new party and enthusiasm gripped the nation, the ruling 
party was under threat of being uprooted from the state power it had occupied since 
independence in 1980. In February 2000, the ruling party was defeated in a 
referendum on a new constitution, this, a sure sign that the incumbents were facing 
their strongest ever opposition. In a similar fashion response to the Zimbabwe Unity 
Movement opposition threat in the 1990 elections, the ruling party intensified populist 
redistributive and empowerment policy stances to dispense patronage and regain lost 
ground. The army, alongside war veterans, took over the previously sporadic farm 
invasions by landless people and transformed them into a coercive land redistribution 
programme (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005: 359). Conspicuously, senior military officers 
and ZANU-PF politicians emerged as the major beneficiaries of land take-overs 
(discussed at length in chapter five).  
 
 
72 
 
Post 2000: The State, Military and Business Relations 
 
The delicate state and white business production-oriented class alliance 
collapsed at the height of land takeovers. The collapsed alliance with international and 
domestic white agrarian capital was substituted by an alliance with ruling party linked 
parasitic businessmen, political and military business elites. State policies favouring 
greater allocation of wealth provided extensive opportunities for patronage. Internally, 
the bureaucratic capacity of the state was constrained by skills flight at the height of 
the economic crisis and replacement of office bearers by military officers without 
regard to professional competence. The fundamental characteristic of the bureaucracy 
was now its inability to exercise impartiality. Instead, bureaucracy served as an 
extension of the ruling elite to secure economic privileges, additional wealth and 
power. The opposition was repressed and its supporters targeted and persecuted. 
 
State economic policies cast as black-economic empowerment programmes 
provided the primary rationale for dispensing patronage. The UNDP (2008: 211) 
observed that ‘economic policies seem to have been driven by the need to secure 
immediate and medium-term political goals, while paying scant attention to collateral 
social and economic consequences of such actions.’ Sachikonye (2012: 89) argued 
that the developments not only illustrated the extent to which the state had been 
captured by vested interests but also the apparent transition from state capture to a 
predatory state. The state pursued black economic empowerment policies with the 
aggressive launch of the indigenisation and empowerment programme whose 
beneficiary footprints, mirror patronage politics across remaining economic sectors, 
notably mining, transport and energy. The indigenisation laws promulgated in the 
mid-2000s entailed ceding 51 per cent shareholding to indigenous Zimbabweans. The 
laws revived the historically born mistrust, which had followed the land 
appropriations earlier in the decade. Independent investors, both domestic and 
foreign, scrambled to withdraw their investment to safer investment destinations 
abroad with catastrophic consequences.  
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All economic indicators went in the wrong direction. National output dropped 
against declining industrial capacity utilisation70 to levels below ten per cent across 
the economy. Declining revenue collections triggered excessive reliance on printing 
money without corresponding growth in national output causing hyperinflation. By 
2008 at the height of the crisis, the rate of inflation reached over 3,2 quintillion per 
cent (Hanke, 2008:355) and the country’s economy shrank from an estimated US$9 
billion in 1997 to US$4 billion (Zimbabwe Independent, 03 June, 2010). The 
government’s response to the worsening economic situation was to institute 
interventionist measures: price controls, fixing foreign exchange, pegging the gold 
price and controlling foreign currency. The interventions triggered serious market 
distortions, which rendered the country’s payment and exchange system dysfunctional 
resulting in a flourishing parallel market. The state turned to the military to implement 
key state policies and programmes justified in the appellation of restoring sanity and 
national security. However, such programmes rarely extended beyond patronage and 
the accompanying political regeneration project. Two key features linked to the 
dominance of the coercive apparatuses in the state, politics and economy will be 
discussed here: (1) military appointments in the state and (2) deepening 
authoritarianism and particularism. 
 
Military appointments to key positions in the state 
 
As the economic crisis depended, the tentative Weberian bureaucratisation 
inherited at independence gradually waned. Bureaucracy became a pale shadow of its 
former self. Public service corruption had heightened while a semblance of any 
bureaucratic norms vanished. Hundreds of professionals left the public service for 
greener pastures abroad while the ruling elites responded by deploying serving and 
retired military officers to key state parastatals and other government departments. 
Senior military officers were deployed to run key government arms and departments, 
including the Judiciary, Zimbabwe Prisons Service, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, 
the Central Intelligence Organization, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, and 
                                                        
70 Capacity utilisation is a concept in economics that refers to the extent to which an 
enterprise or a nation actually uses its installed productive capacity as opposed to the 
potential output which ‘could’ be produced, if capacity was fully used (Berndt and 
Morrison, 1981). 
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parastatals such as the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, the Grain Marketing 
Board, National Railways of Zimbabwe and the Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife.  
 
Table 4.1: Serving and retired military and other security personnel in government 
and parastatals as at 2008 
Name Institution Position 
1. Lieutenant-General 
Mike Nyambuya 
 
Ministry of Energy and Power 
Development. 
Minister 
2. Brigadier Ambrose 
Mutinhiri 
Ministry of Youth Development 
and Employment Creation. 
Minister 
3. Saviour Kasukuwere 
(ex- CIO) 
Ministry of Youth Development 
and Employment Creation. 
Deputy Minister 
4. Lt Colonel Hubert 
Nyanhongo 
 
Transport and Communication Deputy Minister 
5. Colonel Christian 
Katsande  
Ministry of Industry and 
International Trade 
Permanent 
Secretary 
6. Justin Mupamhanga (Ex 
CIO) 
Energy and Power Development Permanent 
Secretary 
7. Colonel Joseph 
Mhakayakora 
Ministry of Construction Director 
8. Major Anywhere 
Mutambudzi 
Department of Information Under secretary 
9. Brigadier General Elisha 
Muzonzini 
Foreign Affairs Ambassador, 
Kenya 
10. Major General Edzai 
Chimonyo 
Foreign Affairs Ambassador, 
Tanzania 
11. Brigadier Borniface 
Chidyausiku 
Foreign Affairs Ambassador, 
Zimbabwe 
Permanent Mission 
to UN in New York 
12. Major Jevan Maseko 
 
Foreign Affairs Ambassador, Cuba 
13. Major General Paradzai 
Zimondi 
Prisons Commissioner 
14. Brigadier General 
Happyton Bonyongwe 
Central Intelligence 
Organisation 
Director 
15. Brigadier Gilbert 
Mashingaidze 
 
Sports and Recreation 
Commission 
Chairman 
16. Air Commodore Mike 
Karakadzai 
National Railways of Zimbabwe 
(NRZ) 
General Manager 
17. Brigadier Douglas 
Nyikayaramba 
(Commander 2 Brigade, 
National Railways of Zimbabwe 
(NRZ) 
Board Chairman 
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Harare) 
18. Colonel Samuel Muvuti Grain Marketing Board Chief Executive 
Officer 
19. Major General Engelbert 
Rugeje 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Holdings. 
Board Member 
20. Brigadier General 
Sibusiso Moyo 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Holdings. 
Board Member 
21. Colonel George 
Chiweshe 
Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission 
Head 
22. Major Utuile Silaigwana Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission 
Spokesperson 
23. Sobusa Gula-Ndebele 
(former director of 
military intelligence) 
Attorney General Attorney General 
24. Colonel Karikoga 
Kaseke 
Zimbabwe Tourism Authority Chief Executive 
25. Brigadier General 
Epmarcus Kananga 
Parks and Wild Life. Deputy Director 
General 
26. Major Clive Manjengwa Comptroller and Auditor 
General. 
Officer 
27. Col. Godfrey 
Nhemachena 
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe General Manager 
28. Colonel Ronnie Mutizhe 
 
Operation Maguta/Sisuthi Head 
29. Lieutenant Colonel 
Arnold Hakata 
Garikai/ Hlalani Kulhe Head 
30. Lieutenant Colonel 
Reuben Ngwayi 
Postal and Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority of 
Zimbabwe 
Board Member 
31. Wing Commander M 
Dengura 
Postal and Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority of 
Zimbabwe 
Board Member 
32. Colonel Livingstone 
Chineka 
Postal and Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority of 
Zimbabwe 
Board member 
33. Brigadier Charles 
Wekwete 
TelOne Board Member 
34. Wing Commander 
Kapondoro 
TelOne Board Member 
35. General Vitalis 
Zvinavashe 
Parliament of Zimbabwe MP, Gutu (until 
March 2008) 
36. Colonel Makova Parliament of Zimbabwe MP, Bikita East 
(until March 2008) 
37. Tracy Mutinhiri Parliament of Zimbabwe Senator, Marondera 
Seke 
38. Mendy Chimene (CIO) Parliament of Zimbabwe Senator, Mutasa- 
Mutare (until 
March 2008) 
39. Lieutenant Colonel Parliament of Zimbabwe MP, Chiredzi South 
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Kallisto Gwanetsa (until March 2008) 
40. Vivian Mwashita (CIO) Parliament of Zimbabwe Senator, Mbare- 
Hatfield (until 
March 2008) 
41. Colonel Livingstone 
Chineka 
Parliament of Zimbabwe Member of 
Parliament, Zaka 
East (until March 
2008) 
Source: Zimbabwe Institute (2008: 9). 
 
Not only were the deployments intended to ensure control over state 
apparatuses for political leverage, but they also served as a form of reward to senior 
serving and retired security sector officers. Strategic deployments to the judiciary and 
prison services completed the chain from arrests and detention to prosecution in a 
systematic persecution of the opposition. Not unlike the Botha regime at the height of 
the security state in South Africa, at the policy level, the Joint Operations Command 
took centre-stage in all decision-making processes, with the cabinet (which is charged 
with executive authority) becoming a rubber-stamping organ that endorsed policies 
generated elsewhere. The government in 2005 established the National State Security 
Council to oversee the economy. The National Security Council, chaired by President 
Mugabe himself and including his two vice-presidents, Reserve Bank Governor 
Gideon Gono, Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi, Home Affairs Minister Kembo 
Mohadi and State Security Minister Didymus Mutasa, was dominated by officers 
from the army, the air force, the police and the Central Intelligence Organisation. The 
use of military-style operations to implement policy decisions reflects in the growing 
militarisation of the economy and society.   
 
Alongside the Joint Operations Command, the National Security Council, 
according to Sachikonye, (2011) had become the de facto cabinet. In an attempt to 
control skyrocketing food and other commodity prices as a result of Zimbabwe's 
hyperinflation, the Joint Operations Command and National Security Council ordered 
a clampdown on business in July 2007, compelling businesses and manufacturers to 
slash the prices of goods by more than 50 per cent. The clampdown, named Operation 
Reduce Prices, was overseen by a team of inspectors comprising the police, the army 
and the Central Intelligence Organisation and led to the arrest and imprisonment of 
directors of targeted manufacturing companies and shop managers. However, far from 
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developmental use of state disciplinary capacity to achieve production-oriented 
compliance, the programme lacked economic rationality without corresponding 
control of the costs of production. As a result, the country suffered loss of business 
confidence, a crucial element of the developmental state. Company closures and 
widespread shortages of food and goods ensued as shops failed to restock. Indeed 
‘Operation Reduce Prices’ served as a short-term programme to drum up political 
support at the expense of sustainable economic planning.  
 
Then in July 2005, the government launched ‘Operation Murambatsvina/ 
Restore Order’ and Operation ‘Garikai/ /Hlalani Kuhle/Live Well’. Operation 
Murambatsvina was launched by the government ostensibly to clean up the cities. The 
operation targeted to destroy informal settlements and informal markets while 
Operation Garikai was launched in the aftermath supposedly to redress the effects of 
Operation Murambatsvina. Operation Garikai targeted the building of houses for 
homeless victims of Operation Murambatsvina. Both programmes were planned and 
undertaken by the security forces (International Crisis Group, 17 October 2005). 
Operation Murambatsvina particularly targeted the urban areas, strong opposition 
strongholds, and left more than 700,000 homeless.71 Scholars, including Shale (2006) 
and Alexander and Tendi (2008), amongst other, argued that the ‘operation’ was a 
purge against the people who were suspected of supporting opposition parties, 
particularly the MDC while Operation Garikai benefited mainly ZANU-PF 
supporters. The military oversaw the implementation of Operation Garikai and also 
became its overwhelming beneficiary. As one observer commented about the 700 
houses constructed in Cowdray Park in Bulawayo as part of Operation 
Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle, ‘one could mistake the suburb for a military barrack, soldiers 
appear to be occupying so many of the houses’ (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006: 13). 
 
The government also launched ‘Operation Taguta/ Sisuthi/ Operation Eat 
Well’. Also conceived by the Joint Operations Command, the operation was aimed at 
placing the vital process of food production and distribution under the partial control 
of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008). Under the operation, 
the army was deployed to enforce the delivery of grain by farmers to the Grain 
                                                        
71See UN Fact-Finding Report, (describing how President Mugabe justified Operation 
Murambatsvina to the U.N. 
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Marketing Board. The grain stocks were sold cheaply to ZANU-PF supporters, 
politicians, officials and the military. Perceived opposition supporters were denied 
access to buy cheap grain from the Grain Marketing Board and food aid from donors 
as a political strategy to quell them into submission. The Shadow Report to the 7th, 8th 
and 9thAfrican Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Commission compiled by a 
consortium of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), noted that food aid was being used 
as a campaigning tool by members of the ruling party who refused to allow access by 
members of the opposition to government relief distribution and aid agency food 
programmes.72  
 
Both Operations, ‘Restore Order’ and ‘Eat Well’, did little more than serve the 
political interests of the ruling elite in suppressing opposition and dispensing 
patronage in order to drum up political support. Strategic political and military 
deployments to control key state parastatals enabled the ruling to determine 
beneficiaries while alienating perceived opposition supporters. Within the context of 
severe economic crisis, galloping inflation and high levels of poverty, such 
programmes provided vital avenues for patronage and political control.   
 
Deepening authoritarianism and particularism  
 
Meanwhile, projecting itself under siege, from internal and external 
opponents, ZANU-PF declared in the early 2000s that it was now fighting the Third 
Chimurenga ostensibly to defend the gains of the liberation struggle and preserve the 
gains of the land redistribution exercise. The ruling party mobilised key state organs 
including the military, the war veterans and its paramilitary youth brigades in violent 
2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008 electoral campaigns that included the torturing and 
maiming of opposition supporters. According to Chitiyo and Rupiya, (2005), ZANU-
PF’s struggle for survival became a military operation, and Zimbabwe was turned into 
an operational zone. From March 2000, the state began Operation Tsuro, in which 
military means were used to achieve political objectives. Operation Tsuro had two 
                                                        
72 Cited in the same report: A mother of nine ‘tried repeatedly during 2002 to get on 
feeding lists and was told by the local community leaders responsible for drawing up 
lists that she was not eligible as she was [a member of the] MDC. The kraal head... 
came to her home and told her she had to surrender her MDC cards if she wanted to 
benefit from ... donor food’ (2002:16). 
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main features. The first was that of command-and-control. The Joint Operations 
Command was broadened; this time combining the Ministry of Defence, Zimbabwe 
Republic Police, Central Intelligence Organisation and the Zimbabwe National War 
Veterans’ Association. The second was the establishment of operational zones with 
the task of identifying loyal and opposition communities and individuals with the 
ultimate aim of converting them to ZANU-PF. The third dimension, observed by 
Sachikonye, (2011) included the carrot of land allocations in return for political 
support. 
 
Concurrently, a system of mass political mobilisation began in rural areas, 
with villagers obliged to attend rallies and political indoctrination sessions known as 
pungwes.73 This resulted in groups of internally displaced people, black and white, 
fleeing to the cities. After ZANU-PF’s narrow and controversial victory in the June 
2000 parliamentary elections, the state now formalised its coercive alliance with the 
war veterans and villagers, and also began to indoctrinate the youth in the tenets of 
coercive nationalism. Militia brigades and training schools were established at the 
Border Gezi National Training Centre in Mt Darwin and Mazowe, and the opposition 
continued to be persecuted. Chitiyo and Rupiya, (2005:360) note that another aspect 
was the ‘civilianisation’ of members of the Zimbabwe National Army High 
Command. Many of the high-ranking officers, when nominally retiring from active 
service, received a horizontal transfer to directorships of civilian institutions (as 
discussed earlier on page 71).  
 
Despite the heavily militarised electoral environment, the opposition MDC 
received 57 to ZANU-PF’s 63 of the 120 parliamentary electoral seats in the 2000 
election. ZANU-PF for the first-time lost the two-thirds parliamentary majority it had 
enjoyed since 1985, thereby foreshadowing a tight contest for the 2002, presidential 
polls. Ahead of the presidential elections, the ruling party made changes to key 
electoral bodies. Political deployments ensured the party control of key electoral 
institutions. Lawyer and former Colonel and head of military intelligence, Sobuza 
Gula-Ndebele, was appointed chair of the Electoral Supervisory Commission while 
Brigadier Douglas Nyikayaramba was appointed chief elections officer (Zimbabwe 
                                                        
73 The pungwes were also used by guerrillas in the Second Chimurenga as a mass 
mobilisation technique. 
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Independent, 3 January, 2003). The National Command Centre, established shortly 
before the 2002 election, assisted the Electoral Supervisory Commission. Brigadier 
Douglas Nyikayaramba headed the National Command Centre, responsible for 
collating results from various election centers. Its staff was exclusively drawn from 
the Zimbabwe National Army, Air Force of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Republic Police 
and Central Intelligence Organisation (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008).  
 
The military, war veterans and youth brigades intensified violence against the 
opposition, setting up torture bases in the newly resettled farms. Just a few days 
before the presidential elections, the service chiefs, Commander General of the 
Zimbabwe Prison Services, Paradzai Zimondi, and Commissioner General of Police, 
Augustine Chihuri, led by then Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence forces, General 
Vitalis Zvinavashe, held a press conference and announced that the security forces 
would not salute a president without war credentials. Vitalis Zvinavashe proclaimed 
that: 
 
We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security 
organizations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will 
pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives 
were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe's hard won independence, sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the 
highest office on the land is a ‘straight jacket’ whose occupant is expected to 
observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will therefore not accept, 
let alone support or salute anyone with a different agenda that threatens the 
very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.74 
 
This was in apparent reference to Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the MDC and 
presidential candidate, who did not possess liberation war credentials. ZANU-PF 
presidential candidate Robert Mugabe won the violent election by 57:43 per cent 
against MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai. Since then, the relationship between President 
Mugabe, ZANU-PF and the Joint Operations Command has been subject to the 
critical attention of scholars.  
 
Rupiya has argued that the military had effected a ‘de facto coup d’état’ on 
civilian leadership, while other scholars have more ambiguously described it as a 
                                                        
74  Statement by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander Vitalis Musungwa 
Zvinavashe, Harare, 9 January 2002. 
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‘symbiotic relationship’ (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011). Yet still others argue that 
Mugabe, as Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces is still in control 
(Miles-Tendi, 2013). Concurring with Miles-Tendi, (2013), it appears President 
Mugabe wields effective control of the military elites because of the following 
factors: his power as Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander in Chief and pre-
eminence in ZANU-PF’s 1970s nationalist hierarchy; the use of rewards to maintain 
loyalty; internal divisions in the military elite which prevent it from pulling together 
against him; and his adroitness in appointing to the Joint Operations Command 
officers who are beholden to him because of their chequered past in the military. 
 
Following his presidential election loss, Tsvangirai, wrote a lengthy complaint 
to President Robert Mugabe, which was copied to the Chairman of the African Union 
(AU), the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) and the Chairman of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). In this letter he complained how 
Robert Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF had violated the constitution by 
transforming the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and the Zimbabwe Republic Police into 
partisan political institutions. In the letter, cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006: 50), 
Tsvangirai stated that: 
 
Tragically, the record of your regime displays a deliberate strategy to bend the 
Constitution and warp the relevant Parliamentary statutes in order to obliterate 
this critical separation between civilian and military affairs, as a way to thwart 
and neutralize legitimate and peaceful democratic political change. In the 
result, you have now created a civil-military junta, which acts as an illegal 
bulwark against democratic political opposition in general. This is amply 
demonstrated by the undeniable fact that since 2001, you have remained silent 
when members of the ZDF and ZRP officer corps make public political 
pronouncements singling out the MDC as an enemy political formation that 
must be destroyed, while at the same time, the same officers profess 
unqualified allegiance to your political party, ZANU-PF. 
 
According to the Government of Zimbabwe’s National Defence Policy (NDP) 
of 1997, military personnel are prohibited from active participation in politics. They 
can exercise their democratic right to vote but are not permitted to hold office in any 
political party or political organisation. However, as argued by Chitiyo and Rupiya, 
(2005), notwithstanding the legal and constitutional provisions for civilian control, 
Zimbabwe’s liberation era civil–military relations have had a profound impact on the 
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country’s body politic, reflecting a much more integrated and party based politico-
military structure than what appears in the texts. The national defense policy has been 
redefined as the preservation of ZANU-PF party and government, with the party and 
the state often being perceived as one and the same. The successive election in 2008, 
demonstrate continuities and deepening authoritarian tendencies, the use of military to 
crush opposition politics.  
 
In 2008, the Joint Operations Command was credited with running a violent 
run-off election campaign after President Mugabe had lost the first round poll to 
Morgan Tsvangirai. Under an operation named ‘Operation Makavhoterapapi/ where 
did you cast your vote?’ soldiers were deployed in all ten provinces across the country 
with the aim of ensuring that ZANU-PF would win the presidential election at all 
costs (see appendix 1 for military personnel deployed to lead and run ZANU-PF 
election campaign in April 2008). By Election Day, more than 100 opposition 
supporters had been killed, hundreds were missing, thousands had been injured and 
hundreds of thousands were homeless. Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC’s leader, 
dropped out of the contest and took refuge in the Dutch Embassy in Harare (The 
Washington Post, 05 July 2008). Thereafter, it was only with the intervention of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) that dialogue was facilitated 
amongst the main political parties, leading to the signing of the inter-party Global 
Political Agreement (GPA) which led to the formation of the Inclusive Government 
(which provided for an MDC/ZANU-PF coalition) in February 2009. Subsequently, 
this tentative political stability allowed for a modest economic recovery, as the 
presence in government of the pro-business MDC provided something of a buffer 
against ZANU-PF rapaciousness.    
 
For many observers and stakeholders alike, the signing of the Global Political 
Agreement and establishment of the transitional Inclusive Government was supposed 
to usher in key political reforms leading to the holding of fresh elections under a fair 
political environment. However, as observed by Musavengana (2012), 
notwithstanding the provisions of the Global Political Agreement that recognised the 
two MDC factions as partners in the Inclusive Government (IG), the state security 
sector remained opposed to – and actively sought to undermine – the coalition 
government and maintain its own grip on power. Indeed, the military remained 
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omnipresent in the political and economic spheres. Senior military officers continued 
to usher statements that branded the Prime Minister and MDC leader as a security 
threat. For instance, Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba stated: 
 
Tsvangirai doesn't pose a political threat in any way in Zimbabwe, but is a 
major security threat. He takes instructions from foreigners who seek to effect 
illegal regime change in Zimbabwe. This is what has invited the security 
forces to be involved because we want to ensure we protect our national 
security interests….Daydreamers who want to reverse the gains of our 
liberation struggle will continue daydreaming. They can go to hell . . . they 
will never rule this country. We cannot keep quiet. We will continue speaking 
and as the security forces, we will not sit back and watch things going wrong 
(Herald, 22 June, 2011). 
 
Nyikayamba was subsequently promoted from Brigadier General to Major 
General. However, others including, Miles-Tendi, (2013), argued that the promotion 
was not a form of reward, but rather an espousal of ‘professionalism’ as a means of 
asserting promotional grievance. Nyikayaramba’s comments were not only 
unprofessional conduct but also betrayed the spirit and letter of the interparty 
agreement. Thereafter, the army chief of staff, Major General Martin Chedondo told 
troops at a target shooting competition to leave the military if they did not support 
Mugabe (Zimbabwe Situation, 31 May 2008). Then, in the July 2013 elections, the 
military working closely with an Israeli company, Nikuv International Projects,75 was 
credited with delivering another election victory for ZANU-PF. This time using more 
sophisticated methods and covert rather than overt violence (Masunungure, 2014). 
This election granted Mugabe and ZANU-PF a fresh, albeit controversial mandate 
(although much assisted by the MDC’s own internal divisions and limitations) 
(Raftopoulos, 2013; Masunungure, 2014). The ruling elites continued its populist 
indigenisation and empowerment programmes to nourish their patronage networks 
while investor confidence remained low and economic indicators were heading down.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The rising power of the military in the post-independence period is traced 
back to the politics of the liberation movements and the colonial state. In order to 
                                                        
75 Nikuv Investment projects was officially contracted to provide technical assistance 
to the Registrar General’s Office. 
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control the military wings, the liberation movements co-opted the military 
commanders into policy and political decision-making organs. Simultaneously, the 
Rhodesian Front under increasing political pressure gave enormous power to the 
security forces. However, unlike most African countries at independence, the 
Zimbabwean ruling elite inherited an emerging colonial ‘developmental state’ with 
some notable ‘Weberian bureaucratic characteristics,’ although lacking racial 
impartiality. Through interventionist measures, the state ensured the development of 
white agrarian capital that would be a vital anchor of the colony’s economic growth. 
However, 30 years later, the state had become largely hollowed out, as patronage 
driven appointments to the public service had wrecked the nascent bureaucratic norms 
inherited at independence.  
 
Furthermore, fearing the emergence of autonomous black capital that would 
challenge their interests, the ruling elite chose to collaborate with white agrarian 
capital until 2000 while indigenous business elites were repulsed. Consequently, there 
were no major structural changes to the patterns of ownership (especially land). The 
cumulative consequence of structural economic limitations, failure of the economic 
structural adjustment programme and the regime’s loss of popular support combined 
to define a new regime of accumulation. The economic deterioration in the late 1990s 
triggered popular mobilisation against the ruling elite. In response the state policies 
turned increasingly capricious and predatory motivated by need to build short-term 
political support via patronage and personal greed. To repress political opposition, the 
ruling elite consolidated an alliance with the military. Starting with Gukurahundi in 
the 1980s, ZAPU was destroyed and swallowed, followed by the Zimbabwe Unity 
Movement in the 1990s. Post 2000, MDC leadership and its supporters have been 
subjected to brutal treatment of unimaginable proportions. To retain loyalty and 
support, senior military officers were rewarded with lucrative patronage havens.  The 
accumulation patterns degenerated into often-violent modes of wealth accumulation 
across key economic sectors beginning with the chaotic land grabs in the early 2000s.  
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Chapter Five:  
Land Reform and the Rise of the Landed Elite 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter traces the role of the state in mediating the changing patterns of 
land accumulation and distribution in Zimbabwe. It discusses the colonial state and 
the rise of white agrarian capital, which would emerge as a dominant force both in the 
colonial and post -independence era.  
 
Following the failure by the British South Africa Company to discover large 
quantities of gold, the settlers diversified their economic activities. Commercial 
agriculture emerged as the main sector of this diversification to provide food to a 
growing white population as well as cash crops for foreign markets. The colonial 
regime instituted violent land dispossessions and cattle raids from the indigenous 
black populations. During the early years of settler colonialism, the British South 
Africa company held half of the total arable land, while 20 per cent was classified as 
European and slightly more than 20 per cent infertile land as native reserves (Hull, 
1978: 29). The colonial regime instituted various measures designed to undercut 
productivity and competitiveness of indigenous black agricultural activities and force 
Africans into cheap labour in the white commercial farms and mines. This strategy 
would impose structural limitations on the Rhodesian economy. By undermining 
growth of indigenous agricultural activities and coercing Africans into the sale of 
labour, the state curtailed growth of demand necessary to sustain growth.  
 
By the dawn of independence, 6700 white farmers controlled about 47 per 
cent of all agricultural (prime land) compared to 700,000 black farmers who occupied 
marginal, unfertile lands (Moyo, 1995:78). Yet room to manoeuvre76 was constrained 
by the compromise legislative provisions of the Lancaster House constitution in the 
first decade of independence and the hesitancy prompted by the ruling elite’s alliance 
with white agrarian capital until the late 1990s. The cumulative consequence of 
                                                        
76  Land redistribution was expressly stated as one of the main concerns of the 
liberation struggle. 
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structural economic limitations and the regime’s loss of popular support combined to 
define a new regime of accumulation. The state implemented one of the most 
controversial and violent land reform programme in post-colonial Africa, ostensibly 
to redistribute land to the landless indigenous majority. Yet the military and ZANU-
PF political elites emerged the dominant beneficiaries. Bond and Manyanya (2002), 
contend that this patronage route was important, at a time when state-based 
‘embourgeoisement’ avenues were closing. 
 
Colonial State and Land Politics: 1890 - 1979 
 
In 1890, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) sponsored Pioneer 
Column moved from South Africa to colonise north of the Limpopo in search of a 
mineral strike that they anticipated would be on the scale or better than that 
discovered in the Transvaal. However, when the minerals discovered proved 
disappointing, the colonists began to diversify their interests mainly into agriculture 
(Herbst, 1990: 13). The desire to recover the costs incurred in the heavy infrastructure 
outlays prompted the company to foster the formation of a rural white agrarian 
bourgeoisie, which by developing the country would raise the value of its assets in the 
area, notably the railways, mine claims and land (Arrighi, 1966: 19). In 1894, the 
Company introduced a Hut Tax, and began a lengthy and systematic campaign, 
raiding cattle from indigenous Africans and ‘burning their crops to undermine the 
profitability of indigenous agriculture and compel Africans to pay their taxes in 
labour’ (Benello, 2010: 347). The colonial regime began to pass the first set of 
regulations to assign specific parcels of land to blacks while reserving the best land 
for Europeans (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 23 May 1984). The land 
appropriations and cattle raids caused growing tensions between the Africans and 
white settlers that would culminate in the crushing defeat of the 1896-7 black African 
revolts.  
 
By 1910, 24.3 per cent of land had been appropriated for the whites and 26 per 
cent had been declared Native Reserves, later known as Tribal Trust Lands 
(Harbeson, 1981: 5). Following the attainment of self-governing status, the new state 
institutionalised the land appropriations, notably through the Land Apportionment Act 
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of 1930. The act put a definitive limit to land available for blacks through a legalised 
division of the country’s land, which prohibited members of either racial group from 
owning land in areas assigned to the other. By 1930, 50.8 per cent of the total land 
had been declared ‘European’ (Harbeson 1981: 5), while 30 per cent had been 
reserved for African population. The relegation of the blacks into overcrowded and 
infertile lands rendered black agriculture unproductive and pushed Africans into 
impoverishment and expanding the availability of cheap labour for the white 
economy. In addition, the state imposed high taxes to reinforce the necessity for 
Africans to provide cheap labour to European farms and industries. 
  
 The implementation of the Land Apportionment Act crystalised the 
development of a new class structure marked by the rise of rural white agrarian 
bourgeoisie involved in commercial agriculture and speculation in land, small scale 
and large-scale international mining capital and the proletarianisation77 of African 
labour. Arrighi (1967: 20) argues that development of a rural white agrarian capital, 
‘national’ in character, distinguished Southern Rhodesia from all other colonial 
territories north of the Limpopo where resource extraction was undertaken by large-
scale international capitalism. It conceived as key factors for agrarian growth the 
reduction of competition from peasant agriculture and industry,78 to expand internal 
demand for its produce. Yet the deterioration of peasant productivity and a decline in 
real wages inflicted a dual challenge. On the one hand the decline in African wages 
suppressed growth of domestic demand necessary to sustain growth. On the other 
hand, it would inspire national consciousness among Africans leading to a series of 
protests and political activity in the towns eventuating in the formation of political 
parties, which would culminate in the war of liberation (Hull, 1978: 32). 
 
Through a variety of policy incentives and legislation, the colonial state 
actively promoted the development of white commercial agriculture. Arrighi (1967) 
                                                        
77 By proletariat it is here understood to mean the class of modern wage labourers 
who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour 
power in order to live (Arrighi, 1967: 22).  
78  The interests of industrialisation were contradictory in the sense that while 
industrialisation was important in generating growth of demand both internally and 
externally, it would have the effect of endangering the supplies of African labour 
through increased competition.  
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notes that the colonial regime encouraged growth of white agrarian capital through its 
ambitious programme of investment, experimentation in new crops and through 
legislation aimed at obtaining cheap labour from the indigenous population. 
Furthermore, the state moved aggressively to develop public enterprises to support 
agriculture and other economic activities notably in power generation and marketing 
boards such as the Cold Storage Commission and the Sugar Industry Board’s Triangle 
Estate. Herbst (1990: 19) also notes the provision of state subsidies and price policies 
to guarantee profitability of white farming ventures. He observes: 
 
Although white farmers were the pillars of settler power, many of them were 
about to be forced off the land during the 1930s because of extremely poor 
prices. The government therefore intervened and began to set the maize price 
and stabilise farmers so that they would be able to stay on the land. 
 
The state ensured profitability of white farmers through the provision of 
subsidies and creating a virtual monopoly of the domestic foodstuff market at the 
expense of African producers. Commercial agriculture representative associations 
such as the Rhodesian National Farmers Union (RNFU) founded in 1942 were 
accorded preferential treatment and influence on state policies. Hull (1978: 32) 
observed that from 1937 to 1958, there was a tenfold increase in white agriculture, 
mainly due to a shift from maize to tobacco production in the 1940s. The export of 
tobacco came to represent a substantial portion of the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings. The strengthening of the white rural bourgeoisie would become a potent 
political force when their interests were threatened. The growing political activity by 
Africans and influence of the manufacturing class led to marginal concessions aimed 
at improving the general conditions of Africans to stabilise the labour force.79 The 
partial concessions to improve African working conditions caused animosity with 
white agrarian capital, which relied on cheap labour to ensure viability. The 
December 1962 election victory of the agrarian bourgeoisie backed Rhodesian Front 
(RF) affirmed the growing power of this class whose influence would extend into late 
1990s well after the country’s political independence. The Rhodesian Front victory 
                                                        
79 For example in 1954, a bill to give recognition for African trade unions leading to 
the amendment of the Industrial conciliation act to include Africans in the definition 
of an employee. These measures had the effect of triggering collective bargaining by 
Africans and increasing wages, which was against the interests of white agrarian 
capital. (Hull, 1978: 38).   
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ushered swift reversals of marginal concessions to improve African labour working 
conditions.  
 
Following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, the state 
reversed all the progressive policies meant to improve Africans and intensified 
interventionist measures to hedge the whites against economic uncertainties. 
Although the share of agriculture contribution to national output declined relative to 
manufacturing, tobacco remained a major foreign exchange earner while the 
development of agriculture was viewed as strategic to ensure the colony’s self-
sufficiency. Table 5.1 below shows agricultural contribution to GDP and real GDP 
growth rates between 1947 and 1979. 
 
Table 5.1: Share of agriculture contribution to GDP 1947 – 1979 
Year Contribution to GDP Real GDP growth 
1947 n.a 14,64 
1948 26,9 12,26 
1949 23,6 8,38 
1950 23,4 10,77 
1951 n.a 7,31 
1952 n.a 9,69 
1953 n.a 8,05 
1954 22,8 n.a 
1955 21,3 8,85 
1956 21,8 8,74 
1957 19,8 9,14 
1958 18,7 1,18 
1959 19,2 3,37 
1960 18,8 3,24 
1961 21,7 2,35 
1962 21,0 -0,45 
1963 20,9 1,85 
1964 20,5 2,04 
1965 17,0 3,90 
1966 19,6 -2,12 
1967 20,2 7,41 
1968 15,4 1,87 
1969 17,9 15,66 
1970 15,2 2,18 
1971 16,1 8,77 
1972 16,5 8,46 
1973 13,8 3,00 
1974 16,9 6,44 
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1975 16,2 -3,63 
1976 16,2 -1,04 
1977 15,2 -11,90 
1978 12,4 0,73 
1979 11,5 3,84 
Source: Herbst (1990: 23) 
 
However, whereas statistics show a remarkable agriculture performance with 
the exception of a few years when the economy experienced strain under sanctions 
and war, black farming severely deteriorated throughout the colonial period. The 
techniques employed by the native peasantry, the type of soil allocated to them and 
the shift to continuous cultivation produced progressive soil erosion and thus 
decreasing productivity of African allocated land (within a context of declining 
availability of land to Africans). The increasing hand-to-mouth activities and 
impoverishment would become source of black resistance and the liberation war. 
Hence the centrality of agriculture to African political economy provided the impetus 
for the country’s liberation struggle.  
 
Post-Independence State and Land Politics: 1980 - 1997 
 
After a protracted struggle in which land was amongst the central issues, the 
national liberation movements took power in 1980. However, the compromise 
Lancaster House agreement imposed severe constraints upon the new political elites’ 
ability to implement land redistribution. Firstly, property rights’ provisions ensured 
that white agrarian capital could only be displaced from their land through a ‘willing 
buyer-willing seller’ basis during the first 10 years of independence. This policy had 
strong implications for the resolution of Zimbabwe’s gross inequalities in land 
ownership. Secondly, the new ruling elite lacked the skills to manage the economy. 
This rendered them heavily dependent on the expertise and acumen of the white 
business community to help navigate the demands of managing the inherited economy 
(Taylor, 2007: 107). This would help to explain the hesitancy of the ruling elite 
towards land reform. Yet land was expressly stated as a major concern of the 
liberation war. Herbst (1990: 37) contends, ‘indeed, there was probably no more 
controversial question at independence than how the new regime would be able to 
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resist the influence of white agrarian capital and implement promises concerning land 
it had made during the liberation struggle.’  
 
In 1980, the new black elites inherited a racially skewed system of land 
ownership. Large-scale commercial farmers consisting of less than one per cent of the 
country’s population occupied 47 per cent of the country’s prime agricultural land. 
More than half of the large-scale commercial farms were in the areas of the country 
with high rainfall, where the potential for agricultural production was high. White 
farmers produced almost all of the country’s tobacco, tea, coffee and sugar. In 1984, 
according to the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, these 
crops accounted for 34 per cent of total exports (1987: 11). Commercial agriculture 
contributed more than four times as much agricultural output as all peasant farmers 
combined. Table 5.2 below shows farmers’ contribution to agricultural production: 
 
Table 5:2: Commercial and peasant agriculture production 
Year Percentage contribution to national agricultural output 
Commercial farmers Peasant farmers 
1978 84,65 15,35 
1979 80,03 19,97 
1980 79,48 20,52 
1981 74,10 25,90 
1982 74,88 25,12 
1983 82,18  17,18 
1984 78,58 21,42 
1985 61,17 31,83 
Source: Herbst 1990: 37 
 
Meanwhile the state maintained a close pact with white agrarian capital,80 
which was firmly placed on a strategic economic position with considerable policy 
                                                        
80 Commenting on the Commercial Famers’ Union relationship with the government, 
in an interview, the president of the union Jim Sinclair, remarked that the government 
had displayed more commitment to agriculture than any other sector of the economy, 
and the union considers that it had done more for commercial farming than the 
Rhodesian Front did in 16 years’ (Financial Gazette, September 4, 1981: 12). Mr. 
David Hasluck, assistant director in the CFU also stated ‘I am satisfied that our 
continuing good relations with the Minister provide for useful exchanges of ideas on 
the practicalities of the land resettlement programme (Financial Gazette, February 19, 
1982: 1). 
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influence. The white commercial farmers enjoyed selective incentives from the state 
including preferential access to foreign currency, 81  while the imperative of land 
redistribution suffered, as the government was keen not to upset white capital. For 
example, in 1981, Minister of Lands, Dr. Sekeramayi in a statement released in the 
Herald, announced that a ceiling might be put in place on individual land use by 
commercial farmers to allow for more land redistribution. The Commercial Farmers’ 
Union questioned government’s motives.82 In response, the Minister quickly issued a 
retraction and dismissing his earlier position as having been misquoted (Financial 
Gazette, October 2, 1981: 1).   
 
Progress on peasant resettlement targets remained far off the mark while 
ruling ZANU-PF political elites were beneficiaries of large-scale farms acquired for 
redistribution. During the first decade, the government set the target of resettling 
15,000 families a year, this translating into 150,000 families resettled by 1990 
(Financial Gazette, May 23, 1986: 4). However, by November 1990, about a third, 
52,000 families had been resettled on 3,3 million hectares of land (Financial Gazette, 
November 2, 1990: 20). Yet occasional conflicts were bound to emerge with the 
peasantry given that land was one of the emotive issues instrumental in galvanising 
mass support during the war of liberation. In response to the slow pace of land reform, 
isolated squatting on vacant state land and private land became common (Moyo, 
2000; Masiiwa, 2004). Various other demands for land were expressed through 
transgressions including poaching of wildlife and cattle (Moyo, 1998). Government 
policy was contradictory. In some cases squatters were ruthlessly chased away83 and 
                                                        
81  During foreign currency rationing in the early 80s, the Minister of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement successfully lobbied for increased allocation of 
foreign currency to white farmers arguing that they were the largest foreign currency 
earners and therefore should be allocated more foreign currency to buy imported 
machinery, spares and inputs (Interview, Tony Hawkins, March 2014). 
82 In an interview with the Financial Gazette, CFU Vice President, Mr. John Laurie, 
said that the Minister’s statements were not in the interest of reconciliation and 
confidence building and therefore should be reversed (Financial Gazette, October 2, 
1981: 1). 
83 In an interview with the Financial Gazette, the Minister of Local Government and 
Rural Development, Mr. Enos Chikowero remarked ‘There is no piece of land in 
Zimbabwe which is not owned by anybody. So no individual is allowed to settle on 
another person’s farm property. This is illegal and the state will not hesitate to deploy 
its heavy arm of the law’ (Financial Gazette, May 19, 1989). 
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yet in other (albeit) few cases, the state conceded to squatters’ demands and acquired 
the land in question for resettlement. It would suggest that the government was 
against radical land reforms. The statement by the then Prime Minister addressing a 
meeting of more than 150 commercial farmers at Rusawi River Club, is illustrative:  
 
Apart from the moral aspect of it, if we take all your farms today we would 
not have the people to run them. Regard yourselves rooted here. You are 
Zimbabweans and therefore do not look at yourselves as a separate entity. Our 
policies are not meant to disrupt the economy…nationalisation would lead to 
that kind of disruption…There are non-socialist modalities which must be 
promoted and even given incentives. The state must enable them to have funds 
keep going… Our view is that we must never disrupt the economy’ (Financial 
Gazette, February 01, 1985: 13). 
 
Similar to the mining sector, the state actively protected and supported the 
interests of white capital, while suppressing the development of an independent black 
agrarian class, thus laying the basis for the predatory state. For example, a report by a 
commission of inquiry looking into the agricultural industry bemoaned lack of 
support for communal farmers and noted the need for ‘incentives’ including access to 
finance, marketing and transport facilities to improve productivity (Financial Gazette, 
December 14, 1984: 25). Communal and resettled farmers faced a double challenge.  
They lacked collateral commonly required across commercial lenders to access 
finance. Meanwhile they also faced labour shortages at critical production periods: for 
instance Gokwe communal farmers had to pay cotton pickers 5 cents more per 
kilogramme than that paid by commercial farmers (Financial Gazette, December 14, 
1984: 25). Indeed, the state was reluctant to embrace black capitalist lobby efforts for 
land reform and incentives. This undermined the capacity of the state to develop and 
integrate indigenous agrarian capital for long-term developmental goals. 
 
There are various interpretations that have been proffered to explain the 
failures of the first phase of the land redistribution programme. Acknowledging the 
limitation of the Lancaster House constitution, Moyo (1995; 2006) noted that the legal 
constraints imposed by the constitution limited the government to market based land 
reform approaches. Consequently the pace of land reform was determined by the 
willingness to sell by landholders. The UNDP (2002) also noted that the need to 
protect the economic structure dominated by the minority and the establishment and 
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consolidation of political control to govern the country effectively gave rise to failure 
of land reform. It would suggest as argued by Taylor (2007), the new black ruling 
elites feared the emergence of an autonomous domestic bourgeoisie that would 
challenge their interests and instead opted to forge an alliance with white domestic 
capital, which did not pose a direct threat to the elite’s power aspirations. Thus post-
independence state policies rather than seek to mobilise and integrate previously 
marginalised indigenous black capital, continued to promote and favour white 
agrarian capital until the costs of association diminished with increasing political 
pressure in the late 1990s. Even after the expiration of the Lancaster House clauses in 
the 1990, the state did not pursue aggressive land redistribution. 
 
For a while it appeared that any talk of land redistribution would suffer lack of 
political incentive from the government to concur with black capital lobby and 
peasant demands following the unification of the two major parties to affirm 
unparalleled political dominance. However, the emergence of the new opposition 
shifted the balance of forces. Facing opposition from the newly formed Zimbabwe 
Unity Movement (ZUM) in the 1990 elections, amid corruption scandals in the public 
sector and insatiable demand for land amongst the peasants, the government invoked 
the land issue to mobilise support among the electorate. The president told ZANU-PF 
supporters during election campaigns that ‘the government would not accept a 
situation where an odd 4,000 white commercial farmers held most of the productive 
land, in a country of 10 million people’ (Financial Gazette, March 23, 1990: 19) 
hinting that the government would accelerate land redistribution through 
constitutional amendments when the Lancaster House expired in 1990. The 
relationship between the government and white farmers was getting tenuous as some 
white farmers shifted allegiance to the new opposition political party.84 The state 
responded by attacking white farmers for allegedly supporting the opposition.85 The 
                                                        
84 A former white farmer speaking on condition of anonymity, highlighted that ‘We 
were like anybody else, we should be allowed to vote and campaign for any party 
whose programmes we agree with’ (Financial Gazette, March 23, 1990: W3). 
85 Foreign Affairs Minister, Nathan Shamhuyarira, called a meeting in Chinhoyi with 
the white commercial farmers to express the ruling party’s dismay and anger at their 
alleged support for ZUM including urging farm workers to vote for ZUM (Financial 
Gazette, March 23, 1990: W3). 
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position of famers was even more uncertain after the elections. Land appeared to be 
treated more as a political tool rather than a key asset for national development.  
 
Meanwhile donor support for land redistribution was not forthcoming.86 The 
major donors including; the British Oversees Development Administration, the 
African Development bank, the African Development Fund, the Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic Development and the European Community (EC) queried 
government’s capacity to implement the programme and its corruption. In response to 
the request by the Zimbabwean government for further assistance to purchase land for 
resettlement programme, the British government stated in principle, that it was 
prepared to continue to assist, but on two conditions. One of the conditions was that 
the Zimbabwean government should retain the willing seller-willing buyer provision 
entrenched in the British brokered Lancaster House constitution, and the second was 
that arrangements should be in hand for the timely efficient development of land to 
ensure that economic and social benefits were attainable by those to be resettled’87 
(Financial Gazette, October 19, 1990: 21). 
 
In 1990, the government approved a New Land Policy88 retaining the ‘willing 
seller-willing buyer’ in desperate need for foreign aid, although the government 
would reserve the right to purchase land required for public purposes and would pay 
owners in local currency. The policy also introduced the one-person per farm 
principle. The Land Acquisition Act of 1985 was also amended to give the Minister 
responsible for Land power to designate any land for public purposes and to approve 
all private land transfers.89 The Commercial Farmers Union queried the policy.90 The 
                                                        
86 In 1989, the British government, which since 1980 had single-handedly funded the 
resettlement programme, suspended funding citing poor management and 
implementation of the programme by the government (Financial Gazette, November 
21, 1996: 2) 
87 These points were contained in a letter dated October 18, 1989, written to Vice 
President Simon Muzenda, who was the then acting Minister of Finance, Economic 
Planning and Development, by Mrs. Lynda Chalker, the British Minister for Overseas 
Development. 
88 The New Land Policy was given effect by the Constitutional Amendment (No 11 of 
1990) passed into law by parliament on December 12, 1990. 
89 Land transfers under the act included: sales in execution and insolvency, barter 
deals, donations, land exchanges, and transfers of land to a company by buying out 
another company’s trademark. 
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Union argued for market determined land prices to ensure fair compensation 
(Financial Gazette, July 27, 1990: 23). The government sought to acquire 6 million 
hectares of commercial farmland, at a cost of $540 million, to be allocated to 
communal farmers under the resettlement programme (Financial Gazette, July 27, 
1990: 23). The Commercial Farmers Union felt that ZW$ 540 million was far below 
an estimated market value of ZW$3 billion.  
 
However, the convergence of interest on the ‘turn-around’ structural 
adjustment programme provided the umbilical rapport between the state and the white 
farmers. In spite of its concern about the land takeover threats, the Commercial 
Farmers’ Union sent a supporting letter to all countries and financial institutions, 
which were attending the Paris donor conference on Zimbabwe on March 27 and 28, 
1991 to fundraise for the structural adjustment programme. This letter deserves 
quoting at length to show the commercial farmers’ support and encouragement to the 
government on stability and security of investment: 
 
Commercial farmers are fully supportive of government’s plans to open the 
economy and believe strongly in the need to relax domestic controls, both in 
terms of pricing of products and producing labour regulations more conducive 
to investment opportunities…It is sincerely hoped that those countries and 
individual organisations attending the Paris conference will look favourably 
upon Zimbabwe as a stable and secure country and become actively involved 
in the new proposed structural adjustment programme to the mutual benefit of 
Zimbabwe and themselves….The integrity and intentions of the people and 
the government of Zimbabwe stand out proud in the context of Africa, and the 
commercial farmers of Zimbabwe pledge to do all they can to retain this 
external confidence shown in our young developing nation (Financial Gazette, 
April 4, 1991: 3). 
 
Meanwhile, the situation did not help the white farmers as contradictions in 
government ensued. On the one hand, the Minister of Finance working closely with 
the white farmers to mobilise international donor support for the economic structural 
adjustment programme, promised to help incorporate their views. On the other hand, 
under increasing political pressure, the Minister of Lands and Agriculture insisted that 
                                                                                                                                                              
90 Mr. Hasluck, CFU Director, speaking at the Institute of Bankers of Zimbabwe, 
Winter Banking School told delegates that ‘the National Land Policy document was 
full of ill-conceived and rhetorical recommendations on the manner in which the 
commercial farmers will be dealt with in the future’ (Financial Gazette, July 27, 
1990: 23). 
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the government would take farms and pay later (Financial Gazette, January 14, 1999: 
1). The bill was passed into law without incorporating the views of white farmers. 
Even then, not much progress was achieved, as the state was desperate for funding 
from the IMF and WB at a time when the economy was suffering huge budget deficits 
and inflationary pressures. Only about 400 farms were acquired, and these largely 
benefited senior party officials. The Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report of 
1993 unearthed senior ZANU-PF officials who appropriated farms ahead of the 
landless peasants. 
 
Economic decline and events leading to the fast track land reform 
 
By the late 1990s, under increasing political pressure following corruption scandals, 
rising unemployment and declining economic growth, the government jettisoned the 
structural adjustment program. The legitimacy of the government was fast fading and 
began to breed discontent. In 1997, a spate of strikes that began with the public sector 
workers earlier in the preceding year was soon followed by private sector employee 
strikes and, subsequently, protests by war veterans over the abuse of the war victims’ 
compensation fund (Bond and Manyanya, 2002). The endurance of the war veterans’ 
demonstrations for over three months came as a major shock to the regime, to the 
extent that some ZANU-PF government Ministers stayed for weeks in hiding. 
Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, responsible for the 
administration of the fund, Florence Chitauro was in hiding for weeks after the war 
veterans threatened to take her life.91 The entire top brass of the security service 
organs were implicated in the abuse of the fund,92 including the most trusted personal 
aid to the President, Winston Jangara. After weeks of Joint Operations Command 
(JOC) security council meetings, President Robert Mugabe conceded the pressure and 
announced a decision to give each of the registered liberation war veterans an 
unbudgeted Z$50,000 pension once-off payout, Z$2,000 per month plus benefits 
including school fees for their children. This marked another critical point in the shift 
                                                        
91  Interview, former permanent secretary Ministry of Public Service, Labour and 
Social Welfare, 02 April 2015. 
92  Among those implicated, the Commander General of the Zimbabwe Defense 
Forces, Vitalis Zvinavashe, Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army Constantine 
Chiwenga, Air Marshall Perrance Shiri, Prison Commissioner General Paradzai 
Zimhondi and Police Commissioner General, Augustine Chihuri. 
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towards a predatory state. While the state stressed its funding limitations for land 
redistribution (UNDP, 1998), it honoured an unbudgeted equivalence of US$200 
million93 in gratuities to war veterans. The decision to award gratuity payments to war 
veterans was taken independently of parliament, and transformed the issue from a 
severe embarrassment to a useful alliance with the ruling party (Selby, 2006:267).  
 
On November 14 1997, commonly known as the ‘Black Friday’, the 
Zimbabwe dollar fell from around Z$10 to below Z$30 to the US$ in just over four 
hours of trading time (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:v). President Mugabe further 
announced that he would proceed with more active land redistribution as he sought to 
further strengthen the ruling party alliance with nationalist war veterans and landless 
peasants. Given the ramifications of the currency plunge, the immediate task of the 
government might have been that of instituting confidence measures in the economy. 
Instead, the ruling elite became preoccupied more with regaining political support 
without regard to economic considerations. On 9, December, 1997 commonly known 
as ‘Red Tuesday,’ Tsvangirai (then President of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade 
Unions), led the country’s first post-Independence national stay-away, followed by 
mass strikes and protests during 1998. Then in February 1999, the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions convened the National Working People’s Convention, 
which resolved to launch a political party to challenge ZANU-PF. The Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) was launched in September 1999 as a broad pro-poor 
coalition of workers, students, churches, academics and white commercial farmers - 
whose relationship with the ruling ZANU-PF had reached a breaking point with 
increasing threats of compulsory land acquisition.  
 
In early 1998, the state designated 1,488 large farms for possible compulsory 
acquisition in preparation for the second phase of the land redistribution programme 
(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1997:6). Farm owners contested the appropriations and won 
most of their cases in the courts. However, according to Bond and Manyanya 
(2002:30), ‘once again, ZANU [PF] elites were apparently not serious about 
thorough-going redistribution, which would require vastly greater resources, support 
structures and administrative staff than were budgeted and planned.’ The government 
                                                        
93 This amounted for nearly twice the total budget spent on land acquisitions between 
1980 and 1995 (Selby, 2006:246). 
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estimated that it would need about US$1,9 billion (about Z$42 billion), which it 
hoped to raise from international donors. During this period, increasing isolated land 
occupations started to become more common, with the explicit aim of redistributing 
land from white farmers to landless villagers and war veterans (Moyo, 2006). The 
occupations came in waves, starting with just a few. By mid-1998, communal farmers 
in Nyamandlovu in Matebeleland North and Sosve in Mashonaland East invaded 
commercial farms demanding to be immediately resettled. However, ostensibly in the 
interest of on-going negotiations with donors and the Commercial Farmers Union, the 
government suppressed the occupations. The government proceeded to organise a 
donors’ conference in Harare in September 1998 to raise sufficient funds for Phase II 
Resettlement Programme. 
 
However, the negotiations soon collapsed with the ruling elites seeing that the 
donor processes would involve long negotiations while their interest lay in quickly 
appeasing restless constituencies ahead of the nearing general elections in 2000. The 
state threw all caution to the wind. The army alongside war veterans took over the 
previously sporadic and spontaneous grassroots farm invasions by landless people and 
transformed it into a coercive land redistribution program invading over 1,500 white 
owned farms (Alexander 2003; 2006). Chenjerai Hunzvi led the war veterans while 
the ‘operation’ as a whole was directed by Air Marshal Perrance Shiri, who had been 
the commander of the Fifth Brigade at the time of the Matebeleland massacres in the 
1980s (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008). Meanwhile, the Zimbabwe Republic Police took 
no action to prevent the illegal occupations, claiming that they lacked the capacity to 
repel the squatters (Moyo, 2006).  
 
 The state sought to legalise compulsory land acquisition without 
compensation through passage of a proposed draft constitution. However, this was 
strongly rejected in February 2000 referendum, this providing a sure sign of 
disapproval of ZANU-PF and its patronage policies. More than a rejection of 
compulsory land acquisition, the anti-draft constitution movement sought to express 
disapproval of the ZANU-PF rule by a ‘no vote’ referendum victory.94 Despite the 
                                                        
94  The anti-draft constitution campaign was spearheaded by civil society groups 
including students, churches and opposition political parties under the umbrella of the 
National Constitutional Assembly. 
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rejection of the draft constitution, the ZANU-PF dominated parliament went on to 
amend the constitution in April 2000. This enabled the state to acquire commercial 
farms without an obligation to pay for the land, but only for the farm improvements. 
The amendments did not stop farm invasions: instead the state actively supported 
more violent invasions claiming it was now fighting the Third Chimurenga to 
empower the masses as the June 2000 parliamentary elections approached. The MDC 
won 57 (mostly urban seats) of the 120 contested parliamentary seats clearly setting 
the grand stage for the presidential election scheduled in March 2002. The ruling 
party was severely shaken. ZANU-PF intensified the coercive land redistribution, 
resorting to Ake’s posture of ‘defensive radicalism’95 in order to recover lost political 
ground (1978). According to Bond and Manyanya (2002), the fast track land reform 
beginning in February 2000 can be read as a direct response to the referendum 
humiliation, revenge against white farmers,96 and an emotive vote-catcher.  
 
On 10 November 2000, the Supreme Court passed a judgment instructing the 
state to stop the fast track land programme unless the necessary legal requirements 
had been put in place. Southall (2013: 149) notes graphically that:  
 
The government’s response was vicious. The state portrayed the Supreme 
Court judgment as a racist attempt to undermine the land reform and launched 
public attacks on the white judges. Mugabe and several ministers, amongst 
them Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, condemned the judges as relics of 
Rhodesia, while on one occasion, the war veterans invaded the Supreme Court 
and threatened to kill the opponents of the land reform. 
 
Chief Justice Gubbay in particular was accused of ‘making Supreme Court 
decisions that were meant to derail the land reform programme. Yet an earlier ruling 
by two black judges in the High Court, had also declared that the Land reform was 
being conducted in an illegal manner. Under immense political pressure, Chief Justice 
Gubbay retired before his term was over. Over the next period, the judiciary was 
                                                        
95 Defensive radicalism is an attempt at mystification, an assumption of a radical 
posture and the use of this radical posture as a cover containing revolutionary 
pressures and maintaining the status quo (Ake, 1978:92).  
96 Some white farmers openly joined and supported the broad coalition that formed 
the opposition Movement for Democratic Change.  These included Roy Bennett, who 
would become its treasurer for the new opposition party. 
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under siege.97 Four remaining Supreme Court justices and nine of the eighteen High 
Court judges perceived to be independent either resigned or were forced into 
retirement. They were replaced with judges pliant to the executive,98 who also joined 
the list of beneficiaries of the coercive land redistribution programme. The state took 
control of the judiciary and undermined its vital independence, which supposedly 
provides impartial enforcement of the law to guarantee capital security in a modern 
economy. 
 
The occupations continued and the state established partisan structures in 
favour of ZANU-PF to preside over the land allocations. The notions of Weberian 
bureaucratic impartiality were subordinated to the political imperatives. At grassroots 
level, the ward councillors, headmen and local representatives of ZANU-PF were 
responsible for selecting beneficiaries. A more elaborate approach involved interested 
people submitting their applications to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural 
Resettlement in any province. The applicants were short-listed and evaluated by the 
technical sub-committee of the Provincial Land Identification and Resettlement 
Committee. The sub-committee chaired by the Provincial Administrator was 
comprised of provincial government officers and a representative from the department 
of War Veterans Affairs. The sub-committee would make recommendations to the 
Provincial Land Identification and Resettlement Committee chaired by the Provincial 
Governor and Resident Minister appointed by the President. Chiefs and war veterans 
were also represented in the Provincial Land Identification and Resettlement 
Committee. The committee meeting outcomes were submitted to the Agricultural 
Land Resettlement Board which further reviewed the applications and made 
recommendations to the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement for 
approval. Finally, the National Land Allocation and Redistribution Committee 
endorsed the decision taken by the minister before the land was allocated to 
qualifying applicants (Masiiwa, 2004: 21). 
                                                        
97 At the lower levels, judges who had sufficient credibility to resist undue influence 
from the government and ZANU-PF were likewise subjected to intimidation and 
harassment (Southall, 2013: 149). 
98  The new Supreme Court Chief justice, Godfrey Chidyausiku criticised earlier 
rulings by the Gubbay led bench alleging it was biased in favour of white farmers. His 
reconstituted bench thereafter determined that the government had fully complied 
with the order to put in a lawful programme. This was despite the evidence that the 
rule of law had not been restored, as the illegal occupations continued.  
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The Land Acquisition Act of 1990 obligated the government to pay for 
developments and improvements on the acquired farms. In turn the government 
structured the compensation as follows: 25 per cent of the total value of farm 
developments and improvements immediately after the acquisition, 25 per cent within 
two years and the rest within five years. However, farmers whose land was acquired 
were totally unsatisfied by the compensation arrangements. In their view, the 
staggered way of payment made it difficult for them to invest in other forms of 
business. The situation was made worse by the existing high inflation rate, which 
went up as much as 600 per cent during the year 2003. Paying full compensation after 
5 years therefore meant that part of the compensation was rendered valueless. On 
March 2001, the government enacted the Rural Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) 
Act Chapter 20:10. The act prevented the eviction of people who had invaded farms 
until the issue was determined in the Administrative Court. 
 
The Fast Track Land Reform Targets and Outcomes 
 
On 15 July 2000 the state officially launched the fast track land resettlement 
programme. Targets set during this period were to acquire 1 million hectares and 
resettle 30,000 families. Thereafter, the fast track program would be completed in 
three years with the additional acquisition of 4 million hectares of commercial farm 
land in which about 120,000 families would resettle (Masiiwa, 2004). The state was 
subordinated to the ruling party, to ensure ruling party supporters, political and 
military elites benefited while perceived opposition supporters were discriminated 
against. Although the government claimed success, highlighting that it had managed 
to resettle close to 200 000 peasants,99 resettlement on the best land was regularly 
delegitimised by blatant cronyism and corruption (Bond and Manyanya, 2002, 
Marongwe, 2009). Contrary to the one person per farm policy initially announced by 
the government, senior military officers and ZANU-PF politicians conspicuously 
benefitted by their acquisition of larges farms in lucrative farming regions and often 
with more than one-farm per person. Based on research conducted in late 2010, which 
drew information from government sources and audit reports, Table 5.3 below 
                                                        
99 Other scholars place the figure at 170,000. See Moyo, (2011: 496). 
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provides a list of high-ranking military and political elites who benefited from the 
land reform in the early 2000s. This report has not been challenged by ZANU-PF and 
the government. 
 
Table 5.3: List of high-ranking military and political elites who benefitted from the 
FTLRP in the early 2000s 
Name Farm Size Area 
Security Services 
Solomon Mujuru Alamein Farm 1300ha Beatrice 
Constantine Chiwenga 
 
Chakoma Estates 1276ha Goromonzi 
Bamboo Creek 1950ha Shamva 
Perrance Shiri Eirin Farm 1460ha Marondera 
Augustine Chihuri Woodlands Farm  Shamva 
Paradzayi Zimondi Upton Farm 1029ha Goromonzi 
Happyton Bonyongwe Thetford Farm   
Henry Muchena Serui Drift 1500ha Chegutu 
Abu Basutu Swallowfork Ranch 2711ha West 
Nicholson 
Elson Moyo Daisy Farm 1600ha Chegutu 
Judges 
Godfrey Chidyausiku Estes Park 895ha Concession 
Luke Malaba Marula Block 1866ha Bulilamang
we 
Paddington Garwe Faun Farm 760ha Chegutu 
Antonia Guvava Harndale Farm 1000ha Chegutu 
Mafios Cheda Block 37 3039ha Bulilamang
we 
Ben Hlatshwayo Kent Estate 800ha Norton 
Charles Hungwe Little England 6956ha Makonde 
Chitakunye Alfias The Grange 1300ha Chegutu 
The Executive (President, Vice Presidents and Cabinet Ministers) 
Robert Mugabe Gushungo Estates 4046ha Darwendale 
Gushungo Dairies 1000ha Mazowe 
Iron Mask 1046ha Mazowe 
Sigaru Farm 873ha Mazowe 
Gwebi Wood 1200ha Mazowe 
Gwina Farm 1445ha Banket 
Leverdale Farm 1488ha Mazowe 
Highfield 445ha Norton 
Cressydale Estate 676ha Norton 
Tankatara 575ha Norton 
Clifford 1050ha Norton 
John O’Groats Farm 760ha Norton 
Bassiville 1200ha Mazowe 
John Nkomo Gijima Lodge  Hwange 
Simon Khaya Moyo Marula Block 36 2034ha Bulilamang
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we 
Joseph Made Tara Farm 840ha Odzi 
Emmerson Mnangagwa Sherwood Farm   
Francis Nhema Nyamanda 1000ha Karoi 
Stanislaus Mudenge Chikore Farm 760ha Masvingo 
Kembo Mohadi Block  3000ha Beitbridge 
Benlynian Range 3200ha Beitbridge 
Patrick Chinamasa Tsukumai 800ha Headlands 
Nyamazura 1260ha Rusape 
Hebert Murerwa Rise Holm 1100ha Arcturus 
Ignatius Chombo Allan Grange 3000ha Banket 
Oldham 400ha Chegutu 
Shingwiri 1600ha Chegutu 
Webster Shamu Lambourne Farm 1340ha Selous 
Tobacco Estate 900ha Chegutu 
Obert Mpofu Young Farm 2300ha Nyamandlo
vu 
Umguza Block 39, 40, 41 6200ha Umguza 
Auchenberg 1026ha Nyamandlo
vu 
Sithembiso Nyoni Fountain Farm 3100ha Insiza 
Walter Mzembi BW Farm 720ha Masvingo 
Nicholas Goche Ceres Farm  Shamva 
Savior Kasukuwere Conucopia Farm 100ha Mazowe 
Harmony Farm 500ha Mazowe 
Sydney Sekeramayi Maganga Farm 620ha Marondera 
Edna Madzongwe Aitape Farm 2000ha Chegutu 
Coburn Estates Plot 13a560ha Chegutu 
Bourne Farm 445ha Chegutu 
Mpofu Farm 1200ha Chegutu 
Stockdale Farm 750ha Chegutu 
Reyden Farm 1340ha Chegutu 
Provincial Governors 
David Karimanzira Arcadia Farm 1300ha Marondera 
Cain Mathema Gwayi Ranch 4600ha Gwayi 
Umguza Block 3700ha Umguza 
Chris Mushohwe Kondozi Farm 400ha Odzi 
Titus Maluleke Clipshap Farm 3000ha Masvingo 
Thokozile Mathutu Dete Valley Farm 2800ha Dete 
Anthonia Extension 6500ha Umguza 
Angeline Masuku Wollendale Farm 3000ha Gwanda 
Cephas Msipa Cheshire Farm 2100ha Gweru 
ZANU-PF Politicians 
Reward Marufu Leopards Vlei 1294ha Glendale 
Kachere Farm 880ha Mazowe 
Sabina Mugabe Mlembwe Farm 1037ha Makonde 
Longwood Farm 924ha Makonde 
Gowrie Farm 430ha Norton 
105 
 
Leo Mugabe Diandra 815ha Darwandale 
Nangadza 1200ha Mhangura 
Journey’s End 3000ha Makonde 
Patrick Zhuwao Marivale Farm 244ha Mazowe 
George Charamba Battlefields 02 1572ha Kwekwe 
Nathan Shamuyarira Mt Carmel  Chegutu 
Bright Matonga Lions Vlei 2000ha Chegutu 
Amos Midzi Magudu Ranch 10701ha Chiredzi 
Dick Mafios Insingizi Farm 1100ha Bindura 
Melfort 554ha Mazowe 
Joseph Chinotimba Watakai 1240ha Mazowe 
Happison Muchechetere Burry Hill 617ha Makonde 
Tobaiwa Mudede Ballineety 3147ha Nyabira 
Austin Zvoma Chinomwe Estates 1432ha Makonde 
Mariyawanda Nzuwa Stella Burton 425ha Mazowe 
David Parirenyatwa Rudolphia 802ha Murewa 
Charles Utete Rudzimi 3350ha Lomagundi 
Paddy Zhanda Chipfumbi Meadows 1364ha Goromonzi 
  Source: ZimOnline, 2010 
Challenging Moyo’s claim that the land reform was successful, the report 
(based on the government land register) suggests that a 2,200 strong politically 
connected elite—constituting military officers, cabinet ministers, provincial 
governors, senior party officials, judges, including the president and his wife—
controls close to half of the land seized from white farmers, nearly 5 million hectares 
of prime agricultural land, including wildlife conservancies and plantations. President 
Mugabe and his wife topped the list with 14 farms extending over 16,000 hectares, 
while each of the security service chiefs obtained farms in excess of 1,000 hectares. 
The Commander of the Defense Forces Constantine Chiwenga was rewarded with 
prime agricultural land in excess of 3000 hectares close to the capital, Harare, 
including the Chakoma estates in Goromonzi (about 32 Kilometers South East of the 
capital) with well-developed horticulture facilities. Overall, 90 per cent of the nearly 
200 army officers from the rank of Major to Lieutenant-General own farms, similarly, 
this pattern of ownership was replicated in the air force, police, prison service and the 
central intelligence organisation (Southall, 2013: 256). Likewise, all ZANU-PF 
cabinet ministers, 56 politburo members, 98 members of parliament, and 35 elected 
and appointed Senators were allocated land, often more than one farm. The state 
served to dispense patronage rewards to senior ruling ZANU-PF politicians and the 
military to guarantee political loyalty and support.  
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Following the formation of the inclusive government in February 2009, the 
parties agreed that land reform was irreversible as a compromise arrangement and 
further agreed on the need to institute a land audit as a necessary basis for 
rationalising multiple farm ownership. However, despite agreeing on a systematic 
process, farm invasions and disruptions continued. Successive month on month 
reports by the Commercial Farmers Union highlight disruptions and farm invasions. 
The take-over of the Save Valley Wildlife Conservancy by August 2012 exposed 
entrenched violent accumulation patterns under the guise of the indigenisation and 
empowerment programme. Senior ZANU-PF politicians and military elites who had 
already acquired more than one farm per person under the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme including Major General Rujege, Titus Maluleke (Governor), Shuvai 
Mahofa (Deputy Minister), Basil Nyabadza, Chiredzi South MP, Ailess Baloyi, 
Chiredzi North MP, Ronald Ndama and ZANU-PF Masvingo provincial chairperson 
Lovemore Matuke, parcelled out 25-year leases to themselves while the local 
communities were left out (Mugabe, 2012). 
 
Economic Impacts of the Fast Track Land Reform  
 
Despite manifest politically skewed distribution, a series of recent studies 
including Scoones, et al., (2010) and Hanlon, Manjengwa and Smart (2013) have 
reignited debate with claims that a large number of previously marginalised poor 
families benefited and that production was increasing in resettlement areas. Hanlon, et 
al. (2013: 13) concluded: 
 
In the biggest land reform in Africa, 6,000 white farmers have been replaced 
by 245,000 Zimbabwean farmers. Zimbabwe’s land reform has not been neat, 
and huge problems remain. But 245,000 new farmers have received land, and 
most of them are farming it. They have raised their own standard of living; 
have already reached production levels of the former white farmers; and with 
a bit of support, are ready to substantially increase that production.  
 
Scoones, et al. 2010 also corroborate success claims by suggesting that the 
land reform had improved the lives of farmers in Masvingo province. Although rich 
in qualitative phenomena, such studies offer only a partial picture and lack sufficient 
methodological scope perhaps due to resources and time limitations to paint a 
generalisable picture of the exercise, a point the authors also acknowledge in their 
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study findings. For example, Scoones et al.’s book is based on a sample of 400 
households in one province (Masvingo also not a prime agricultural region) out the 
country’s ten provinces representing 17 per cent of the total beneficiaries in one 
province. King (2012: 737) starkly concludes: 
 
This is a patchy book. The myths would have benefitted from a greater 
discussion, since the entire raison d’eˆtre rests on challenging them…Even if 
the rural subsistence economy has not collapsed, it is unambiguously true that 
commercial agriculture and therefore export earnings suffered a drastic 
downturn and the wider Zimbabwean economy nosedived as society suffered 
commensurate damage. 
 
Nonetheless, it is fair to acknowledge that there have been some 
improvements in other resettlement areas despite predation. For instance as shown in 
Figure 5.1 below, a number of crops show a marginal positive rebound in 2009 under 
the tenure of the Inclusive Government. The Inclusive Government is credited with 
arresting hyperinflation through the introduction of the multi-currency regime and 
incentives to improve economic production including provision of agriculture input 
schemes to stimulate agricultural production and facilitating timely payments to 
farmers for crops sold to the country’s Grain Marketing Board. However, on the 
overall the national picture shows a calamitous decline in agricultural production 
between 2000 and 2011 and with it, in consequence, a decline in its relative 
contribution to national output. Figure 5.1 below shows the national output production 
since the land reform programme in 2000. 
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Figure 5 1: Agriculture output 2000 – 2011 
 
Source: World Bank, 2011 
 
National statistics reveal that between 2001 and 2011, national production of 
maize, wheat, soya, tobacco, dairy and beef all declined. Compared to 1990s 
averages, wheat production decreased by 27 per cent and tobacco production by 43 
per cent, with more dramatic declines from 2006 (Moyo 2011). Against this, after 
initial decline, there has been some recovery, particularly for tobacco, in 2010 and 
2011 albeit not to the level prior to the land reform. Equally, national maize 
production has become more variable, because of the reduction of irrigation facilities. 
Meanwhile, significant droughts have resulted in shortages, with average production 
over this period down by 31 per cent from 1990s levels. On the declining national 
production levels, Kinsey (2003) argued that any radical reform would of course have 
a transitional phase, as production systems, markets and trading priorities readjust. 
However, the transition period in Zimbabwe has now been so extended that it 
suggests that the reforms as undertaken are unable to deliver sustainable national 
strategy to feed the country. Zimbabwe has moved from exporter of maize to 
perennial importer to meet the national demands. Figure 5.2 shows maize imports 
between 1980 and 2011. 
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Figure 5.2: Maize imports 1980 - 2011 (tonnes) 
 
Source: Zimbabweland.wordpress.com 
 
Zimbabwe has traditionally been self-sufficient and a net exporter of maize 
dating back to the colonial period. The state ensured provision of incentives to 
commercial farmers in order to boost agricultural production until the late 1990s’ 
violent land reform programme. The functional property rights regime also facilitated 
access to agriculture loans through the country’s banking system. The country only 
imported maize during the years of droughts in the early 1980s and the early 1990s. 
However, following the coercive land reform programme, patronage appropriation of 
incentives (discussed in chapter seven under the Central Bank quasi-fiscal operations) 
and collapse of the property rights regime, even outside drought conditions the 
country has degenerated into a perennial importer of maize to feed the population. 
Given the tight fiscal constraints, Zimbabwe has had to rely on humanitarian food 
assistance, a situation that is likely to continue given the gloomy economic condition 
at least in the short to medium term. 
 
By undermining agriculture the situation across the economy has been 
rendered catastrophic. For years, agriculture was the leading employer, employing 
between 300,000 and 350,000 workers or between 20 to 25 per cent of the total 
workforce. The combined workforce is estimated to have been responsible for an even 
larger population about 2 million (Sachikonye, 2003). In addition, historically, the 
sector was not only a major employer, but also a leading contributor to national output 
as well as to the country’s foreign exchange earnings. Its contribution to foreign 
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exchange earnings was boosted by tobacco and horticultural exports. Moreover, the 
manufacturing sector derived about 60 per cent of its inputs from agriculture. 
However, following the violent land redistribution programme, the share of 
agriculture contribution to national output declined from between 16 to 18 per cent in 
the 1990s to 10 per cent of by 2010 (Robertson, 2011). The deepening linkages 
between agriculture and manufacturing sector negatively impacted on the 
manufacturing sector, which is estimated to have experienced a cumulative decline of 
92 per cent between 1998 and 2008 (Zimbabwe Report, 2008:7). The most far-
reaching consequences of the coercive land reform would be the skewed distribution 
outcome, impacts of the collapse of the rule of law and economy wide implications 
particularly on the manufacturing sector. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The new black elites inherited a highly unequal land tenure system brought 
about by the colonial regime. Whereas land had been amongst the contentious issues 
that culminated in the country’s liberation war, the newly born government was 
constrained by the Lancaster House constitution transitional clauses, which protected 
white commercial farms against compulsory land acquisition. Yet ironically, the 
nature of the transition propelled the new government into a coalition with white 
capital, as it did not pose a threat to their political power. Landless peasants who 
attempted to invade farms were forcefully evicted until 1997 when the government 
came under increasing pressure at the backdrop of economic decline, unemployment 
and worsening poverty. Facing unprecedented opposition from the Movement for 
Democratic Change, the government turned to capricious policy making and 
predatory behaviour to consolidate its firm hold on power at a time when patronage 
resources were waning. The government hastily implemented by far the most the 
violent and coercive ‘fast track land redistribution programme’ in post-colonial Africa 
ostensibly to distribute land the landless poor. Despite claims that poor people 
benefitted, senior ZANU-PF politicians and military were the major beneficiaries with 
multiple farms on the country’s prime agricultural land. National agricultural output 
dropped and until 2013, remained below the 1990. The country degenerated from 
111 
 
self-sufficiency, in maize production to depend on perennial foreign imports to meet 
the national food requirements. 
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Chapter Six:  
Mining Development, Decline and Accumulation 
 
Introduction 
 
Mining occupies a special place in Zimbabwe’s colonial history. In search of 
the second richest gold deposits, similar or better than had been discovered in South 
Africa, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) sponsored Pioneer Column moved 
north of the Limpopo to settle in Southern Rhodesia (modern day Zimbabwe). 
Southern Rhodesia’s early economic planning would be modelled around the interests 
of large mining capital. However, the early colonists failed to discover ‘several new 
Johannesburgs:’ rich veins of gold, which would alter the regime of mining 
accumulation and political economy of Southern Rhodesia and later modern 
Zimbabwe in a significant way. The geological limitations of the colony’s gold 
deposits led to the propensity towards small mines and development of a local white 
mining capital, ‘a feature which sharply distinguished Southern Rhodesian mining 
from both the South African Rand and the later development of the Zambian 
Copperbelt’ (Phimister, 1976, 465).  This entailed new interests distinct from those of 
the BSAC and large-scale foreign mining capital. Small-scale miners had to compete 
with large-scale mines for labour, while both also competed with agriculture. In order 
to ensure viability of the mining sector, both large scale and small-scale mines would 
need to rely heavily on effective cost minimisation strategies. The state was critical in 
developing infrastructure and instituting ruthless disincentives, which obliterated 
indigenous mining and peasant farming to force indigenous Africans into cheap 
labour.   
 
Throughout the colonial period, small-scale miners contributed increasingly 
significant mining output. However, large-scale mines, through representative 
associations, enjoyed closer proximity and favours from state. This trend continued 
into the post-independence state, although large scale operators’ cheap labour cost 
minimisation strategy was always bound to result in contestation with the new black 
government under pressure to redress colonial imbalances. The post-independence 
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state maintained a close albeit a wary, relationship with large-scale mining capital that 
would involve mining sector investment incentives, direct participation and increasing 
regulation and oversight. In the late 1990s the mining sectors provided an important 
patronage avenue when the economy collapsed. Despite the discovery of diamonds 
and consequent hopes for economic prosperity what remains are the vivid footprints 
of coercive and violent anti-developmental accumulation. Meanwhile, the economic 
indigenisation and empowerment programmes only favoured a few politically 
connected elite and trusted foreign investors—Chinese and South African capital who 
did not pose a threat to the ruling elite’s power aspirations.   
 
Colonial Development and Mining  
  
 At its arrival in 1890 in the new colony of Southern Rhodesia, the BSAC 
expected to find huge gold deposits, similar or greater than the scale of the Transvaal. 
Consequently, the BSAC administration policies were designed to promote working 
of gold deposits by large-scale companies funded with capital raised from European 
markets, especially London. Yet, following the realisation from the early exploration 
works that the new territory was a far cry from the rich deposits of Witwatersrand, the 
company avoided direct involvement. The company secured mining interests by 
prescribing that 50 per cent of the vendors’ scrip of every mining company operating 
in the new territory was controlled by the BSAC. However, the impact of the 1896-7 
African revolts coupled by the poor quality of the gold deposits negatively impacted 
on mining investment into the new colony. Between 1895 and 1898, twenty-two 
companies listed on the stock market lost between 50 to 90 per cent of their share 
values (The Rhodesian Herald, 10 March 1898). The new mining sector quickly 
degenerated into speculative, often fraudulent share dealings and conflict pitting the 
large-scale mining companies against the BSAC over the 50 per cent vendors’ scrip. 
This would result in far reaching compromises by the BSAC, the development of 
infrastructure, cost minimisation incentives 100  and encouragement of small-scale 
miners to restructure the mining sector towards a profitable trajectory.  
  
                                                        
100 Prior to 1919, the price of gold was internationally fixed. While this meant that the 
gold mining industry could increase output indefinitely without jeopardising profits, it 
also made the industry extremely vulnerable to cost inflation.   
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 To facilitate these requisites, the colonial administration invested in the 
development of railway lines and revision of its mining policies to reduce 
development and working costs. By 1902 a major railway line was developed linking 
Mutare to Bulawayo via Harare as well as to the east coast (Mozambique). Vendors’ 
scrip were initially reduced to 30 per cent by 1902 and finally dropped altogether by 
1907 while a 5 per cent scale on royalty was substituted (Mawowa, 2013:45). The 
company was also forced to reduce the scale of royalties by varying adjustments to 
the quality of gold ore grades and encourage development of small mines through the 
Mines and Mineral Ordinance of 1903 (Phillips, et al, 1962: 349), which recognised 
small-mines and provisions for flexible legal arrangements including sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, tributary and syndicate agreements. The importance of 
small-scale miners against the erratic and spatial gold deposits was underscored in a 
report to the BSAC: 
 
Overcapitalisation has been the curse of the company, and the scattered and 
often lenticular formation of the reefs in Rhodesia, leads me to think that the 
interests of the gold industry…will be served by the encouragement of small 
and economically worked concerns (Michell’s report to the BSAC, cited in 
Phimister 1976: 467). 
  
Small-scale miners used less capital-intensive operations and were more likely 
to easily shift from one property to another. While small mines provided opportunity 
of entry of African players, entry was restricted to whites, while Africans were 
relegated to the provisioning of cheap labour. The BSAC and local banks also 
provided working capital advances to small-scale miners on easy repayment terms. 
The impact of the reforms was demonstrated by the growth of the mining sector. The 
success of small-scale mines is noticeable in the increasing number of small-scale 
miners as well as contribution of small-scale miners to overall mining output. Small-
scale mines increased to 76 by 1905, and by 1907 there were 254 mines producing 
1,000 ounces of gold annually (Wilson, 1933: 15). By 1925, there were a total of 419 
small-scale mines contributing a total of 11.37 per cent of total gold output. Table 6.1 
shows gold mines by scale and output between 1925 and 1948. 
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Table 6.1: Gold mines by scale and output 1925 - 1948 
Y ear  
 
Large Mines (+ 10 
000 oz.) 
Medium Mines (1000 
0 - 10 000 oz.) 
Small Mines (- 1000 
oz.) 
 No.  
 
Per cent 
of Total 
output  
No.  
 
Per cent 
of Total 
output  
No.  
 
Per cent 
of Total 
output  
1924 10 67.56 59 21.07 419 11.37 
1925 8 67.89 45 19.18 428 12.93 
1926 9 71.33 43 17.02 431 12.65 
1927 9 73.50 39 14.52 326 9.98 
1928 9 77.31 33 14.01 258 8.68 
1929 9 77.59 32 17.15 249 9.26 
1930 9 74.65 36 15.50 286 9.85 
1931 9 68.93 39 18.66 401 12.41 
1932 10 61.41 50 20.01 722 18.58 
1933 10 52.34 - - - - 
1934 10 43.47 - - - - 
1935 8 38.06 95 30.25 1650 31.69 
1936 10 37.19 114 32.37 1583 30.44 
1937 11 39.12 121 32.18 1440 28.70 
1938 12 40.04 127 34.40 1431 25.56 
1939 11 38.00 117 37.33 1442 24.67 
1940 13 39.74 113 34.84 1351 25.42 
1941 14 43.51 112 33.22 1050 23.27 
1942 15 44.87 119 35.59 877 19.54 
1943 14 46.97 88 32.22 690 20.81 
1944 12 46.29 77 33.78 613 19.93 
1945 12 46.42 70 33.82 650 19.76 
1946 12 44.98 69 35.12 687 19.90 
1947 9 39.80 68 38.30 706 21.90 
1948 10 42.90 75 37.70 580 19.40 
Source: Phimister 1988 (cited in Mawowa, 2013: 47). 
 
While there is noticeable growth and success of small mines in the post 1900 
reforms, the position of large-scale mines also strengthened markedly from a share of 
67.56 per cent of national output in 1894 to a peak of 77.59 per cent by 1929. Van 
Onselen observes that ‘... it was the intense exploitation of cheap African labour 
throughout the history of the industry that made the greatest contribution to 
establishing [growth] and profitability’ (1980: 24). Wages and incomes generally 
lagged behind productivity, facilitating high profit margins, savings and investments. 
Phimister illustrates the centrality of cheap labour with regard to the Wankie coal 
mines: 
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From its inception, the colliery's fortunes ultimately turned on the regular 
supply of black labour, and in the absence of capital investment, this 
dependency became increasingly pronounced after 1914. Because Wankie's 
board of directors, on whom the BSAC was heavily represented, refused to 
sanction the purchase of additional capital equipment, expanded output was 
instead won through the simple expedient of increasing the size of the labour 
force. By drawing on the flood of migrant workers initially compelled to seek 
wage employment by the tax regime enforced by the BSAC the coal mine was 
able to recover from its initial losses (1992: 66). 
 
For the mining industry, cheap labour was achieved in two important ways. 
The first strategy was intensified recruitment through the Rhodesian Native Labour 
Bureau, specifically designed to exclude recruitment of the Rand101 from certain areas 
and direct labour to local, as opposed to Rand mines. The second strategy was 
progressive underdevelopment of the indigenous peasant sector from 1890 onwards. 
For instance, the effort price for indigenous participation in the produce markets was 
steadily raised while conversely that of commercial farming was lowered (Phimister, 
1976: 476). The progressive marginalisation of peasant agriculture from such markets 
left Africans with few alternative forms of income other than wage labour to meet 
subsistence and tax obligations (Arrighi, 1966).  
 
Following the attainment of self-governing status at the end of the company 
rule in 1923, the state deepened interventionist measures to ensure a steady supply of 
labour to the mines and provision of infrastructure. The Rhodesian National Labour 
Board, a successor to the Labour Board of 1899, was established as central mobiliser 
of black labour for Southern Rhodesian mines. The board had a specific mandate to 
ensure an uninterrupted supply of cheap labour. The centralisation of labour 
administration made it possible to compel mines to ‘loan’ labour in line with 
‘national’ priorities. In addition, several state support enterprises were founded, 
including the Electricity Supply Commission power stations to service growing power 
demands and the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Commission (later renamed the Zimbabwe 
Iron and Steel Company). 
 
                                                        
101 The longer working lives and greater profits for the Rand mines absorbed a higher 
cost structure including offering attractive wages, than that possible of Southern 
Rhodesian mines.  
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However, despite the increased contribution of small-scale miners, state 
mining policy remained largely biased towards large-scale mining capital even well 
after independence. For example the Rhodesia National Labour Board remained 
principally a recruiting agent for large scale mining capital, a double blow to small-
scale miners, who were also outcompeted on wage packages offered by large scale 
mines. Large-scale mines also enjoyed close proximity to railway infrastructure, rail 
and road, while this was not the case with small-scale miners. This bias worked to the 
vast interest of the BSAC in large-scale mining and railway (or at least until its 
mineral rights were bought out in 1933). The company held considerable interests in 
gold, coal, chrome and asbestos mining and agriculture. The state also actively 
collaborated with the large-scale mining companies through associations formed to 
represent the interests of these mining companies. The Rhodesia Chamber of Mines 
based in Bulawayo and its sister the Salisbury Chamber of Mines based in Harare, 
represented most BSAC and medium-sized mining interests. In 1939 the Rhodesia 
Chamber of Mines was officially instituted through an act of parliament. It was aimed 
at promoting, encouraging, protecting and fostering the mining industry of Southern 
Rhodesia (Incorporating Act, Chapter 199: 1939).  
 
In 1947 the government made legislative changes to encourage large scale 
prospecting to attract new investments in the face of post-World War reconstruction 
demands. Prospecting licenses were issued for areas over 1000 square miles for 
natural gas, coal and oil and 500 square miles for other minerals (Phimister, 1998: 
354). The government also introduced an exploration section in its Geological 
Department. The export orientation induced demand attracted prominent interest from 
international mining and manufacturing capital. Chief amongst these were, Anglo 
American Corporation with interests in coal, ferrochrome and cement industries, the 
Rhodesian Selection Trust, which participated, jointly with Anglo American 
Corporation in Rhodesian ventures, and Lonrho originally founded in Rhodesia 
expanded its interest considerably in mining. Hull (1978: 33) notes that over one third 
of the 50 largest British manufacturers had direct interests in Rhodesia, and these 
were to be found in virtually every sector of the manufacturing industry. Meanwhile, 
the state abandoned support towards small-scale mining. The following quote is 
illustrative: 
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While we are fully aware of the difficulties facing the smaller mines in raising 
their capital requirements, it is our view that the capital resources required by 
such mines should, in general, be obtained from the customary channels. 
Where assistance is granted by the government there is always the danger of 
abuse, therefore such loans should be extended under the most restrictive 
conditions and as an exceptional measure (Phillips, et al, 1962: 355). 
 
 Small-scale mining was marginalised while the state moved to focus on large-
scale investment to exploit the post-World War demand opportunities. The war itself 
also accounted for significant restructuring of the Southern Rhodesian economy. In 
response to the disruption of European manufacturing, the state adopted an Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) Policy (which would become an import strategy to 
mitigate the impact of sanctions in the UDI era) to stimulate local manufacturing of 
previously imported goods. Meanwhile, the domestic market also grew with the 
increased white emigration into the country. The mining sector’s contribution to 
national output declined relative to agriculture and manufacturing sectors. By 1948, 
for the first time both agriculture and manufacturing leaped ahead of mining in terms 
of contribution to national output. Figure 6.1 below shows changing relative 
contributions to national output for mining, agriculture and manufacturing over the 
period 1939 to 1948. 
 
Figure 6.1: Mining, agriculture and manufacturing contribution to national output 
1939 - 1948 
 
 Source: Phillips et al. 1962. 
The tandem increase for agriculture and manufacturing contribution to 
national output relative to the mining sector revealed significant synergies between 
the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The growth of the manufacturing sector 
had strong backward linkages with agriculture for food production servicing the 
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steady growth of the local and new sources of foreign markets. Although mining had 
linkages with the manufacturing sector for inputs, it remained predominantly oriented 
towards export markets as demonstrated by the sector’s contribution to total exports. 
This was a feature reminiscent of the colonialism dependency accumulation model, 
which placed emphasis on primary resource extraction from the colonies. Figure 6.2 
shows the mining sector contribution to exports between 1928 and 1953. 
 
Figure 6.2: Mining sector contribution to exports 1928 - 1953 
Source: Phillips et al. 1962. 
 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland joining Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, between 1953 and 1963 also introduced an important 
demand dynamic to Southern Rhodesia economy. The Federation provided an 
important market for Southern Rhodesia mining, agriculture and manufacturing 
sectors in the protected tariff areas of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Coal mined 
from Southern Rhodesia’s Wankie colliery mines would easily find its way to the 
Northern Rhodesia’s copper belt mines, while migration of labour from Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland to Southern Rhodesia’s farms and mines helped to mitigate 
the Rand’s competition for labour. Southern Rhodesia’s growing manufacturing 
sector also found an important market for its construction materials, textile 
production, food processing and other consumer goods. Correspondingly, the 
Southern Rhodesian economy grew at an average of 8 per cent during the 10-year 
period under the federation.  
 
 The structural changes to the Rhodesian economy brought significant and far-
reaching changes in the class structure of the Rhodesian society. Coincident with the 
relative decline of mining was the strengthening of agrarian capital (discussed in 
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chapter five). A second major change was the emergence of a national manufacturing 
class. The significance of the manufacturing class grew with the strategic importance 
for import substitution, albeit constrained by lack of a dynamic internal demand. The 
share contribution to national output for the manufacturing sector rose from 9 per cent 
in the 1930s to 15 per cent in the early 1950s to over 18 per cent in the early 1960s 
(Arrighi, 1966: 44). However, mass production, mechanical aids and specialisation 
necessitated increased demands for the supply of a stable skilled labour force (which 
was in short supply) as opposed to unskilled labour. In addition, unable to compete on 
the international market due to poor quality goods, the sector could depend on the 
growth of African peasant and wage labour purchasing power. However, the growth 
of internal demand was constrained by the deterioration of peasant productive 
capacity and poor wages. The labour requirements of this sector would necessitate 
divergent and often conflictual interests with both mining and agriculture. The 
conflicts contributed to the weakening102 and demise of the Federation.103 In addition, 
these contradictions would also form the basis of mobilisation and victory for the 
agrarian capital backed pro-Unilateral Declaration of Independence coalition. 
 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence and Mining Accumulation: 1965 -1980 
Following Unilateral Declaration of Independence,104 the state sought to take 
full charge of the economy to navigate the impact of sanctions and protect the 
interests of whites. The ruling white coalition strengthened state capacity through 
expanding bureaucratic apparatuses, deepening state planning and collaboration with 
                                                        
102  The Federation policies were aimed at stabilising the African labour force by 
reducing turn-over which was problematic for the manufacturing industry. Measures 
such as raising minimum wages in urban areas and mining locations ran against the 
interests of a rural bourgeoisie, which depended on cheap African labour. 
103  The Federation eventually collapsed under increasing pressure from African 
liberation and internal divisions within the ruling white elite. In Southern Rhodesia, 
disaffected white elements broke away from the ruling party by 1956 to form an 
opposition, Dominion Party, which ousted Prime Minister Garfield Todd from power 
two years later.   
104 Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November 1965 was a decision by 
the ruling Rhodesian Front to declare self-governing status and autonomy from Great 
Britain.  
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white capital targeted at midwifing agriculture105 and manufacturing106 sectors. The 
state provided a regime of incentives included access to cheap credit, controlled 
labour and a protective tariff system. After an initial period of stagnation, and in spite 
of the sanctions, the Rhodesian economy took off on a growth trajectory.  Between 
1965 and 1973, the economy sustained a real increase in national output of 7 per cent 
per annum. Hull (1978: 35) pointedly concluded that ‘sanctions had by no means had 
the intended effect of bringing the rebel regime to its knees.’ Despite the sanctions the 
Rhodesian economy continued to attract foreign investment and trade. Industry grew 
by 80 per cent under the ISI regime (Hull, 1978:34). Manufacturing growth averaged 
10 per cent and increased its share contribution to 25 per cent of national income 
(Mawowa, 2013:51). While large scale manufacturing companies continued to 
dominate the industry, many new local manufacturing companies emerged providing 
products blocked by sanctions.  
 
While the share of the manufacturing sector increased from less than 20 per 
cent in 1965 to nearly 25 per cent in 1975, the combined share of agriculture and 
mining declined slightly from 24 per cent to 23 per cent (Hull, 1978: 36). Although 
the mining sector’s contribution averaged 7 per cent, the sector remained an important 
foreign exchange earner and source of capital expansion following the freezing of all 
transnational corporation profits inside the country. It is ironic that even after 
sanctions were imposed. Rhodesian exports continued to grow. During the period 
1967 to 1972 exports continued to account for about 25 per cent of GDP (Hull, 1978: 
36). Rhodesian copper and asbestos performed favourably during this period. The 
state introduced several developmental support mechanisms for large-scale mining. 
Beneficiation was promoted through a selective royalty regime as part of sanctions 
busting interventions. Meanwhile, blocked funds were invested in value adding 
beneficiation, notably the processing of chrome to ferrochrome, copper cable and 
other semi-processed or finished products that could compete successfully in 
international markets.  
 
                                                        
105  The agricultural sector remained strategic to promote white agrarian capital 
interests and to ensure self- sufficiency in the face of melting relations with the 
regional and international community.  
106 The manufacturing sector was critical to ensure supply of previously imported 
goods which were now impossible to import due to the sanctions regime. 
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However, the disruptions caused by war and ‘uneven development’ imposed a 
growth restraint upon manufacturing and mining growth. Rapid industrialisation that 
began in the post Second World War II period had been constrained by the absence of 
an adequate internal market dynamic. The colony was hamstrung by effects of the 
civil war, while the African rural economy, which could provide an important market 
for growing manufacturing, remained mired in poverty with reverse linkage effects to 
the country’s mining, agriculture and manufacturing sectors. By the time of the 
negotiations for political independence at the end of 1977, the economy was showing 
signs of severe stress. The GDP had fallen by 3.4 per cent in 1976 (Chikuhwa, 
2004:291). The government was spending 25 per cent of its budget on defense while 
white emigration reached alarming levels (Hull, 1978: 36). In 1977, Rhodesia 
recorded a net emigration of 10,000 whites (by 1975 white population was estimated 
at about 296,000, representing just over five per cent of the population) (World 
Affairs, 2010). 
 
Post-Independence State Mining and Accumulation: 1980 to 2000 
 
Zimbabwe’s independence settlement was a compromise agreement, which 
attempted to strike a balance between fears of white capital on the one hand and the 
need for change on the other. It enfranchised the majority while safeguarding settler 
privileges at least for the first 10 years after independence.107 Yet, the immediate task 
for the new government was considered to be the necessity of correcting racial 
imbalances. The early years of independence were characterised by mutual suspicion 
between international mining capital and government. The government accused the 
mining sector of ‘cheating Zimbabwe of its rightful earnings from minerals’ 
(Financial Gazette, June 5, 1981: 1). However, the chamber of mines persistently 
denied the accusations and viewed the government statements as negatively impacting 
on mining investment.108 In March, 1983, the government established the Minerals 
                                                        
107 The constitution stipulated that during the first 10 years, amendments concerning 
citizen’s rights required a unanimous vote in parliament in order to guarantee and 
protect property rights. 
108 In an interview, the new Chairman of the Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines, Mr. 
Lander remarked, ‘I have no doubt that these statements [by the government officials] 
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Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) by an act of parliament to handle all 
external selling and marketing of minerals (Financial Gazette, September 12, 1986: 
12). International mining capital was opposed109 and fearful of government control 
over the marketing of minerals as a first step towards nationalisation of minerals 
sector (Interview, Respondent no. 19, 20 June 2014). 
 
Meanwhile, the mining sector was adversely affected by falling world demand 
and prices as well as increasing costs 110  and shortages of foreign currency for 
essential equipment and spares. Gold which by 1980 stood at US$860 per ounce had 
fallen to US$517 per ounce within a year by 27 January 1981. Similarly, copper, 
cobalt, silver and nickel prices were also falling (Financial Gazette, January 30, 1981: 
12). Only tin, chrome, coal, iron and asbestos recorded slight increases in value. 
Overall earnings from Zimbabwe’s mineral production dropped by US$25 million 
from 1980 to 1981(Financial Gazette, February 19, 1982: 9). The falling commodity 
prices threatened viability of most mining companies and the manufacturing 
industries in the face of a government prize freeze 111  and an increasing cost of 
labour112 (Financial Gazette, September 24, 1982: 1) 
 
The state took steps to acquire struggling mining companies ostensibly to save 
employment as well as strategic mining companies such as to coal protect the national 
interest. This strategy reflected the continuity with developmental interventionism, 
albeit racially limited, inherited from the colonial state. In 1983, the state established 
the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) to invest in the mining 
industry on behalf of the state. Among other things, ZMDC was to oversee and 
                                                                                                                                                              
are affecting prospecting and willingness to invest’ (Financial Gazette, June 5, 1981: 
1). 
109 Two major foreign mining groups, one from West Germany and the other from 
America threatened withdrawal, while two Swedish withheld their planned 
investments following the moves to establish MMCZ (Financial Gazette, December, 
18 1981:1). Similarly, the chamber of mines expressed concerns over the new law. 
110 The government increased the minimum wage to improve the working conditions 
of workers. 
111 In 1982, the state introduced a ‘price freeze’ and mooted the formation of a Price 
Control Board as part of interventionist measures to curb rising prices (Financial 
Gazette, February 19, 1982: 1). 
112 Wages in the mining industry in 1980 were recorded as being about Z$116 million 
rising to Z$158 million in 1981 and Z$200 million by 1982 (Financial Gazette, 12 
November 1982: 3). 
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support the development of the mining industry through prospecting, beneficiation 
and providing support to mining cooperatives and start up individual or group 
ventures. ZMDC interests included 100 per cent of the voting shares of the Mining 
Promotion Corporation (geological exploration) and Peneast Mining Corporation 
(gold). In November 1984, the corporation acquired the troubled Messina Limited’s 
mining interests in MTD (Mangula) Limited, Lomagundi Smelting and Mining (Pvt) 
Limited, MTD Sanyati Limited, and MTD Management Services. The Zimbabwe 
government also bought controlling shares in Kamativi Tin and Hwange Coal Mines, 
regarded as strategic for energy generation and rail-transport.   
 
Nevertheless, although the government evinced mistrust towards international 
mining capital, the relationship was not entirely antagonistic. The state pursued 
developmental interventionism through the provision of incentives: bailout packages 
and loan grantees. In 1982, the government set aside Z$50 million to help the mining 
industry through provision of loans. The government provided a loan of Z$2,7 million 
to the Rio-Tinto group, Empress Mine, Z$6 million each to Anglo American’s 
Bindura Nickel and Zimbabwe Alloys and Z$10 million loan guarantee to MTD 
Mangula (Financial Gazette, April 04, 1982: 1). The relationship with local mining 
capital was not supportive. The state closed opportunities for indigenous participation 
as the ruling elite feared development of an independent indigenous class that could 
pose a threat to its political ambitions. Remarks by a local mining entrepreneur, Mr. 
Clement Landberg, bemoaning frustrations at the lack of government support are 
revealing: 
 
I was told at a recent small-miners meeting that investors are coming from 
France. This is all waste of time. I have been hearing this sort of thing for the 
last two years. Government has no money. They say carry-on on your own, 
but I bet that when I start bringing the emeralds out, they would want a cut of 
the action. The MMCZ is more keen on selling the stuff than on helping to 
produce it (Financial Gazette, November 21, 1984: 6). 
 
The state chose an alliance with international mining capital while both small-
scale white capital and entry of blacks received only reluctant support, which 
undermined the development of domestic capital. Although, ZMDC was tasked to 
facilitate, inter-alia, the provision of support to mining cooperatives and the start-up 
of individual or group ventures, the corporation lacked resources to support small-
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scale miners. By suppressing small-scale miners and the entry of new black players, 
the state not only undermined the vital role of domestic capital in emulating the ‘triple 
alliance of the state, domestic and international capital’ 113  as a vital source of 
transformative capital but also exhibited predatory behaviour in repulsing potential 
threats to ruling elite power interests.  
 
In the 1990s, as part of the broader neoliberal reform agenda the state 
instituted reform measures to attract Foreign Direct Investment, notably amendments 
to the Mines and Minerals Act to provide for special mining leases. The measures 
yielded favourable investment responses. Substantial investments in the gold sector 
during the 1990s lifted Zimbabwe into the world’s top ten producers. In 1995 
Australian mining giant BHP Inc. was given a special lease and formed Hartley 
Platinum Mine to mine in Selous, about 60 kilometers southwest of Harare. Reunion 
Mining also started copper production at Munyati Copper Mine while Ashanti Gold 
Fields took over Freda Rebecca gold mine. In addition, renewed interest in 
ferrochrome, and a large greenfields investment in platinum – the second largest 
foreign direct investment since independence at more than half a billion US dollars – 
helped boost capital inflows into mining exploration, mine commissioning and 
production expansion (Saunders, 2008). Plans for other major investments in coal and 
thermal power generation were also developed, including a US$160 million Sengwa 
Coal Field project led by mining major Rio Tinto. Data from the Zimbabwe 
Investment Authority (2011) shows that in 1995, a record 36 new mining projects 
were approved. Table 6.2 shows Zimbabwe mining investment in the 1990s.  
 
Table 6.2: Zimbabwe mining investments in the 1990s 
Investment Source Company Source 
Country 
US $m Year 
Hartley Platinum Mines BHP Australia 500 1998 
Turk Mine Casmyn Corporation Canada 30 1995 
Eureka Gold Mine Delta Gold Australia 24 1998 
Indarama Gold Mine Trillion Resources Canada 15 1998 
Jena Gold Mine Trillion Resources Canada 12 1991 
Rio Tinto Zinc 
Corporation 
Rio Tinto UK 5 1994 
                                                        
113  Term used by Peter Evans 1979 to explain the role of the state, local and 
international elites as a source of capital in the structural transformation of Brazil. 
126 
 
Chaka Processing Plant Delta Gold Australia 3 1998 
Bubi Gold Mine Anglo American SA 2 1997 
Source: Business Map SADC FDI Database (Johannesburg).  
The reform measures also envisioned small-scale mining operations as part of 
mitigating short-term socio-economic effects. The state viewed small-scale mining as 
an important sector in providing solutions to the unemployment problem. Financial 
incentives to support small-scales mines were made available through the Mining 
Industry Fund. With technical assistance from the University of Zimbabwe 
department of engineering, Rural District Councils (RDCs) were given the right to 
issue gold panning licenses over 100 metre long stretches along rivers. However 
policy was biased towards promotion of cooperatives through Zimbabwe Mining 
Development Corporation support, which however failed due to lack of management 
and technical capacity of the Rural District Councils. Though the programme was a 
viable option, in terms of broadening indigenous economic participation its failure 
reflected half-heartedness on the part of the state to develop an autonomous 
indigenous class. Ultimately the success of any policy or programme hinges on the 
implementation capacity of the agent, which the state failed to provide. The failure of 
the programme triggered unregulated mining on disused pits and undesignated areas 
with disastrous social and environmental consequences.  
 
In response, the state criminalised panning. A report by the Zimbabwe 
Republic Police, indicated that the year 1991 recorded a 52,6 per cent increase in 
accused persons arrested for gold offences, compared to 34 per cent in 1990 and less 
than 25 per cent before 1989 (Financial Gazette, February 6, 1992: 8). The report 
estimated that the country was losing Z$100 million a year through illegal gold 
trafficking. The increase in gold crimes was attributed to an increase in mining 
operations and a drastic upsurge in legal and illegal panning. By the 2000s, informal 
mining provided a vital accumulation avenue when most economic opportunities 
dried up especially for the rural poor. This avenue later proved important to serve the 
accumulation needs for the ruling party’s important constituencies, political elites and 
security arms to ward off opposition from the newly formed formidable opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Deepening economic crisis triggered 
dramatic ruling party loss of popularity in the late 1990s. The state allowed growth of 
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informal mining to serve survivalist needs of ruling party supporters and key rural 
constituencies in order to regain support.  
 
As the economy imploded, growing political threats to the ruling party 
increased the importance and power of the military to control citizens and opposition. 
Declining domestic opportunities to reward the securocracy meant that more 
resources should be mobilized from elsewhere. The decision by the Zimbabwean 
government to intervene in the DRC epitomised the shift towards predatory 
accumulation to provide accumulation opportunities for the political and military 
elites. In 1997 the Zimbabwe government decided on a costly114 and controversial 
military intervention at a time the government was barely supporting its struggling 
productive sectors and social welfare obligations in health and education. Horace 
Campbell (2003: 231) notes that: 
 
the crisis of the government in all its spheres of operation lent a special 
importance to the military…In this sense, the war in the DRC and the land 
invasions to seize the property of commercial white farmers [discussed in 
chapter five] represented two poles of a military strategy by an aspiring 
capitalist class willing to use warfare, coercion and violence for its growth and 
consolidation. 
 
The Zimbabwean military was involved in a network of opaque dealings in 
alliance with ZANU-PF political elites and its holding company, ZIDCO, 115  and 
former Rhodesian white capital116 through a commercial arm, Operation Sovereign 
Legitimacy (OSLEG). The company was in a joint venture with Comiex-Congo, a 
Kinshasa based company whose main shareholder was Laurent Kabila, then president 
of the DRC. According to Global Witness (2002) Operation Sovereign Legitimacy 
Directors included Lt. Gen. Vitalis Zvinavashe, Job Whabira (then permanent 
secretary of the Ministry of Defence), Onesimo Moyo, the Director of the Minerals 
                                                        
114  Simba Makoni then Minister of Finance reported to parliament that the 
government had spend about US$200 million on its military intervention in the DRC 
in two years between 1997 and 1998 (Ministry of Finance, Budget Statements, 1997; 
1998). 
115 ZIDCO owned 237,000 shares of Oryx diamonds, a partnership between Oryx 
Natural resources, Operation Sovereign Legitimacy and ZIDCO. 
116  The Zimbabwean government was working with Billy Rautenbach and John 
Bredenkamp, who had a long history of sanctions busting business connections with 
the Rhodesian and South African apartheid regimes.  
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Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe and Isiah Ruzengwe, the General Manager of 
the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation. The joint venture is known as 
COSLEG (Pvt.) Ltd had interests in mining and timber logging. A United Nations 
Report listed the Zimbabwe Army Commander, General Vitalis Zvinavashe and 
parliamentary speaker Emmerson Mnagagwa amongst 54 top individuals responsible 
for looting minerals during the conflict in the Congo (UN, 2002). After failing to raise 
capital117 required for formal large-scale mining operations the Zimbabwean military 
capitalist elite formed a subsidiary timber company, Sobeco to carry-out timber 
logging operations over a 34 million hectare area (Campbell, 2003:244). The forests 
were designated by the United Nations as one of the most important forests leading to 
international condemnation for harming the environment and biodiversity.  
 
Zimbabwe’s promising growth in the mining sector was shattered by the 
economic and political crisis that ensued in the late 1990s as the state deepened 
predation. The jettisoning of neoliberal reforms towards capricious policies to pacify 
discontented war veterans and the military intervention in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo that served the accumulation needs of a politically connected capitalist class 
and the military epitomised the shift towards predatory behaviour. The supportive 
incentives such as mining bailout packages and loan guarantee schemes that helped 
the mining industry during the global minerals depression all vanished as the 
economic situation deteriorated. Meanwhile, the very policy shifts associated with 
structural adjustment that had facilitated a favourable business climate for new mining 
investments had simultaneously harmed a growing proportion of the masses still 
marginalised from the economy, predating Zimbabwe independence. ZANU-PF’s loss 
of popular support soon triggered the emergence of strong political opposition 
emboldened by the deepening decline of ordinary Zimbabweans’ living standards and 
frustrated liberation hopes.  
 
To conclude this section: it is interesting to observe that predation seems to 
result from political threats and loss of economic performance. This is different than 
other predatory states, such as DRC under Mobutu where predation was built from the 
                                                        
117 The Zimbabwean capitalists tried unsuccessfully to raise capital to finance their 
ventures on international capital markets including the London Alternative Investment 
Exchange (Campbell, 2003: 241-2). 
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absence rather than the presence strong of opposition. The Zimbabwean state 
increasingly became predatory in part due to dynamics in society, economy, and the 
state.   
 
Post 2000 Crisis, Mining and Accumulation 
 
The state’s deepening predatory shift in the late 1990s, notably the costly DRC 
intervention to reward the military and unbudgeted lump sum pay-outs to reward the 
war veterans, played havoc with the country’s macroeconomic indicators. The state 
lost control as soaring inflation, increasingly unstable power supply, rising fuel costs 
and skills flight made economic production planning precarious. Mining and industry 
grappled with the increasing costs of production and shortages of foreign currency. 
By 2000, a number of mines closed down at the height of the crisis, including the 
copper producers at Mangula, Alaska and Sanyati and the Epoch and Madziwa nickel 
mines. The Railway Block high-grade chromite mine closed down as well as the 
Dalny-Venice-What Cheer group of gold producers and the smaller Gaika, Motapa 
and Royal Family gold mines (Hawkins, 2009). The original BHP Platinum mine at 
Selous, which opened in the late 1990s, also closed down. The plant was subsequently 
restructured for the opencast mining at Ngezi, while Murowa (the Rio Tinto group) 
and River Ranch maintained minimum production levels.  
 
The predatory state can go too far and annihilate its own capacity for 
predation. The economic crisis severely degraded the capacity of the state to meet 
basic obligations: basic public and social services and paying civil servants a decent 
wage. The closure of companies led to declining production, national output and 
revenue. Gold official production figures slumped from a peak of 27 tonnes in 1999 to 
18 tonnes in 2001 and 12.5 tonnes in 2003, with critical consequence on the economy 
after the collapse of agriculture in the late 1990s (Robertson, 2011). Gold alone 
accounted for one-third of foreign currency earnings and more than 50 per cent of 
mineral production. Other traditional mineral sectors also receded, affected by the 
same combination of rising production costs, materials shortages, degraded 
infrastructure, skills flight and low realised returns due to distorted exchange rates. 
‘Copper production collapsed from about 15,000 tonnes in 1990 to barely 2,000 
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tonnes in 2001; and ferrochrome, which peaked in 1995 at nearly 300,000 tonnes, fell 
to 218,000 tonnes ten years later’ (Saunders, 2007:3). Meanwhile, exploration 
spending, a critical indicator of future investment intentions and production potential, 
also suffered (Saunders, 2008). It peaked in 1996 but quickly dried up, with no new 
significant internationally financed exploration materialising into the first decade of 
the new century – a period in which neighbouring mineral-bearing countries 
witnessed high growth in exploration spending. 
 
With the deepening crisis, the state deployed violence and coercion towards 
autonomous informal panners while creating accumulation avenues for ZANU-PF 
supporters, political elites and security arms of the state. Shoko (2002) estimates the 
number of those involved at over 500 000. According to UNIDO (2007), by 2008 
some two million Zimbabweans were dependent on artisanal and small-scale mining 
and perhaps even more today. Policy implementation tended to be haphazard, 
inconsistent and election driven. In between the election, the police indiscriminately 
raided artisanal small-scale miners (both registered and unregistered). Methods used 
are brutal and miners are often killed or injured in the process (Mawowa, 2008). 
Between 2006 and 2007, over 26,000 miners were arrested during state clampdown 
operation known as Chikorokoza Chapera (translated to mean ‘informal gold panning 
has ended’) (Zimonline, May 14, 2007). Members of the military police, soldiers and 
the prison service carried out these operations jointly. Hostile state interventions 
forced miners (small-scale and informal) to either suspend operations or join ZANU-
PF political elites and security agents for protection. Informal markets and smuggling 
increased. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe estimates that between 2002 and 2007 
gold worth US $400 million (15 tonnes) was being smuggled out of the country 
annually (Gono, 2007). 
 
Yet far from deterring informal and illegal mining, police were forming joint 
syndicates with ZANU-PF linked informal miners even in restricted zones. In Mazoe 
River, despite banned riverbed mining, policemen worked with ZANU-PF youths 
involved in informal panning along the river and some would go as far as providing 
metal detectors used to locate lumps of alluvial gold and share proceeds (Field 
observations, June 2014). Interviews during fieldwork revealed how top ranking 
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ZANU-PF politicians were running syndicates of informal gold miners. A senior 
government minister was cited by one respondent as being involved with extended 
networks from informal gold mining, milling and buying syndicates. The First Lady, 
Grace Mugabe also elbowed out a small-scale miner in Mazoe close to her farm 
following a gold rush in the area after reports that the miner was realising in excess 10 
kilogrammes of gold a day. Although the miner held legal claims, he was evicted and 
police were guarding the area (Interview Respondent, no. 12, 24 June 2014). Another 
interview respondent revealed that the first Lady’s son had now taken over mining in 
partnership with the Chinese (Interview Respondent no. 11, 18 July 2014).  
Meanwhile, victims have often acquiesced even in full glare of breakdown of rule of 
law and selective prosecutions in which the politically powerful have emerged 
untouchables.  
 
Indigenisation and Mining Accumulation 
 
In 2008, just before the landmark Zimbabwe national election, the state passed 
the indigenisation law in parliament. In the subsequent election, ZANU-PF for the 
first time in its history suffered electoral defeat by the opposition, MDC-T albeit 
without sufficient margins. Thereafter the opposition candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai 
withdrew from the run-off election citing violence. Following a series of settlement 
negotiations, ZANU-PF reluctantly accepted a coalition government with erstwhile 
adversaries, the two MDCs. Despite the MDC-T winning majority parliamentary 
seats, 118  ZANU-PF dominated the coalition government. 119  In essence, ZANU-PF 
dominated state and policy making. The state deployed the indigenisation and 
empowerment programmes to provide avenues of accumulation for the ruling ZANU-
PF, politically connected business and military elites in collaboration with South 
African and Chinese capital while autonomous indigenous capital was eschewed. The 
consequences of indigenisation for the manufacturing and other non-commodities 
sectors were dire. Whereas the mining sectors offered attractive return in the context 
of a commodities boom and increasing Chinese appetite for minerals, the 
                                                        
118 The Movement for Democratic Change won 100, ZANU-PF 99. 
119  ZANU-PF controlled all key security and policy organs in the allocation of 
ministerial portfolios under the Inclusive Government, except the Ministry of 
Finance.  
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manufacturing sector was hard hit by lack of capital as investors feared appropriation 
of their investment. By 2007, industry and manufacturing capacity utilisation120 stood 
below 10 per cent (Shumba and Jahed, 2012: 155). 
 
Saunders (2008: 71) observed the emergence of new wave of foreign mining 
investment: 
 
fuelled by a potent mixture of capital raised in South African and international 
finance markets; the political protection (real or imagined) afforded by the 
South African government and other regional political elites; a declining 
appetite for non-core assets held by major mining houses; and the availability 
of both established and recently developed mineral resources, particularly 
some large and mostly untapped platinum deposits.  
 
Mzi Khumalo, a high profile empowerment entrepreneur from South Africa, 
became a Zimbabwean player when his Metallon mining group acquired 
Independence Gold Mines in 2002, in a deal that saw the marginalisation of 
Metallon’s prospective Zimbabwean partners and led to a series of bitter lawsuits. In 
another deal, Mmakau Mining, headed by Bridgette Radebe, wife of South African 
Transport Minister Jeff Radebe took over Eureka gold mine from Placer Dome SA 
and promised to bring in a Zimbabwean black empowerment junior partner (SAPA, 18 
July, 2005). This demonstrates that far from the stated goal of empowering 
Zimbabweans, the state preferred an alliance with ‘trusted’ foreign capital which 
would not threaten the ruling ZANU-PF interest than empowering autonomous 
indigenous capital which may threaten the interests of the ruling party in the future. 
Fear of autonomous centres of power thus remains one of the major impediments to 
the construction of a developmental state. By working to systematically weaken 
opposition, civil society and autonomous business the state undermined the 
infrastructural power to achieve development.  
 
China also emerged as a key minerals player in Zimbabwe in the 2000s. In 
2006, a US$1.3 billion contract for coal mining and thermal generation construction 
                                                        
120 Capacity utilisation is a concept in economics that refers to the extent to which an 
enterprise or a nation actually uses its installed productive capacity as opposed to the 
potential output which ‘could’ be produced, if capacity was fully used (Berndt and 
Morrison, 1981).  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was negotiated with China Machine Building International, and a chrome mining 
partnership was established between the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation 
(ZMDC) and Beijing’s Star Communications, bankrolled by Chinese funds. Then in 
2007, Sinosteel bought a controlling stake for US$200m in the Zimbabwe Mining and 
Smelting Company (Zimasco), the leading Zimbabwean ferrochrome producer and 
fifth largest in the world, (China Daily, 21 December, 2007). The public 
encouragement by the Zimbabwean government of Chinese investment as an 
alternative to the politically constrained western markets signaled the appearance of a 
new pattern of mine financing (Saunders, 2008) and a new pattern of development 
away from the ideals of democratic accountable and representational state towards 
authoritarianism, as the Chinese government does not insist on democratic values. 
Instead the Chinese believe that democracy might not be right for Africa and 
authoritarian leaders might be better. 121 With promising Chinese investments, the 
Zimbabwean government could wantonly abandon its ostensible commitments to the 
rule of law. 
 
A few notable investments by Zimbabweans included businessmen with 
strong connections with the military and ZANU-PF political elites. For example, 
Mwana Africa included among its founding directors Oliver Chidau, a wealthy 
Zimbabwean businessman with strong political connections with ZANU-PF. The 
mining house bought a 53 per cent stake from Anglo American in 2003 in the large 
Bindura Nickel operation in the wake of simmering conflict among local business 
factions for control of the nickel mine. They brought in a ZANU-PF stalwart, Retired 
Air Chief Marshall Josiah Tungamirai, to the reconstituted Bindura board and 
prominent state-linked businessman, Muchadeyi Masunda. In 2005 Mwana Africa 
added AngloGold Ashanti’s Freda Rebecca mine to its stable and also took over Cluff 
Mining Zimbabwe. As part of the Freda Rebecca sale agreement approved by 
government, Mwana Africa undertook to sell a 15 per cent stake to a Zimbabwean 
investor, although this had still not happened by 2014. 
                                                        
121 Speaking at a Southern Africa Political Economy Series (SAPES) workshop, in 
Harare on 6 May 2014 at the Crown Plaza Hotel, Lin Lin, the Chinese Ambassador to 
Zimbabwe, indicated that China does not believe in calls for the standardisation of 
democracy as the right formula for Africa. China recognises that countries may 
pursue different models other than standardisation of democracy as the only way of 
governing societies.  
134 
 
 
Meanwhile, indigenous Zimbabwean investors who fell out with the ruling 
elite were punished and prosecuted. The ruling elite abused state power and violence 
to assert its control over society and business. Political control of the judiciary 
through targeted deployments—discussed in chapter five—ensured selective 
application of the law. Only those who lost favour were prosecuted. Mutumwa 
Mawere, an indigenous mining magnate initially exploiting strong links with ZANU-
PF relied on government guarantee and creative financial structuring to purchase a 
controlling shareholding in Shabanie Mashaba asbestos mines in the late 1990s. 
However, when he fell out with the ruling party, Mawere’s empire collapse was 
ensured by the withdrawal of political support and prosecution for various alleged 
crimes.122 The one-time empowerment hero, recast by government as a criminal, went 
into self-imposed exile in South Africa fearing arrest in Zimbabwe. His Shabanie 
assets were seized by the state. Meanwhile ZANU-PF linked businessmen involved 
scandalous pillaging of public funds in the banking sector (discussed in chapter 
seven) were allowed to walk scot-free. Indigenous Zimbabweans’ empowerment 
deals were increasingly tied to and dependent upon powerful political connections in 
the party – especially those with military and security connections. The violations of 
the rights to property undoubtedly impacted negatively on the country’s investment 
climate outside the ‘trusted sources’ that banked their investment security through 
political relationships such as the Chinese and South African investors. Mainstream 
analysts have noted that despite the deepening crisis and obstacles for capital in 
Zimbabwe, some perceived form of residual protection from the South African 
government could explain the presence of dozens of South African investors (Games, 
2004a; 2004b). 
 
In terms of indigenisation and empowerment, demands that mining giants take 
on local partners lacked a clear and enforceable policy. The state was equally 
rendered vulnerable by its bankruptcy and desperate need for foreign exchange-
yielding mineral exports. At Zimplats, owner Implats’ engagement with three 
successive sets of local partners nominated by government—whose key assets 
                                                        
122  Mawere was specified for allegedly externalising foreign currency, converting 
Zimbabwe dollars into foreign currency without going through the Zimbabwe Central 
Bank, as required. 
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appeared to rest on the strength of connections and influence—each collapsed because 
the company required bankable financial commitments from any future partner. 
Zimplats proposed domestic participation by means of the listing of some of its shares 
on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, but government rejected the idea. In early 2013, 
attempts at negotiated restructuring through vendor financing were hampered by 
corruption revelations in a scandal that became known as the Niebgate scandal. The 
deal negotiated by Brainworks (Pvt) Ltd123 would see the government of Zimbabwe 
getting a 10-year loan from Implats to buy the 51 per cent share ownership in 
Zimplats that will be repaid through dividends. The government eventually rejected 
the idea as it turned out that shareholding transfer depended on the declaration of 
dividends, so if the company made losses the government will emerge heavily 
indebted.  
  
 Despite the indigenisation and empowerment rhetoric, the state favoured 
investment from ‘trusted’ regional and international capital taking up majority 
shareholding contrary to the indigenisation law. South Africa’s platinum mining giant 
with probably the biggest mining investment in the country successfully negotiated its 
way to resist indigenisation. This was facilitated by the government being prepared to 
tamper with important foreign exchange earnings from at a time when the fiscus was 
severely constrained. Documented indigenisation deals showed that regional South 
African and international Chinese capital were the major beneficiaries (Saunders, 
2008), in partnership with the state and ZANU-PF politically connected business and 
military elites while autonomous indigenous capital was marginalised. The ZANU-PF 
government would not demonstrate greater commitment to democratic and 
accountable forms of governance given that the preferred Chinese investment 
partnership does not subscribe to the values of democratic governance. The 
implications will be far-reaching.  It will be difficult to envisage how the new 
investment patterns and development trajectory will foster greater transparency and 
accountability in the management of natural resources. 
  
                                                        
123 A little known company called Brainworks (linked to then ZANU-PF minister 
responsible for indigenisation, Saviour Kasukuwere) was reportedly awarded a 
US$100 million deal to negotiate a restructuring deal with Zimplats and other mining 
houses without going to tender (Daily News, 17 February 2013). 
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Marange Diamonds and Militarised Accumulation 
 
In the diamonds-mining sector, the state deployed violence and coercion 
ostensibly to stamp out informal and illegal diamonds trade following a frenzied 
diamond rush, which started in 2006 after the discovery of alluvial diamonds in 
Marange (appendix 2). Operation Hakudzokwi or ‘You will not return’ in the autumn 
of 2008 resulted in the killing of over 200 and wounding many more artisanal miners 
(Human Rights Watch, 2009). Meanwhile, the predatory state appeared to be losing 
way to an avaricious ruling class deploying violence for its own interests. There were 
soon allegations that soldiers, too, were digging in the secured zone, and that senior 
ZANU-PF and military elites were involved in illegal mining syndicates and trade. 
For example, Perrance Shiri, Commander of the Zimbabwean Air Force, and cousin 
to Robert Mugabe, deployed his own agents involved in illegal informal mining and 
trade (ZimDaily, October 6, 2008). Allegations of smuggling124  and corruption at 
Marange fingered senior politicians in ZANU-PF including Mines and Mining 
Development Minister Obert Mpofu whose business empire instantaneously sprouted. 
In a deal which raised much public interest, Mpofu bought an ailing Zimbabwe Allied 
Banking Group (ZABG) for $27,8 million in cash. Subsequently, the World Diamond 
Council called for an investigation into the Zimbabwe diamond mining industry. As 
early as 2007, the Kimberly Process (KP) announced that some diamond exporters in 
Zimbabwe were under investigation. In their 2009 report Partnership Africa Canada 
(PAC) concluded that the Zimbabwean diamonds were not ‘clean’ on the basis of 
human rights abuses and illicit trade dealings. 
 
In the subsequent restructuring, the first to receive concessions were Chinese 
companies, Anjin Investments (see also appendix 3) and Sino Zimbabwe 
Development (Pvt) Ltd working in close connection with ZANU-PF political and 
security elite and Marange Resources (Pvt) Ltd, wholly owned by the parastatal, the 
Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), chaired by retired Colonel 
Tshinga Dube (Financial Gazette, 11 April 2012). In its detailed report, Global 
Witness (2012) revealed how members of the Central Intelligence Organisation and 
                                                        
124 In February 2007, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), Gideon 
Gono speculated that the country was losing between US$40 million and US$50 
million per week through the smuggling of gold, diamond and all precious minerals 
(New Zimbabwe.com, 11 December 2009). 
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military were directors of a group of companies, Sino Zimbabwe Development and 
Anjin respectively. Three members of the Central Intelligence Organisation who sat 
in the Sino Zimbabwe Development (Pvt) Ltd board included; Dr. Gift Kalisto 
Machengete (Director, Finance and Administration), Pritchard Zhou and Masimba 
Ignatius Kamba (Director - Finance). Global Witness identified that a senior military 
lawyer in the Ministry of Defence, Brigadier General Charles Tarumbwa, held 50 per 
cent of Anjin’s shares, while the permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Mr. 
Martin Rushwaya also sat on Anjin’s executive board. Other members of the Anjin 
executive board included;  
1. Mr. Oliver Chibage, a commissioner in the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP),  
2. Ms. Nonkosi M. Ncube, a commissioner in the ZRP,  
3. Mr. Munyaradzi Machacha, a ZANU-PF director of publications,  
4. Mr. Mabasa Temba Hawadi, a director of Marange Resources (Pvt) Ltd, a 
subsidiary of the ZMDC,  
5. Mr. Morris Masunungure, a current or retired officer in the Zimbabwe 
Defence Forces (ZDF),  
6. Mr. Romeo Daniel Mutsvunguma, a retired colonel in the ZDF alleged by 
Human Rights Watch to have participated in violence in 2008. 
 
The Registrar of Companies records show that 50 per cent of Anjin is part 
owned and controlled by the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence, military and police. A 
letter (attached in the appendix 4) shows Commissioner General, Augustine Chihuri 
applying for a diamond-mining license in Chiadzwa through a company identified as 
Security Self Reliance Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd, demonstrating the level of involvement 
of the country’s security services sector in the controversial diamond mining 
activities. The nature of diamond mining industry investment between the state and 
Chinese investors lacked transparency and accountability in the declaration of 
revenue earning from the diamond sector. In May 2013 the MDC-T Finance Minister 
in the coalition government complained that diamonds mining companies were not 
paying enough tax to the treasury, while Anjin had not paid anything since it began 
trading (Centre for Research and Development, Workshop, 6 May, 2013). The 
attendant anti-developmental accumulation patterns served the important interests of 
military and ZANU-PF political elites while undermining the extractive capacity of 
the state necessary to finance development projects. The avenue to reward the 
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generals with diamond mining interests was costly and beyond the inclusive 
government, the military jointly owned companies continued to evade statutory 
contributions at a time when the state fiscal capacity was severely constrained.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The chapter shows how developmental state features at independence 
gradually waned giving way to predation in the mining sectors, as the state faced 
increasing political threat and poor economic performance. Indigenisation produced 
outcomes diametrically opposite from the state’s claims. New opportunities driven by 
the global boom of commodity prices opened up to mainly ‘trusted’ regional investors 
who did not pose a political threat. Meanwhile domestic autonomous indigenous 
capital was repressed and marginalised. This is in sharp contrast to the claim that the 
state was empowering the majority of Zimbabweans. Further, investment in the 
manufacturing sectors waned as investors feared compulsory take-over of their 
investments through the indigenisation and empowerment regulations. In the 
diamonds sector the security organs of the state are the notable beneficiaries in 
partnership with Chinese capital. Operations of diamond mining and trade were 
shrouded in secrecy while the diamond mining companies evaded their tax obligations 
to the treasury. Through the indigenisation and empowerment programs the logic of 
predatory accumulation extended across other viable key economic sectors: banking 
and finance; and transport and energy sectors and discussed in next chapters. 
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Chapter Seven:  
The Banking and Financial Services Sector 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the role of state in mediating accumulation in the 
banking and finance sector. It focuses primarily on the banking sector given the 
central role it plays in intermediating accumulation processes. The history of 
Zimbabwe’s banking and finance sector dates back to colonial settlement in the 
1900s. International banking institutions such as the Standard Chartered Bank and 
Barclays Bank dominated colonial state banking and financial sector, through 
provision of working capital to support white commercial interests in mining and 
agriculture. Following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the state imposed 
capital flight and exchange controls that would re-orient financial intermediation 
towards the country’s productive sectors as part of sanctions busting strategies. The 
subsequent development of manufacturing significantly transformed the structure of 
the economy providing backward linkages and stimulating prodigious growth rates. 
State capacity was critical in disciplining and fostering collaborative relationships 
with finance capital.  
 
For the greater part of the first decade of independence, the state maintained 
this skewed banking system at the expense of indigenous players (Kanyenze et al, 
2011). Indeed, Harvey (1998) observed that immediately after independence, the state 
did not interfere significantly with key sectors like the banking system because it 
regarded it as an integral part of a modern business sector, whose privileges it did not 
dare attack for fear of outflows of capital and skilled labour. Not until the early 1990s 
did the banking and finance sector feature entry of indigenous players following the 
liberalisation of the economy and black economic empowerment initiatives. The 
command economy that government pursued during the first decade of independence 
had facilitated the emergence of a state bourgeoisie whose appetite for capital 
accumulation had been greatly enhanced by a decade of privileged access to various 
resources. The easing of entry barriers in the 1990s facilitated the first wave of an 
opportunistic and speculative indigenous elite into the previously closed banking and 
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finance sectors. In order to secure their interests, indigenous investors banked security 
of their business interests with granting preferential loans to the ruling elite.   
 
In the 2000s, bank failures characterised most of the indigenous ventures as a 
result of poor corporate governance and the collapse of speculative bubbles under the 
hyper-inflationary environment. It is intriguing to note that although hyperinflation 
was highly unfavourable for this industry, indigenous participation actually increased. 
By December 2013, indigenous banks constituted 68 per cent of the total banking 
sector, while foreign banks stood at 29 per cent (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2013). 
This chapter analyses the role of the state in mediating the changing structure of the 
banking and financial sector in Zimbabwe. It engages connections between the state 
and elite accumulation in the banking and finance sectors and consequent economy-
wide impacts. 
 
The Colonial State and Banking Sector 
 
The development of modern banking and finance in Zimbabwe dates back to 
the colonial settlement in late eighteenth century with the arrival of the South African 
based London banks and stock exchange speculators in the new colony. It was the 
Cape Town-based Standard Chartered Bank, originally founded with London capital, 
in 1860 which first descended on the colony on the back of the Pioneer Column. The 
close meshing of Standard Chartered Bank with Rhodes’ empire is denominated in 
part by the bank’s control of nearly all local gold assaying and purchasing in the 
colony. According to Bond (1998: 32), Rhodes’ close personal friendship with 
Standard Chartered Bank’s general manager, Lewis Michell, was one reason the bank 
opened its first branch in Salisbury just five months after the construction of a 
telegraph line in 1892. The bank provided two important services: an acceptable 
currency supply to replace the British South Africa Company’s cheques (until then 
the chief medium of exchange) and local bank accounts which enabled savings and 
money circulation. The other influence wrought by financial power was the easy 
availability of foreign portfolio funding for the emerging local stock markets.  
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The Banks’ speculative exploits, largely in land and gold, during this early 
period of colonisation would fundamentally transform the course of Southern 
Rhodesia’s development. Until the collapse of speculative bubbles in land 
speculation, financiers like Standard Chartered Bank were reluctant to invest medium 
and long-term capital into agricultural credit. The colonial administration established 
a Land Bank in 1912 to provide loans for white agricultural activities. In addition to 
Standard Chartered Bank, Barclays Bank began operations in Southern Rhodesia in 
1895. Between them, the two banks achieved such thorough penetration of white 
consumer banking that in 1938, the two banks in Gwelo  (now Gweru) had 1,400 
accounts at a time the white adult population was 1,600 (Bond, 1998: 40). Alongside 
providing currency and savings facilities, the banks established a symbiotic financing 
relationship with the state. For example the banks provided a £2 million overdraft 
facility to the colony’s 1933 purchase of British South Africa Company mineral rights 
(Bond, 1998:41). By the late 1930s the two local banks were providing start-up 
capital to white businesses in line with the goals of the state although only limited to 
short-term capital, and not long-term funds (Central Statistics Office, 1947: 10).  
 
Following the attainment of self-governing status, the new state introduced 
new financial instruments to borrow from international financiers in order to support 
development of white settler commercial interests. For example, the state issued £4 
million in official bonds at 5.0 per cent interest (Bond, 1998:38). However, across the 
African continent, repayment problems were aggravated by declining value of 
exports. Exports declined from £179 million in 1929 to £117 million in 1931, which 
was barely above the nominal 1913 value (Frankel, 1938: 173). The 1933 electoral 
victory of white urban and agrarian populists, which signalled conflicts with powerful 
international financial capital interests, re-oriented the economy towards somewhat 
more locally controlled development. The state changed course towards aggressive 
interventionist measures. Notable measures included protectionism to reverse the 
drain of financial surpluses to the two Southern Rhodesian banks’ London 
headquarters. Barber (1961: 166-167) noted that during 1930s-40s the lending 
policies of these banks were oriented towards short-term, liquid, and low-risk loans as 
opposed to fixed capital formation. The hostility towards international finance 
emerged from the high interest loan repayments and the state’s lack of control over 
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levels and priorities of banking credit. This resulted in the first national calls for a 
central bank as a solution to excessive South African and London influence. 
 
In 1952, the state responded by regulating loose credit with rigid controls to 
direct the banking sector to finance state defined development priorities. Notable 
provisions associated with the 1952 controls were summarised as follows: 
 
The banks have been advised to give priority to credit facilities, which will 
increase, or at least maintain, agricultural and mining output and also that of 
secondary industry. Also included in the priority class are credits, which will 
directly benefit the export trade, and credits designed to facilitate the 
progressive and orderly liquidation of existing industrial stocks... Credit will 
in no circumstances be made available for the carrying of supplies of non-
essential imported goods, while requests by importers for finance after the 
placing of orders will be critically examined (Commerce, cited in Bond 1998: 
66). 
 
The Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the new Central African Federation 
was established in 1956 (Richards, 1956). Three other banks were later established in 
the colony; the Netherlands Bank of South Africa (which opened in 1951), National 
and Grindlays Bank (1953), and the Ottoman Bank (1958). By the end of the decade, 
altogether the five banks had opened 220 branches in 60 towns (Pearson and Taylor, 
1963:14). A major boost to the money market was the commencement of regular 
government sales of Treasury Bills in 1957. Also new on the scene were a few 
development corporations providing medium and long-term venture financing. In 
1960 the Federation also established an Industrial Development Corporation, supported 
by the Reserve Bank and the Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation 
(Barber, 1961: 167). The state also introduced supervisory controls with the Banks 
Act of 1956 and 1959 introducing both reserve requirements and liquid asset 
requirements. 125  Subsequently, the state further introduced tighter currency and 
exchange controls in 1961 and 1963 respectively.  
 
                                                        
125.Initially, for commercial banks, 8 per cent of demand deposits and 3 per cent of term 
deposits were to be held with the reserve bank, although the demand deposit 
requirement was relaxed to 6 per cent in 1960 as recession set in. Furthermore, 25 per 
cent of all bank assets, and 20 per cent of other financial institutions’ assets, had to be in 
liquid form, although only from mid-1962. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that by 1960 annual local savings of approximately 
£60 million ─ representing a relatively substantial 21 per cent of Southern Rhodesia’s 
GDP ─ were sufficient to finance 70 to 80 per cent of new capital formation, access to 
foreign loans was considered increasingly essential by the government (Bond, 
1998:56). During the 1950s, £72 million in official debt was issued on the London 
bond market as against £60 million on the local capital market (Bond, 1998: 56). 
Total foreign and local public debt increased from £27 million in 1946 to £137 
million in 1954, and two-thirds of the total domestic investment of nearly £300 
million during those years was derived from international sources. In the late 1950s 
private corporations also became more active international borrowers, with an average 
of £23.5 million in net new annual foreign debt (Thompson and Woodruff, 1954: 
171). Among the overseas funds were US$140 million in World Bank project loans 
during the 1950s and early 1960s (Bond, 1998:56). The Bank’s largest single loan 
project ever through the mid-1950s was the US$80 million lent for the £114 million 
Kariba Dam (with a volume four times greater than the second biggest dam on earth 
at the time) (Bond, 1998:56). Roads, public works, water systems, railways, 
electricity, iron and steel, and a national airline all considered essential for the rapid 
expansion, relied on foreign funding. 
 
New housing credit accumulation opportunities also opened in the wake of the 
increase in numbers of black workers in urban mining centres. This was deemed a 
politically essential strategy to weaken black resistance through divide and rule. The 
state encouraged financiers to tear down traditional barriers to black housing or small 
business credit although little progress was recorded on this front. As Davies and 
Dewar remark (1989: 48), ‘what was being achieved was the co-optation of a black 
property owning class which would favour stability and oppose resistance to the 
existing social order.’ Loans were also extended to black farmers although such loans 
would always be far smaller (at roughly £50 each) than those received by the 80 per 
cent of white farmers who borrowed from the Land Bank (Bond, 1998:70). This 
deliberate policy of squeezing of loans to black farmers was ultimately aimed at 
avoiding black competition with white agriculture (Davies and Dewar, 1989). 
However, while it was strategic to suppress black competition, the strategy 
concurrently harmed the development and expansion of domestic demand necessary 
to sustain a high growth political economy during the colonial era.  
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The Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 featured a shift in the 
Rhodesian economy’s general sectoral orientation of accumulation. Finance was at 
the heart of the shift, but this time in a dominated, not dominant way. The state 
introduced controls that effectively prevented capital flight including exchange 
control restrictions, which encouraged capital accumulation in a direction determined 
by the state. Handford (1976: 18) revealed how successful the countervailing efforts 
had been: 
 
When the full story of the ‘whisking away’ of considerably more than half of 
the fixed and liquid Rhodesian reserves in London is eventually told, it will read 
like a James Bond thriller. Weary officials of the Reserve Bank and of the 
Treasury regard the secret removal, only a matter of hours before the 
Independence Proclamation, as the auspicious start of Rhodesia’s counter-attack 
against the British sanctions... Probably the biggest British miscalculation of all 
was on the extent of the funds, which would be available once money was 
bottled up inside Rhodesia through the operation of the closed economy. 
 
Exchange controls trapped not only local financial resources and the profits of 
multinational corporations, but also existing bank deposits of non-residents, which by 
the late 1970s accounted for a third of the stock of surplus funds that banks had 
available for loans. According to Clarke (1980: 325), the system of financial autarchy 
was in place convincingly by the late 1960s: 
 
The controls worked, especially when combined with buoyant growth 
conditions in the economy associated with high net white immigration (and 
rising mortgage demand), rapid industrial development through diversification 
(and demand for hire purchase and leasing facilities), and expanded primary 
sector output. All these developments widened the base of the institutions, led to 
diversification within them, increased intra-sectoral linkages and flows, and 
strengthened the financial sector’s structure. 
 
The success of the strategy hinged on state planning capacity to direct 
investment in a manner conducive to development. The Reserve Bank assumed 
responsibility for overall coordination of exchange control in 1965. With financial 
capital under the firm control of the state, it was the resurgence of manufacturing ─ 
responsible for a quarter of national output by that stage ─ that powered the 1966-74 
boom in which annual national output growth averaged 9.5 per cent. It is important, 
however, to understand some of the preconditions for this centrally-directed economic 
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dynamism:  the powerful yet flexible state economic policy apparatus, the cohesion 
and class solidarity of industrialists, existing manufacturing production overcapacity, 
and the availability of cheap, repressed labour (Bond, 1998:86). South African banks 
offered support in the evasion of sanctions and in lubricating anonymous trade (Clarke, 
1980: 104), while London’s Sunday Times investigations also established that from 
1972, imports of steel-making equipment were being financed by Swiss and Austrian 
banks. 
 
Short and medium-term cooperation between the state and the major financial 
institutions was an integral component of initial post-Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence economic successes. ‘British-controlled banks in Rhodesia, presumably 
not wishing business to foreign banks, put their foreign currencies in South Africa 
before the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and it appeared that this helped them 
to extend credit against blocked accounts in Southern Rhodesia,’ (Handford 1976: 18). 
In the words of top Barclays bank officials (Crossley and Blandford, 1975: 251-252), 
‘Unilateral Declaration of Independence had in effect been anticipated and made no 
change in the administration of the bank’s affairs save that London could no longer 
approve nor reject proposals put forward by Salisbury.’ Similarly Seidman (1986: 65) 
also notes, ‘the foreign banks became more closely interlinked, not only with each other 
but also with other financial institutions, on account of their collaboration in the face of 
United Nations sanctions, to mobilise locally generated investable surpluses, primarily 
to finance the transnational corporate affiliates expanding activities in the modern 
sector.’ 
 
The manner in which the state intervened to stimulate production across the key 
economic sector during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence is worth some 
comment. From late 1965, the state focused unprecedented resources on controlling 
external account balances, encouraging immigration of skilled white males, ensuring 
labour market stability, cementing land inequality, expanding police and military 
control, and subsidising all manner of white business ventures. This entailed waiving 
overseas firms’ production rights, licensing arrangements and trademarks, as well as 
other constraints against technology transfer. The state spending also included new 
investments in transport (especially rail and airlines), energy, posts and 
telecommunications, and purchasing and marketing authorities (Kadhani, 1986: 
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104-105). The combination of state controls, public works programmes and aid from 
neighbouring states, including sanctions-busting transport arrangements, loans and 
other assistance from South Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique enabled the 
regime to navigate the impact of sanctions and war until the country’s independence in 
1980. 
 
The Post –Independence State and Banking Sector: 1980 – 1990 
 
At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had a sophisticated banking and financial 
market inherited from the colonial era, with commercial banks mostly foreign owned 
and a central bank that had been inherited from the Central Bank of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland at the winding up of the Federation. Suspicious of international finance 
capital and yet recognising its significant economic role, the state did not seek to 
interfere with the banking and finance sector. Instead state intervention was aimed in 
part at buying a small piece of the banking system through state shareholding with 
limited attention directed at providing policy instruments to expand financial 
intermediation and access for previously marginalised indigenous black capital.126  
 
The state acquired Nedbank’s 61 per cent majority interest in Rhobank in a 
deal which observers saw as a ‘generous takeover offer’ 127  (Financial Gazette, 
January 30, 1981: 12). The state in 1981 also partnered with the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International acquiring a 47 per cent shareholder in the local subsidiary 
(Bond, 1998: 135). The bank was later taken over by the state and renamed the 
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe when the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International collapsed in 1991 over allegations of continent-wide unethical business 
practices. The state also gained a leading stake in Fidelity Life Assurance of 
Zimbabwe in 1988 following the sale of shares by Legal and General Society of 
London through the state-owned Zimbabwe Reinsurance Group. In addition, the state 
initiated the Zimbabwe Development Bank with a 51 per cent controlling stake in 1983 
                                                        
126 At the low end of the market a Credit Guarantee Corporation was supported, though 
in a half-hearted manner, offering small businesses collateral to their commercial bank 
lenders (Bond, 1998: 135).  
127 The government of Zimbabwe bought 4, 506 878 shares at 590c (15c less than the 
quoted price of 605c on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange). 
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to make loans to medium and large-scale businesses. Support to the Industrial 
Development Corporation formed by the colonial regime to advance its state capitalism 
projects during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence period was also continued.  
 
The state interventions focused on ownership through the state rather than 
liberalising the sector for indigenous participation. In the first decade of 
independence, no indigenous bank was licensed and there was no evidence that the 
government had any indigenous economic participation reform plan for the banking 
and finance sectors (Masuko, 2010). Stringent laws and regulations that restricted 
entrance of indigenous players in the sector were maintained. As a result, the colonial 
structure of the financial sector remained intact, and the sector continued to be 
dominated by multinational banks such as Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered 
Bank (Makina, 2009). Indigenous blacks struggled to access business loans in part 
due to the racial biases embedded within the inherited white banking institutions still 
trapped in the colonial regime mentality and stringent lending conditions that 
disqualified majority new black business entrepreneurs. Black access to business 
finance was a long-standing problem predating independence. Even as free enterprise-
oriented reforms escalated in the late 1970s, the credit barrier proved nearly 
insurmountable. Over a three-year post-independence period through early 1983, 
‘bank credit to black entrepreneurs amounted to a meagre 414 loans for Z$2.25 
million (most for the retail trade)’ (Chimombe, 1983: 109), accounting for less than 
three per cent of total loans issued. In its editorial the Financial Gazette (28, October, 
1993) pointedly noted:  
 
It is increasingly becoming difficult to do business when one is black in 
Zimbabwe. Financial institutions, most of which are white-dominated, have 
used their economic power effectively. They have pulled the plugs on 
corporations headed by blacks and imposed onerous conditions to keep the 
financial tap flowing to the same executives. The effect of this has been to 
thoroughly humiliate black executives, most of whom have been caught by the 
current harsh financing environment. On the other hand handsome rescue 
packages amounting to spoon-feeding have been put in place for whites in 
similar positions. White mismanagement and general financial problems have 
been tolerated and encouraged through an unlimited and unconditional 
availability of loan funding. The banks and the white community will 
vehemently deny that there is racism. But this is a futile exercise. If they deny 
its existence then they clearly do not understand the predicament of their black 
countrymen. 
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Racial discrimination in the banking system remained a real phenomenon, 
though probably no more so than in other parts of the white-controlled economy. 
Barclays, Zimbank and Standard Chartered all eventually opened small business loan 
departments to serve emergent black firms, but such incremental institutional change 
did not make much difference. Part of the problem, it was alleged, was the race and 
class composition of high-ranking bank officials.128 The claims featured prominently 
in several indigenous lobby group pronouncements during the period.129  It would 
appear that despite indigenous black lobby pressures, reforms were stalled both by a 
combination of international finance capital resistance and reluctance by the state, as 
the ruling elite feared the development of an independent indigenous black capital 
that could pose a threat to its power interests.  State-owned banks equally proved 
impotent, constrained by pathologies of patronage and corruption. For example, 
according to the World Bank the Zimbabwe government inherited a Development 
Finance Company, founded with $3 million in 1979 to make loans to black small-scale 
enterprises, but which ‘dissipated its resources during the regime immediately 
preceding independence by making politically-motivated loans, many of which had to 
be written off’ (World Bank, 1986: 5).  
 
Constrained by a racially skewed banking system and corruption, the state 
failed to stir financial intermediation to support a high-growth political economy. 
While the money markets were awash with funds and the banks underlent, investment 
levels were wholly inadequate to the task of maintaining the capital stock intact, let 
alone generating the 200,000 new jobs needed each year.130 Although this alone cannot 
explain the economic stagnation in the following decade it certainly accounts for its 
share of the inherent challenges constraining growth in the post-independence period. 
                                                        
128 Although affirmative action facilitated greater inclusion of blacks in formal sector 
employment, it was largely in government where blacks accelerated faster to positions 
of influence. In the private financial sectors, higher positions of influence remained 
firmly dominated by whites. Black lobby groups advocated for institutional reform; 
indigenisation of shareholding and appointment of black chief executive officers and 
managers. 
129  For example in 1992, Strive Masiiwa, then a vigorous black empowerment 
campaigner, demanded that Standard Bank appoint a black chief executive arguing 
that the bank was too conservative (Financial Gazette, 12 January 1994). 
130  Estimates given by the Minister of Finance Bernard Chidzero in the 1980s 
(various fiscal policy statements 1981 – 1989). 
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Zimbabwe had posted impressive growth rates, 10.7 per cent in 1980 and 12.5 per 
cent in 1982, but by 1985 the economy went on a downward spiral recording 
declining average growth rates until late 1989 (Shumba, 2010: 2). By 1990, on the 
backdrop of escalating domestic and international debt, the state succumbed to 
pressure for economic structural adjustment reforms sponsored by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the IMF and WB.  
 
 Following the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program in 
1990 and the amendment of the Banking Act (24:01), the financial sector was 
liberalised and deregulated. Concurrently, the founding of the Indigenous Business 
Development Corporation (IBDC) in 1990 also increased traction for reforms to 
enable greater access to business loans for black entrepreneurs. Entry barriers were 
eased leading to increased participation of both autonomous indigenous players as 
well as opening avenues for politically connected accumulation. Indigenous banking 
entrepreneurs opted for less costly financial institutions in terms of both initial capital 
requirements and working capital. For example, a merchant bank would require less 
staff, would not need banking halls, and would have no need to deal in costly small 
retail deposits, which would reduce overheads and reduce the time to register profits 
(Business Council of Zimbabwe (BCZ), 2011). The period 1991-1999 therefore gave 
rise to indigenous players in the banking and financial services sector. The number of 
banking institutions increased from 10 before amendment of the banking act in 1991 
to 30 by 1999. Table 7.1 below shows the new banking institutions formed between 
1991 and 1999. 
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Table 7.1: New banking institutions formed 1991 - 1999 
Institutions 
Formed131 
Type of 
Banking 
Institution 
Year of 
registration 
Political Linkages 
1. Intermarket 
Discount House 
Discount 
House 
1991 No political links 
established 
2. Zimbabwe Building 
Society 
Building 
Society 
1992 No political links 
established 
3. National Merchant 
Bank of Zimbabwe 
Merchant 
Bank 
1994 Founder Ariston 
Chambati was a ZANU-
PF technocrat and later 
Minister of Finance 
4. National Discount 
House 
Discount 
House 
1994 No political links 
established 
5. United Merchant 
Bank 
Merchant 
Bank  
1995 Roger Boka ZANU-PF 
aligned businessmen 
closely connected to 
President R. Mugabe 
6. Tetrad Securities Discount 
House 
1996 No political links 
established 
7. First National 
Building Society 
Building 
Society 
1996 No political links 
established 
8. Rapid Securities Discount 
House 
1997 No political links 
established 
9. Prudential Discount 
House (changed name 
to Global Investment 
House in 2000) 
Discount 
House 
1997 No political links 
established 
10. Kingdom 
Financial Services 
Merchant 
Bank 
1997 No political links 
established 
11. Time Bank Commercial 
Bank 
1997 No political links 
established 
12. First Banking 
Corporation 
Commercial 
Bank 
1997 Owned by ZANU-PF 
13. Trust Banking 
Corporation 
Merchant 
Bank 
1999 No political links 
established 
Metropolitan bank Commercial 
bank 
1999 Founded by Enock 
Kamushinga ZANU-PF 
aligned businessman 
close to President 
Mugabe 
                                                        
131Discount Houses are financial institutions devoted to trading in money market 
securities in the secondary market. Merchant Banks are banks that deal in (but are not 
limited to) international finance, long-term loans for companies and underwriting. A 
Commercial bank is a type of bank that provides services such as accepting deposits, 
making business loans, and offering basic investment products. Building societies are 
financial organisations, which pay interest on investments by members, and lend 
capital for the purchase or improvement of houses. 
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Institutions Closed Year closed Political Linkages 
1.   United Merchant Bank 1998  
2. Genesis Bank 1998 Linked to Saviour 
Kasukuwere, ZANU-PF 
Cabinet Minister 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Annual Reports, Various Issues 
 
Most of the first entrants emerged from independent bankers for example, Jeff 
Munzwimbo, Royal Bank founder; Nigel Chanakira, Kingdom Bank; William 
Nyemba Trust Bank; and Vingirayi, Intermarket. Outside this class of bankers other 
new players reflected the dominance of political elite connections setting the basis for 
predation. The state facilitated accumulation avenues for ruling party linked 
businessmen. For example, the first indigenous bank to be granted a commercial 
operating license, the United Merchant Bank (UMB) was owned by Roger Boka, a 
businessman aligned to ZANU-PF who built his empire initially through substantial 
loans from government controlled financial institutions at low rates and with almost no 
collateral (Companion, 2011). His empire collapsed in 1998 at the backdrop of serious 
maladministration and generous loans to many cabinet ministers, politburo members 
and other political businessmen. Although, he flouted almost all banking regulations 
according to the inquiry and declared a ‘specified person’ in Zimbabwe for having 
traded fake commercial paper in the name of the government owned parastatal, Cold 
Storage Company (CSC) and having illegally transferred US$21 million of depositors 
funds to his offshore personal accounts, he was never prosecuted for any charges. 
Instead of ensuring maintenance of law and a functioning justice delivery system the 
power elite captured the state to facilitate criminalised accumulation avenues with 
impunity. 
  
Timebank, which also soon followed the same fate, had two ZANU-PF 
cabinet ministers fingered in the collapse of the bank. In its report on ‘Failed Banking 
Institutions’, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) identified the then Board 
Chairperson, Eng. Munacho Mutezo and Francis Nhema, former ZANU-PF 
Indigenisation and Empowerment Minister (also founding Managing Director of the 
Zimbabwe Building Society (ZBS)) as beneficiaries of loans, which partly led to the 
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collapse of the bank. Francis Nhema married132 the daughter of the late Vice President 
Joshua Nkomo, Louise Nkomo nee Nhema. His political appointment is viewed as a 
way of appeasing the family of former vice-President Joshua Nkomo, who had died a 
year before Nhema’s appointment. According to the RBZ (2005:18) report: 
 
Indirect and direct loans to the chairman of the board Mr. Mutezo (of 
Authentic Engineering) and Mr. FD Nhema (of Streisand) comprised 60 per 
cent and 22 per cent respectively of the bank's capital…These facilities were 
not performing and represented a potential loss to the bank. 
 
Timebank exhibited analogous structural weaknesses characterised by Non-
Performing Insider Loans133 to cabinet ministers. Similar to most criminal instances 
where politically connected elites are involved, although its Directors were arrested, 
none of them were convicted. The bank was forced to shut down in 2004 at the 
backdrop of serious liquidity challenges.  
 
The other banks including Zimbabwe Building Society, Genesis Investment 
Bank, National Merchant of Zimbabwe (later renamed NMB), Metropolitan Bank, 
First National Building Society and First Banking Corporation had strong ZANU-PF 
political support (SW Radio Africa, 02 August 2012).   
 
Zimbabwe Building Society was founded by a consortium of insurance 
companies and what were described as unnamed businessmen and ‘big guns’ in ZANU-
PF (Bond, 1998:142). Meanwhile, National Merchant of Zimbabwe founding 
chairperson, Ariston Chambati was a ZANU-PF technocrat and later Minister of 
Finance. Enock Kamushinda, a former ZANU-PF stalwart and close friend to 
President Mugabe, was founder of the Metropolitan bank (later renamed Metbank) 
(New Zimbabwe, 18 October 2013). Kamushinda was later forced out by the Reserve 
Bank in exchange for a $20 billion loan injection to recapitalise the bank at the height 
of the bank’s financial troubles in 2003 (The Zimbabwe Independent, 16 September 
                                                        
132The marriage broke down in 2013 through divorce. 
133 A Nonperforming Insider Loan (NPIL) is the sum of borrowed money upon which 
the debtor, internal to the company, has not made his or her scheduled payments for at 
least 90 days. A nonperforming loan is either in default or close to being in default. 
Once a loan is nonperforming, the odds that it will be repaid in full are considered to 
be substantially lower (Investopedia). 
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2005). Genesis Investment Bank Limited had strong links to Saviour Kasukuwere, 
ZANU-PF Political Commissar and Local Government Minister. Starting as a low-
ranking member of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) in the late 1980’s, 
very little is known about how Kasukuwere built his business empire. His empire 
included ComOil (Pvt) Ltd, an oil procurement company, Migdale Holdings ltd and 
Allen Wack and Shepherd. His bank voluntarily surrendered its banking license in 
2012 after the bank failed to meet capital requirements. ZANU-PF also owns 
shareholding in First Banking Corporation through one of the party’s investment 
vehicles, Zidlee Enterprises, which also controls the duty free shops at the Airport of 
Zimbabwe, (Nehanda Radio, 26 June 2012).  
 
Therefore, beyond economic liberalisation and the call to facilitate indigenous 
participation, the opening up of the banking sector set up gateways for predation. 
These observations run against the commonly held logic that liberalisation reforms 
will limit the state and erode the excesses of the ruling elite through market 
competitiveness. As Fatton (1992) has argued, it is more likely, that the ruling elite 
will be reluctant to adopt principles of market rationality when they know fully well 
that their continued capacity to rule depends on their use of the state as a predatory 
means to acquire wealth and build political clienteles. Consequently, neo-liberal 
reforms rather than an omnipotent panacea provided opportunities that set up the basis 
and consolidation of predation in Zimbabwe. The ruling elite took advantage of the 
liberalisation reforms to facilitate entry of politically connected players into the 
country’s banking sector. Further, in response to loss of popular support and increased 
resistance to increased food prices, the state deepened patronage and violence.   
 
The Crisis and RBZ Quasi-fiscal Operations: 2000-2007 
 
In response to deepening economic crisis marked by an acute fall in production 
levels, shortage of basic commodities and constrained fiscal space, the state through 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe launched highly inflationary quasi-fiscal operations.134 
                                                        
134 Quasi-fiscal facilities were highly inflationary as they were largely financed from 
money printing thus driving money supply growth to unprecedented high levels. 
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The country exploded into hyperinflation 135  as money growth accelerated while 
national output declined. The appointment of Gideon Gono to the helm of the central 
bank in 2003 after the controversial 2002 presidential elections was largely seen as 
highly political within the finance sector (Interview, respondent no. 10, 27 March 
2014). Gono’s credentials were affixed largely to his relations as personal banker and 
financial advisor to the first family. His appointment was seen as ensuring much 
needed control over the financial sector and the central bank printing press at time of 
severe economic depression and depleted fiscal capacity. President Mugabe’s open 
criticisms of then Minister of Finance, Herbert Murerwa, arguing for tighter control of 
the printing press, signalled ZANU-PF’s insatiable appetite for seignorage power. 
Table 7.2 below presents a summary of the Reserve Bank quasi-fiscal facilities 
between, 2000 and 2007: 
 
Table 7.2: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe quasi-fiscal operations 2000 - 2007 
                                                        
135 The hyperinflation environment that peaked at an annual inflation rate of 231 
million per cent in July 2008 and an unpublished 3.2 quintillion per cent in December 
2008, (Hanke, 2008). 
Productive  
Sector  
Facility (PSF), 2000 
 
The PSF was initially introduced in 2000 to support the Export 
and Productive Sectors of the economy, of which the agriculture 
sector would receive 35.5 per cent. The facility was extended to 
other sectors of the economy in 2004. The interest rate on the 
facility was initially hugely subsidised.  
Parastatals and  
Local Authorities 
Reorientation 
Programme  
(PLARP), 2005 
 
The Parastatals and Local Authorities Reorientation Programme 
(PLARP) was introduced in 2005 in order to improve the viability 
and efficiency of parastatals and local authorities within the 
auspices of the envisaged turnaround programme. The programme 
focus was to promote good corporate governance and to stir 
parastatals and local authorities on a more sustainable path 
through increases in profitability and enhanced operational 
efficiency.  
Agricultural Sector 
Productivity 
Enhancement 
Facility (ASPEF),  
2006 
 
ASPEF was a successor financing facility to the PSF. The facility 
was a targeted support facility meant to enhance support 
productivity in the agricultural and export sectors through 
provision of concessional funding to support capital and working 
capital requirements.  
Farm Mechanisation 
Programme (FMP), 
2007 
The RBZ embarked on the FMP in 2007. The thrust of the 
programme entailed the procurement of all-inclusive farming 
equipment targeted at mechanising both communal and 
commercial farmers. The FMP was also aimed at improving 
efficiency and productivity in the farming sector with the ultimate 
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Source: RBZ Annual reports various (2000 – 2007) 
 
Five of the six programmes were in practice designed to dispense patronage. 
The programmes’ official design assumption was that declining productivity and 
output on the newly resettled farms was the absence of capital and hence the need for 
state interventionist measures. Yet the outcomes revealed that rather than serving the 
interests of the officially intended beneficiaries, the programmes benefitted the ruling 
elite.136 On the Farm Mechanisation Programme, NewsDay pointedly observed that: 
 
‘The ZANU-PF government introduced the farm mechanisation programme 
[supposedly] to benefit the masses, but was marred in controversy as it ended 
up benefiting those with close links to the system…In 2013, former RBZ 
Governor Gideon Gono refused to disclose the names of the beneficiaries of 
the farm implements to parliament when he appeared before the agriculture 
portfolio committee.’ 
 
More succinctly, former Deputy Prime Minister, Arthur Mutambara, disputing 
claims that he had benefitted from the Farm Mechanisation Programme, asserted that: 
 
‘The so-called Agricultural Mechanisation program is nothing but shameless 
abuse of taxpayer’s money in pursuit of cheap propaganda, while satisfying a 
few cronies to the detriment of the generality of the people,’ 
(Newzimbabwe.com, 11 December, 2009) 
 
                                                        
136 For example, leading ZANU-PF politicians were notable beneficiaries of the Farm 
Mechanisation Programme while the government claimed to empower the masses. 
The list of leading beneficiaries include the late former Agriculture minister Kumbirai 
Kangai; Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development 
minister Olivia Muchena; ZANU-PF senior official in Harare province Noah 
Mangondo; former Chitungwiza executive mayor Joseph Macheka; Chikomba East 
ZANU-PF MP Edgar Mbwembwe; Justice Paddington Garwe and the late Harare 
Governor David Karimanzira, (NewsDay, 03 February 2014). 
goal of enhancing agricultural output through efficient land 
utilisation and timely land preparation.  
Basic Commodities 
Supply Side 
Intervention  
 (BACOSSI), 2007 
 
The Basic Commodities Supply Side Intervention Programme was 
introduced in 2007 in order to invoke supply side response. Under 
the BACOSSI Facility, primary, secondary and tertiary producers 
and suppliers in targeted key sectors had access to concessional 
production-linked financial support for working capital 
requirements. The funding was specifically designed to generate 
positive supply responses. 
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 The expansive nature of these quasi-fiscal operations at a time when national 
output was dropping generated severe hyperinflation that made a severely negative 
impact upon the operations of business across the economy. The very patronage driven 
programmes meant to prop up political support had simultaneously harmed the 
economy and consequent predatory capacity of the state itself. The closures of 
businesses across the economy triggered massive unemployment, dwindling fiscal 
capacity and the state failed to meet basic minimum public service delivery obligations 
including a decent civil service salary.137 
 
Post 2000s State and Banking Sector Crisis 
 
In the post-2000s, the state intensified its indigenisation and empowerment 
crusade that saw increasing number of indigenous investors awarded banking 
licenses. Table 7.3 below presents 12 new banking institutions formed during the 
period 2000-2008.  
 
Table 7.3: New banking institutions formed during the economic recession period 
2000 - 2008 
Banking Institution Type of Banking 
Institution 
Year of 
registration 
Institutions Formed   
1. Interfin Merchant Bank Merchant Bank 2000 
2. Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe 
(Agribank) 
Commercial Bank 2000 
3. TrustFin Finance House 2000 
4. Century Bank Commercial Bank 2000 
5. Trust Banking Corporation Commercial Bank 2000 
6. Renaissance Merchant Bank Merchant Bank 2001 
7. Intermarket Banking Corporation Commercial Bank 2001 
8. Royal Bank of Zimbabwe Limited Commercial Bank 2002 
9. Premier Discount House Discount House 2002 
10. Barbican Bank Limited Commercial Bank 2002 
11. Sunpol Finance Finance House 2003 
12. Leasing Company of Zimbabwe Finance House 2006 
13. Metropolitan bank Commercial bank  
RBZ reports, 2000 - 2007 
 
                                                        
137 By 2007, minimum civil service salaries for teachers, nurses, police and soldiers 
could barely buy a loaf of bread.  
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The irony is that although a significant number of indigenous players had now 
entered the banking industry, the onset of hyper-inflation now made the tasks of 
juggling investments and cash demands hugely complex. Behind the veil of 
empowerment rhetoric, a number of new players awarded banking licenses had 
political support from the ruling elite. This important route opened up accumulation 
avenues through access to precious foreign currency and loans that would be 
worthless at the time of maturation. For instance, Intermarket Banking Corporation 
including its founder Mr. N.M. Vingirayi funded (retired) General Mujuru’s TRS 
Mujuru acquisition of shares in Willdale Holdings Limited (Willdale), which were on 
offer from Anglo America Corporation of Zimbabwe (Anglo). Of the total 21.98 
share acquisition, Intermarket funded Retired General Mujuru’s TRS Mujuru Limited 
17.08 per cent share acquisition, contributing 89 per cent. The initial funding was 
provided as follows: 
 
Table 7.4: Funding provided to TRS Mujuru 
Funded By Shares Values Percentage 
Intermarket Banking Corporation 275,750,663 264,408,841.67 16.03 per cent 
TRS Mujuru 88,888,889 80,000,000.00 5.17 per cent 
N. M. Vingirayi 13,451,832 12,106,648.83 0.78 per cent 
Total  378,091,384 356,515,490.00 21.98 per cent 
Source: Confidential memo 
  
 Strangely, given the banks’ meticulous lending process, the Intermarket bank 
was initially offered proceeds from the sale of land held by General Mujuru in the 
Goromonzi peri-urban area, which successive interviews revealed, did not have title 
deeds until the period the bank was placed under curatorship (Interview, Respondent 
no. 10, 27 March 2014). The Intermarket founder is widely believed to have been into 
the deal to fund General Mujuru in return for political protection fearing persecution 
for alleged links with the opposition. The case manifests the strong links between the 
state, military and capital in predatory settings. Even then the deal could not ensure 
safety, as the Intermarket bank was set up for failure after withdrawal from the inter-
bank facility for alleged financial distress.138 The state abused its supervisory powers 
                                                        
138 An observer questioned the Central Bank decision citing political persecution 
(Interview, Respondent no. 10, 27 March 2014). 
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targeting autonomous or indigenous businesses perceived to be aligned to the 
opposition to stifle political challenge.   
 
 Yet, the banking sub-sector on its own also faced a number of exogenous 
challenges that affected public confidence in the financial system. In mid-2003, the 
economy experienced a severe shortage of bank notes. The major causes of the cash 
crisis included high inflation levels, currency denominations which had become too 
small and a high demand for liquid cash required by the public to purchase basic 
commodities that were mostly accessible on the informal market. It was difficult for 
the public to withdraw their earnings and deposits from the banks. The state gave 
preferential treatment to the military and paid its salaries in cash at the barracks 
(Interview, Respondent no. 4, 28 February 2014). Indeed Bratton (2014) notes that in 
times of economic crisis, the ruling coalition shrinks down its coercive core. Predatory 
states ‘will always accord special treatments to the armed forces in order to maintain 
their essential loyalty: even if civil servants sometimes go unpaid, every effort is made 
to compensate the military’ (Bratton, 2014:7). 
 
 As the banking crisis deteriorated, some banking institutions responded to the 
unstable macroeconomic environment by shifting from their traditional banking 
business into non-traditional activities such as investments in property development, 
buying and selling of commodities, trading in shares on the stock exchange, as well as 
dealing on the foreign exchange parallel market (Muranda, 2006). The central bank 
claimed that leveraging on non-traditional activities was financial indiscipline and 
responded with clampdown and disincentives that at best worsened the situation.139 
The consequences triggered far-reaching impacts that threatened the viability of the 
banking sector and the predatory state. Banks came under pressure from depositors, 
while the central bank also failed to sustain the overnight lending facility and 
consequently, the interbank market collapsed and most banks (with the exception of 
international banks) failed to manage cash withdrawal demands. Public confidence in 
the banks plummeted, spawning a massive withdrawal of funds by depositors from 
both affected institutions and those that were sound. All indigenous owned banks were 
                                                        
139  For example, the Reserve Bank responded by increasing statutory reserve 
requirements in a sector already grappling with liquidity challenges. 
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affected as deposits shifted to foreign owned banks, which were perceived to be stable 
and sound.  
 
 The capital position of most banks had been eroded by inflation. The country 
soon suffered its worst banking crisis in 2004 when a total of nine indigenously owned 
financial institutions namely; Barbican Bank Limited, CFX Bank Limited, CFX 
Merchant Bank, Intermarket Banking Corporation Limited, Intermarket Building 
Society, Intermarket Discount house, Royal Bank, Time Bank, and Trust bank were 
placed under curatorship by the Reserve Bank (Mupamhadzi, 2013). In the same year, 
Barbican Asset Management, Century Discount House and Rapid discount house were 
also placed under liquidation. First National Building Society was subsequently placed 
under liquidation in 2005 (RBZ, 2012). One interviewee likened the Governor of the 
Central Bank to a Bill Cosby show comedy.  
 
In the comedy, an old sick lady is resting in a wheel chair fastened against the 
wall. Unnoticed, Bill Cosby unfastens the chair and allows it to roll to the edge 
of the balcony, almost to the point of falling over. He, (Bill Cosby) then 
suddenly rushes to rescue the situation and postures himself as compassionate 
and helpful [sic] (Interview, Respondent no. 10, 27 March 2014). 
 
 The respondent claimed that while the banking sector was experiencing 
challenges, they remained in a sound financial position until the Central Bank 
Governor criminalised foreign banking and non-traditional inflation hedging 
investments such as building materials. With the state under pressure from 
hyperinflationary challenges and increasing popular discontent, the Central Bank 
Governor needed to shift the blame away from the state. The Governor claimed that 
non-traditional investments were a show of financial indiscipline and that the banking 
sector was itself responsible for the financial crisis. The Governor then set up a 
Troubled Banks Facility, which benefitted favoured banks, rendering some ‘failed’ 
and placing them under liquidation and curatorship ostensibly to weed out financial 
rot. Table 7.5 below shows the list of financial institutions either closed or placed 
under curatorship between, 2001 and 2008. 
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Table 7.5: Financial institutions closed and put under curatorship 2001 - 2008 
Banking Institution Type of Banking 
Institution 
Closed/Put 
under 
Curatorship 
Year 
1. Genesis Investment Bank Merchant Bank Curatorship 2002 
2.  ENG Capital Investments 
(Pvt) Ltd 
Asset Management 
Company 
Collapsed 2003 
3.  First National Building 
Society 
Building Society Curatorship 2003 
4. Barbican Bank Limited Commercial Bank Curatorship 2004 
5. Century Discount House Discount House Liquidation 2004 
6. CFX Bank Limited Commercial Bank Curatorship 2004 
7. CFX Merchant Bank Merchant Bank Curatorship 2004 
8.  Intermarket Banking     
Corporation Limited 
Commercial Bank Curatorship 2004 
9.  Intermarket Building Society Building Society Curatorship 2004 
10.  Royal Bank of Zimbabwe 
Limited 
Commercial Bank Curatorship 2004 
11. Time Bank Zimbabwe 
Limited 
Commercial Bank Curatorship 2004 
12. Trust Bank Corporation 
Limited 
Commercial Bank Curatorship 2004 
13. Barbican Asset Management  Asset Management 
Company 
Liquidation 2004 
14. Rapid Discount Hose Discount House Liquidation 2004 
15. Intermarket Discount House Discount House Curatorship 2004 
16. CFX Asset Management Asset Management 
Company 
Curatorship 2004 
17. Intermarket Discount House Discount House Curatorship 2004 
Source: RBZ Annual Reports for 2001-2008 
The failure of so many banks is unprecedented. Fearing the growing 
opposition coalition, most of the indigenous banks that lacked ruling elite political 
support were targeted and persecuted. Mutumwa Mawere140 saw the Central Bank 
Governor’s actions as criminalising rational economic behaviour and deliberately 
targeting benign autonomous businessmen to ensure they behaved ‘appropriately’ in 
the run-up to elections in 2005 and 2008, (NewZimbabwe.com, 11 December 2009). 
Mawere likened the Central Bank Governor, to a ‘Warlord’ or ‘Gangster’ persecuting 
genuine autonomous businessmen with the support of the state machinery. Concurring 
with Mawere’s observations, the closure of Jeff Munzvimbi’s Royal Bank, William 
Nyemba’s Trust Bank, Francis Zimuto and Julius Makoni’s National Merchant Bank, 
                                                        
140 Exiled Zimbabwean businessman now living in South Africa after a fall-out with 
the ruling elite.   
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Moses Chingwena’s Century Bank and Nicholas Vingirayi’s Intermarket Bank 
manifest pervasive state sponsored persecution of automous and perceived opposition 
aligned bankers than alleged unsound financial position warranting either curatorship 
or liquidation (Interview, Respondent no. 10, 27 March 2014). 
The ruling elite’s rapaciousness also struck back, triggering failure of its own 
controlled banks. In turn, this signalled potential limits of the reproduction capacity of 
the predatory accumulation model. By pillaging its own controlled banking 
institutions, the power elite not only destroyed its continued access to banking sector 
liquidity but also crippled financial intermediation to stimulate production in other 
sectors of the economy. In 2012, Interfin, linked to Central Intelligence Organisation 
(CIO) boss, Happyton Bonyongwe through family business Brinski Investments 
(Private), (Zimbabwe Independent, 07 September 2012), was put under curatorship 
due to severe viability concerns. In addition, Genesis Bank, connected to the former 
Minister of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Saviour Kasukuwere and 
Royal bank, voluntarily surrendered their licenses after failing to meet the minimum 
capital threshold (Mupamhadzi, 2013). A general and striking feature of the failure of 
most indigenous banks shows overindulgence of insider loans. For example, 
according to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe report on the failure of Renaissance 
Merchant Bank in 2011, the collapse of the bank represented a pillaging scandal in 
which the bank owners, working in cahoots with a pliant management, looted the 
bank to a shell. Thus predatory accumulation ultimately undermines its own capacity 
to continue to predate. The owners of Renaissance Bank granted themselves huge 
loans that were non-performing, leading to the bank collapse. The last RBZ published 
disaggregated loans to deposit ratio per individual banks reveals the lending appetite 
of indigenous banks. Table 7.6 below shows Zimbabwe banking institutions by Total 
Loans and overdrafts, Total Deposits and Loans to Deposit Ratio as at 31 December 
2010. 
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Table 7.6: Zimbabwe banking institutions by total loans to deposit ratio as at 31 
December 2010 
Name of Institution  Total Loans 
and Overdrafts 
(US$M)  
Total Deposits 
(US$M)   
Loans to 
Deposits Ratio 
per cent 
Agribank  30.3  24.7  122 
BancABC  129  211.4  61 
Barclays  43.6  172  25 
Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe 
431.7  572.9  75 
CFX  0.00  0.00  0 
First banking Corporation  73.5  134.9 55 
IBC  - - - 
Kingdom  101.7  111.3  91 
MBCA  86.6 68.4  127 
Metropolitan  29.1  44  66 
NMB  62  87.9  71 
Stanbic  100.5  296.6  34 
Standard Chartered  110.5  218  51 
TN  36.7  53.8  68 
ZABG  1.5  14.3  11 
ZB Bank  72.7  102.1 71 
Merchant Banks    
Genesis  1.6  1.5  109 
Interfin  132  126.5  104 
NDH  - - - 
Premier  17.1  44.7  38 
Rennaissance  64.9 6.4 104 
Tetrad  33.3  37.3  89 
Building Societies    
Central African Building 
Society 
58.2  118.8  49 
Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe Building 
Society  
18.9 10.4  181 
First Banking Corporation 
Building Society  
7.2  7  103  
ZB Building Society 3.4 7.8 44 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Monetary Policy Statement, and January 2011 
 
 
While none of the international banks imposed more than a 55 per cent Loan 
to Deposit Ratio, 15 indigenous banks were over 60 per cent. Indigenous banks’ loan 
books were bloated by predatory ruling elite Non-Preforming Insider loans.  
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The central bank inspection reports on the failed banks in Zimbabwe 
concluded that the reasons for the collapse of indigenous banks included the 
following; concentrated shareholding, weak corporate governance, owner-managed/ 
controlled and insider loans, and abuse of depositors’ funds. The closure of banks had 
egregious social and economic consequences. Depositors were stripped of their 
savings by a politically connected vampire business elite. Mambondiani (2012) argues 
that the approach of the central bank was insipid and, at worst, a case of ‘wilful 
blindness.’ The bankers responsible for creating the mess were allowed to walk scot-
free and enjoy their loot in the comfort of their mansions built on stolen depositors 
hard earned incomes. Meanwhile, autonomous bankers or those sympathetic to the 
opposition were persecuted. The brazen plunder and pervasive collapse of several 
indigenous banking institutions threatened the sustainability of predatory 
accumulation.  
By May 2013, there were 24 banking institutions in the country, of which only 
seven (29 per cent) were foreign owned and internationally active banks. The 24 
banking institutions were constituted as follows; Commercial Banks (17), Merchant 
Banks (2), Building Societies (4) and Savings Bank (1). In addition, there were 164 
licenced Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), 53 Money lending Institutions (MLIs) and 
16 Asset Management Companies (AMCs), all indigenously owned. Below table 7.7 
summarises ownership of Zimbabwe’s financial sector as at 31 May 2013. 
Table 7.7: Ownership outlook of Zimbabwe financial sector as at 31 May 2013 
Type  Total Number of 
Institutions 
Locally Owned Foreign Owned 
Banking Institutions 24 17 7 
MFIs 164 164 - 
MLIs 53 53 - 
AMCs 16 16 - 
Totals 250 250 - 
Proportions 100 per cent 97 per cent 3 per cent 
Source: RBZ, 2013 
 
Out of the foreign-controlled banking institutions, Standard Chartered (100 per 
cent foreign), Barclays (68 per cent foreign), Stanbic (100 per cent foreign) and 
MBCA (76 per cent foreign) have historically been foreign-owned. Indeed, despite the 
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continued overtures to indigenise the banking sector, the sector was already 
indigenised. In 2013, then Minister of Indigenisation, Saviour Kasukuwere and 
Governor of the Reserve Bank, Gideon Gono, publicly disagreed over application of 
the 51 per cent indigenisation thresholds to foreign banks. More laconically, in the 
RBZ Statement released in May 2013 titled ‘Consequences of implementing the 
current indigenisation framework on the banking sector part 1’ Gono bemoaned that; 
 
Of particular concern to us as Monetary Authorities would be any attempts to 
forcibly push the envelope of indigenisation into the delicate area of banking 
and finance. To this end, we call upon those with interests in the financial 
sector to approach the Central Bank with their applications for new banking 
licenses. It is important to note that this comment comes against a background 
of reported incidences involving well connected personalities who are 
positioning themselves to muscle into certain mining, manufacturing, financial 
and other entities that are currently performing well and contributing to the 
foreign currency inflows of the country (RBZ, 2013: 6). 
 
The Governors’ statement further exposes the potential limits to predation in an 
implicit acknowledgement of the disastrous impacts of indigenisation and risks of 
ultimate collapse. Ironically, Minister Kasukuwere is linked to Genesis bank, which 
failed and shut doors after failing to meet recapitalisation requirements. Table 7.8 
below summarises foreign owned banks and corresponding shareholding in Zimbabwe 
as at May 2013. 
 
Table 7.8: Foreign owned banks and corresponding shareholding in Zimbabwe as at 
31 May 2013 
Foreign controlled Bank Per centage foreign ownership 
Standard Chartered 100 
Barclays  68 
Stanbic  100 
MBCA 76 
CABS 100 
Premier 54 
Metropolitan 60 
BancABC 53 
Sources: RBZ Statement, May 2013 
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The seven foreign owned banks (3 per cent) commanded US$ 250 million, a 
terribly small amount accounting for 36 per cent of the sector’s US$ 700 million paid-
up capital of which 64 per cent (US$ 450 million) was held by 97 per cent of the 
market players who were indigenous, (RBZ, 2013). In terms of deposits, indigenous 
banks cumulatively held about US$ 3.0 billion in total deposits while the foreign 
owned institutions held US$ 1.3 billion of total deposits. And in terms of the loan 
book, out of a total market book of US$3.6 billion, indigenous owned banks had a 
loan book of about US$ 2.7 billion (75 per cent) while the seven foreign owned banks 
had extended loans of about US900 million (25 per cent), (RBZ, 2013). It remains 
both ironic and not uncommon that while indigenous banks commanded a lower 
proportion of total deposits, they had higher loan to deposit ratios compared to foreign 
banks. Total bank Insider Loans stood at US$175.3 with 67 per cent of the amount 
regarded as non-performing accruing to indigenous banks (Interview, Respondent no. 
5, 03 March 2014) 
In the post-2013 Inclusive Government period, the state’s indigenisation 
mantra continued to threaten the banking sector viability and yet ironically in so doing 
threatening its own survival and capacity to glean personal profits.  Public confidence 
in the banking sector plummeted as this accumulation avenue stripped bank deposits 
and failed to compensate depositors.  Due to the low confidence in the banking sub-
sector, the public largely keep their foreign currency outside the formal banking 
system. As at January 2014, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe estimated that an 
estimated US$2 billion was circulating outside the formal banking system (RBZ, 
2014). The situation contributes to low savings that are critical for investment 
mobilisation and stimulating economic growth especially for a country battling with 
low foreign direct investment. Consequently, the financial services sector contribution 
to economic growth declined by more than 50 per cent to an average of 4.1 per cent 
from its peak of 8.4 per cent between 1991 and 1999 (Zimbabwe Situation, 03 
October 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The colonial state fostered largely collaborative relationships with 
international finance capital to facilitate development of the financial sector and 
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financing projects. However the state has shown a gradual shift towards predation 
further away from independence. In the immediate post-independence period, 
indigenous black participation remained largely excluded by international financial 
capital resistance and state’s reluctant commitment to develop an independent 
indigenous capital. However, in the 1990s, the state liberalised the economy and 
opened up opportunities for politically linked businessmen. Contrary to Moyo’s 
depiction of the influence of international capital ‘infiltrated bureaucrats’ (1992:4) 
economic liberalisation set up opportunities for predation. The entrance of a new crop 
of bankers in the face of hyperinflationary environment is ironic. This new crop of 
bankers was involved in criminal activities in close alliance with political elites. The 
harm to the country’s banking and finance sector would be very deep and long lasting. 
Public confidence in the banking sector eroded to its lowest. The chapter also highlights 
the potential limits of predation. By undermining a functional economy, the ruling elite 
rapaciousness can go so far to the extent of damaging the state’s predatory capacity. 
The continued indigenisation overtures in the banking and finance sector threaten the 
remaining pillar of stability provided by international banks. Therefore, as ironically 
lamented by the RBZ in 2011 a reckless and unstructured indigenisation process can 
have severe impacts, if not work against the interests of the ruling elite and trigger 
implosion. 
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Chapter Eight:  
Transport and Energy Sectors 
  
Introduction 
 
The colonial administration took important steps to provide basic facilities for 
economic development of the country in line with the class interests of the ruling 
white minority. Public works especially in road building and railway were carried out 
on a large scale: several state enterprises were founded in the 1930s and early 1940s, 
including the electricity power stations. Hence in 1980, the new state inherited 
developed transport and energy sectors that supported the best performing industrial 
hub in Sub Saharan Africa outside South Africa. However, by the late 1990s, the 
transport and energy sectors had been run down as the strategic sector parastatals 
provided important sites of accumulation for the ruling party patronage network. 
Where the state did open up private participation, notably in the energy sectors, the 
military and politically connected elites were the most notable new entrants. In the 
passenger transport sub sector the security services benefitted from both evading tax 
and collecting ‘instant tax,’ while in the goods transport they were actively involved 
in facilitating cross border business interests.  This chapter discusses the role of the 
state in mediating the changing patterns of accumulation and consequent implications 
for the nature of the state, military and business relations. 
 
The Transport Sector 
 
As early as 1901, the British South Africa Company administration developed 
a railway line from its base in Bulawayo through to Chegutu to support white 
business interests in large-scale mining operations and farming activities. By 1902, 
the railway line expansion programme linked Bulawayo and Mutare via Harare as 
well as to the east coast. Indeed, for the better part of its existence, the fortunes of 
Hwange colliery (viewed as strategic to the economic well-being of the whole colony 
and the war effort, 1914 to 1918), lay with the railway both as a consumer and 
transporter of coal (Mawowa, 2013). The coal-powered steam engine rail, the bedrock 
of the country’s transport system, was the biggest consumer of coal from Hwange. In 
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addition, due to challenges in recruiting local African labour, following desertions 
from unfavourable mine working conditions, the railway transport provided important 
form of transport to migrants from Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique to work at 
Hwange colliery and gold mines in Matebeleland and the Midlands (Thompson and 
Woodruff, 1953, 66).  
 
Then, following the choice of self-governing status in 1923, the colonial state 
further expanded road and railway to facilitate the importation of equipment and an 
easier link between the mines and the markets. Notably the state expanded and 
developed a railway signalling and communication system linking the Democratic 
DRC and Zambia to Botswana, Mozambique and its ports of Beira and Maputo, and 
South Africa and its ports of Durban, Richards Bay and Port Elizabeth (BCZ, 2011). 
The railway also provided cost effective rail road links between Malawi and South 
Africa through Harare (Blantyre to Harare by road and onwards by rail); Lusaka and 
the port of Beira through Harare (Blantyre to Harare by road and rail from Harare to 
Beira); and Lusaka and the port of Durban through Harare (the road from Lusaka to 
Harare and rail from Harare to Durban) (BCZ, 2011). The railway network also 
connected all major mines and collection points for agricultural sectors. The state also 
provided locomotive goods and passenger trains to facilitate the movement of raw 
materials and labour in urban industrial centres such as Harare. In the road 
infrastructure development the settler colonial state invested in the development of 
trunk roads linking provincial towns and regional capitals to facilitate movement of 
goods and labour. Table 8.1 below shows major roads constructed by the settler 
colonial government, distance and average years by 2008. 
 
Table 8.1: Regional trunk road network by distance and average years as at 2008 
Road  
Linking Neighbouring 
Country  
Distance 
(Kilometers) 
Age 
(years) 
Harare – Mutare Mozambique 262.8 44 
Harare – Masvingo South Africa 292.3 49 
Harare- Gweru - 275.3 47 
Gweru – Bulawayo - 164 47 
Bulawayo - Beitbridge  South Africa 321.7 47 
Bulawayo – Plumtree Botswana 110.4 49 
Bulawayo - Victoria Falls  Zambia/ Botswana  438.8 49 
Source: Ministry of Transport, Communication and Infrastructure Development, 
Department of Roads, 2008 
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The road network covered a total of 1865.3 kilometers compared to 1349 
kilometers developed by the post-independence government by 2010. The settler 
colonial state investments in the commercial transport to support the emerging agro-
economy, manufacturing and industrial sectors were linked to the colonial state’s 
international trade objectives to promote the country’s exports.  
 
In the passenger transport business, black indigenous entrepreneurs were 
largely restricted to rural passenger transportation. The Road Service Board granted 
preferential permits to African applicants for rural bus service, seen as an important 
part of developing an African middle class that would protect the interests of the 
colonial state. Black indigenous transport entrepreneurs, who handled mainly rural 
passenger transport, benefited from growing number of Africans commuting between 
their work places in town and rural areas where they lived. The favourable economic 
situation allowed modest profit margins (Wild, 1997: 184). Among the indigenous 
pioneers in the sector were independent entrepreneurs such as Paul Matambanadzo, 
Mernard Kupara Chanakira, Ben Mucheche, Richard Makoni, Benard Vito, E. K 
Chitiyo, Zvanyanya Chidavaenzi, Isaac Samuriwo, Josephat Ruredzo, Stephen 
Gondo, Gorge Tawengwa, Peter Kambasha, Richard Murape, and Kadhani (BCZ, 
2011). By 1960 indigenous operators constituted 43 per cent of all the registered 
passenger transport operators and 9 per cent of the goods transport operators. 
However, due to limited access to capital indigenous entrepreneurs’ businesses 
remained small and fragile, always on the brink of bankruptcy (Wild, 1997).  
 
Commercial cargo transport was dominated by white companies who had 
privileged access to capital to build up an efficient fleet, business and organisational 
skills to provide reliable freight services and prompt delivery. The major players in 
the road haulage sub-sector included Cargo, Welson Transport, Colbro, J. J Transport 
and Pioneer. Table 8.2 below shows the proportion of indigenous entrepreneurs in the 
transport market measured in numbers of Road Service Permits (RSP) granted in 
Rhodesia between 1940-1964. 
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Table 8.2: Proportion of indigenous entrepreneurs in the transport sector measured by 
numbers of Road Service Permits granted in Rhodesia 1940 - 1964 
Year 
Passenger Transport  Goods Transport   Total  
 
Permits 
Share of 
Indigenous, 
per cent  
 
Permits 
Share of 
Indigenous, 
per cent  
 Permits 
Share of 
Indigenous, 
per cent  
1940-44 102 19 15 15 117 9 
1945-49 391 37 102 6 493 18 
1950-54 879 46 238 5 1 135 18 
1955-59 1 065 44 632 10  1 697 19 
1960-64 1 607 43 662 9 2 269 20 
Source: Wild, 1997: 12 
 
Similar to all profitable economic activities, the colonial state’s racial 
segregation policies limited indigenous African participation in lucrative commercial 
transport ventures. Indigenous participation in the commercial transport sector 
constituted a mere 20 per cent, mainly dominated by rural passenger transport 
permits. Only in unfavourable ventures for whites did the colonial state facilitate entry 
of indigenous Africans, notable in the passenger transport sector linking commercial 
hubs and rural areas. The rural passenger transport was largely unfavourable due to 
the poor state of rural roads, limited business volumes and insecure for white 
commercial interests. 
 
At independence in 1980, the state initially maintained continuities with the 
colonial state by retaining monopoly role as the sole authority responsible for funding 
key infrastructure projects such as road development. The state undertook key 
developmental infrastructure projects including the expansion of road network at the 
backdrop of derived demand from the increasing economic activities. Notably, the 
state developed new trunk roads totalling over 1349 kilometres aimed at improving 
local market access and opening new regional and international trade routes. Table 
8.3 shows new regional trunk road networks by distance and average age in years by 
2008. 
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Table 8.3: New regional trunk road network by distance and average years as at 2008 
Road  
Linking 
Neighbouring 
Country  Distance (Km) Age yrs. 
Harare- Chirundu Zambia 352.1 23 
Harare- Nyamapanda Mozambique 237.5 27 
Mvuma- Gweru  - 82.8 18 
Masvingo- Beitbridge South Africa 321.7 27 
Mutare – Forbes Boarder  Mozambique 8.3 27 
Rutenga - Boli - Sango  Mozambique 150 >20 
Chivhu – Nyazura - 196.6 19 
Note: - Implies roads linking provincial capitals  
Source: Ministry of Transport, Communication and Infrastructure Development, 
Department of Roads, 2008 
 
Enabling infrastructure, including efficient transportation is necessary for a 
developmental state to support industrialisation. Given the high cost of infrastructure 
projects, the state or working in joint collaboration with the private sector should 
support the development and maintenance of enabling infrastructure. However with 
worsening economic situation the state capacity to maintain the road network severely 
deteriorated. In the 1990s the treasury allocation barely met the required routine 
maintenance costs. Then by the 2000s with the heightening of economic meltdown 
and drying up of international aid, state road development agencies like District 
Development Fund were unable to replace their equipment fleet, most of which had 
reached the end of their useful economic life. The roads sector suffered from under-
funding. For instance in 2005, the total annual requirement for maintenance by all 
road authorities was about US$160 million, but the combined budget allocation for all 
the road authorities and road Fund was about US$10 million equalling 6 per cent of 
the full maintenance requirement (Zimbabwe National Road Administration, 2005). 
Consequently, national road infrastructure deteriorated gravely. Most roads 
constructed in the 1960s had passed their design life of 20 years by far. By 2009, the 
Zimbabwe National Road Administration estimated that it required about US$ 2 
billion to rehabilitate the roads including road signage, road furniture, street lighting, 
drainage and carriageway marking (Southern Eye, 18 March 2014). One interview 
respondent remarked: 
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Public transport maintenance is not up to date, the population has outgrown 
the infrastructure, roads are overtaken by growth of cities, and the hierarchy of 
roads has been overtaken by events. There is need for expansion of the road 
network and reducing transport conflicts (accidents and delays) [sic] 
(Interview, Respondent no. 15, 23 August 2014) 
 
Despite earlier resistance to outright privatisation of strategic parastatals 
(including transport and energy), in 2010, the government liberalised the sector and 
invited private participation through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The state 
formed a joint venture company, Infralink, through the Zimbabwe National Road 
Administration and a South Africa partner, Group Five International of South Africa, 
to rehabilitate and expand the Plumtree-Mutare highway covering 820 kilometers. 
The state in joint collaboration with private capital facilitated a mega transport 
infrastructure rehabilitation project. Under the partnership, the state owned parastatal, 
Zimbabwe National Road Administration held a controlling stake of 70 per cent 
shareholding while Group Five owned the remaining 30 per cent. Given the 
dilapidated state of major roads in the country the deal was a major step towards 
resuscitation of the country’s failing road infrastructure. However, accompanying the 
state and private capital joint venture, the deal opened new accumulation avenues for 
ZANU-PF patronage network. Companies with strong links to ZANU-PF elites were 
involved in project management, the supply of quarry, cement, steel and electrical 
engineering including the hiring out of key road equipment. The state welcomed 
privatisation to create new patronage avenues for its clients. For example, along the 
Harare to Mutare stretch, indigenous companies such as Utare - a consortium between 
Bitcon owned by Oliver Chidau a ZANU-PF linked businessman and Tarcon owned 
by Supa Mandiwanzira, ZANU-PF deputy minister of Media and Information, - Madz 
owned by Chistopher Madzingira husband to President Mugabe wife’s sister, and 
EarthSet owned by Robert Mhlanga, a former Vice Air Marshal were subcontracted to 
do work on some 80 kilometer stretches of the highway. The companies failed to 
deliver, rocked by allegations of financial abuse, leading to termination of subcontract 
agreements by December 2013 (Interview, Respondent no. 2, 12 February 2014). 
 
In the rail and air transport subsectors, the post-independence state maintained 
a monopoly through State Owned Enterprises. The state maintained sole ownership of 
commercial transportation in the rail transport sector through the National Railways 
of Zimbabwe, and airlines through the wholly owned government parastatal, Air 
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Zimbabwe. However, a notable post-independence feature of the running of State 
Owned Enterprises has been the appointments to the management boards based on 
political motivation rather than based on merit. The military became the distinct 
beneficiary of this form of patronage when most senior civil servants deserted in the 
2000s following severe economic decline, hyperinflation and poor working 
conditions. The state responded with appeasements to serving and retired senior 
military officers with lucrative positions in key parastatals, including the National 
Railways of Zimbabwe, in return for loyalty and support. Amongst those appointed, 
retired Air Commodore Michael Karakadzai was appointed General Manager of 
National Railways of Zimbabwe. An anonymous commentator complained on social 
media: 
 
There (at the National Railways of Zimbabwe) is a separate payroll being used 
for ghost workers. The actual salary bill is not more than US$3 million but 
they lie that it is US$4.5 million. Inflation of invoices is business of the day 
and who can stop them. Management’s children are staying lavishly overseas 
attending universities. Army personnel do come and collect fuel at National 
Railways of Zimbabwe pumps. They come in droves to collect diesel for their 
farms. Now who will stop them? This is all happening whilst employees are 
not receiving their pay (Anonymous, 23, June 2014). 
 
By allotting senior parastatal management jobs on the basis of political 
support and loyalty, the state was able to dispense patronage to ensure political 
support. The National Railways of Zimbabwe was run down. Despite holding a 
virtual monopoly over the freight and passenger traffic in the country, National 
Railways of Zimbabwe incurred a net deficit of close to US$100 million per year, 
constituting about 65 per cent of the parastatal’s gross revenue and 3.5 per cent of 
Zimbabwe’s national output. By 2009, only 40 per cent of the locomotive fleet was 
working although characterised by high failure rate and unreliability (BCZ, 2011). 
The Railway board was struggling to pay its workers who had gone for months 
without pay.  
 
Similarly, the ruling elite plundered Air Zimbabwe. The state awarded tenders 
to provide accumulation avenues for ruling party and its politically connected crony 
businessmen. The tender to construct the Harare International Airport is one of the 
major political corruption scandals involving Air Zimbabwe in the 1990s. The tender, 
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awarded to Air Habour Technologies, was brokered by Leo Mugabe (President 
Mugabe’s nephew), acting together with ZIDCO Holdings, the commercial arm of the 
ruling party. In return Air Habour Technologies funded the construction of a private 
residence for President Robert Mugabe (Zava, 2000). Zava also noted that Air Habour 
Technologies owner Yamani donated US $50,000 to ZANU-PF and made payments 
to two senior cabinet ministers, Herbert Murerwa, then Minister of Finance, and the 
former Minister of Transport and Energy Enos Chikowore. Following successive 
years of run-down the national airline grappled to provide service. By 2010, the 
airline had a grounded a fleet of 8 aircraft (2 Boeing 767-200ER, 3 Boeing 737-200, 
and 3 MA 60) and suffered huge debt overhang and undercapitalisation. The situation 
had knock-down effects on the country’s productive sectors and down-stream 
industries such as tourism and commerce.  
 
Meanwhile, in the passenger transport business, there has been a gradual 
increase of middle and senior level police officers owning commuter buses and 
private taxis. Presenting before the parliamentary portfolio committee on Transport 
and Infrastructure development in 2010, the Greater Harare Association of Commuter 
Omnibus Operators Chairperson, Cosmas Mbojani claimed that the Zimbabwe 
Republic Police officers owned 50 per cent of commuter omnibuses servicing Harare 
routes. Mbojani complained that the police officers benefited from unfair competition 
as they were evading tax and were susceptible to conflict of interest. In an interview 
with the NewsDay, Mbojani asserted that: 
 
The problem we experience is that some of them (traffic police) can be 
deployed to supervise routes where their own commuter buses operate and in 
such circumstances they give hell to our drivers and cause unnecessary delays 
to ensure their own vehicles benefit more from the business (NewsDay, 28 
January 2014). 
 
Police roadblocks were used to penalise motorists by demanding bribes. One 
interview respondent concluded that ‘The police officers see corruption avenues as 
benefits to supplement their meagre earnings 141  in exchange for their political 
                                                        
141 Civil servants in Zimbabwe have been grossly underpaid with their salary hardly 
enough to buy a loaf of bread during the hyper-inflation era. However, with 
dollarization civil service earnings had improved averaging a minimum of US$300 
per month.  
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allegiance to the ruling party.’ In a situation where the state has been turned into a 
vehicle for personal accumulation, even those that are charged with maintenance of 
law flout bureaucratic rules and create opportunities for personal gain in a fashion 
reminiscent to the DRC under Mobutu Sese Seko. The appropriation of the state into 
an agent of private accumulation at different levels in government is blowing away of 
the boundaries of legality.  
 
Energy Sector: New Sites for Accumulation 
 
Arrighi (1966) argued that unlike other colonial states south of the Sahara it 
would appear the white settler regime in Rhodesia was oriented towards long-term 
development. The state constructed the first thermal power stations in the country by 
1938. In 1955, under the Central African Federation, the central authority initiated a 
‘remarkable feat of engineering creating the largest human-built dam on the planet at 
the time and costing £114 million’ with loans from the World Bank to be repaid in 
part through taxes from mine houses. The Kariba dam project investment would 
provide electricity generation capacity to support largely mining interests. The dam 
was completed in 1958, although according to Bond and Manyanya (2002), it may be 
impossible to determine whether Kariba was developmentally efficient (in 
comparison to the opportunity cost of the money invested), due to inadequate 
available data. In addition, the state bought out the British South Africa Company 
interests in coal and constructed the Hwange thermal power station by 1970, the 
second largest power generation plant after Kariba (The Insider, 28 November 2013). 
 
In 1980, the new black elites inherited an economy with robust energy 
infrastructure that serviced needs of the country’s industrial sector. The government 
through the Electricity Act of 1985 introduced the Zimbabwe Electrical Supply 
Authority as a virtual monopoly in generation, distribution and sales of electricity in 
the country. The ruling elite embraced a state centered development model espoused 
by its predecessor as the new state elites sought to take charge of the economy albeit 
balancing with the constraints imposed by its white capitalist alliance. Indeed across 
key sectors of the economy, not much significant progress on a wide scale was made 
to facilitate inclusion of the previously marginalised blacks with the exception of the 
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public service. Instead, the state favoured an alliance with domestic white and 
international capital. The 1982 controversial loan to expand the Hwange Power 
Station suggests a close relationship between the state and mining capital (Mawowa, 
2013). In that year, the government secured a US $458 million loan from the World 
Bank and other western private lenders for a 440-watt extension of the Hwange Power 
Station. A report by Jubilee UK notes that this project was actually the idea of the 
Anglo-American Corporation. 
 
At the time demand for coal from the field was falling, and Anglo American 
Corporation was looking for alternative buyers: getting the Zimbabwean 
public electricity company to build a power station was their number one 
option. The power station was due to use coal with a high ash content, which 
Anglo American Corporation were struggling to sell to other buyers (Jones, 
2011: 15). 
 
However, upon the completion of the project, demand for electricity was less 
than projected. To keep Anglo American Corporation afloat, the Zimbabwean 
government obtained electricity from the coal plant rather than the Kariba dam. This 
reflects significant misappropriation of resources that would have been otherwise 
directed towards productivity enhancing priorities. Even then, despite the improved 
power generation capacity, the state would not expand energy distribution outside the 
cities to facilitate access by indigenous small to medium enterprises then largely 
confined to the country’s rural areas. By restricting expansion of electricity to many 
small to medium enterprises, the state undermined the development and growth of 
indigenous entrepreneurship. Bond and Manyanya (2002) also observe the irony, that 
despite the fact that although Zimbabwean citizens bore the cost of double taxation to 
fund the Kariba project; direct taxes to the colonial regime and World Bank loan 
repayment, by 1987, only 20 per cent of households were electrified.  
 
Following the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program, the 
government published a White Paper on Power Sector Reform in 1999. The paper 
envisaged restructuring and unbundling of the state energy parastatal, leading first to 
the creation of commercialised public-sector ‘business units’ out of the Zimbabwe 
Electricity Supply Commission’s generation and distribution activities, followed by 
revision of tariffs to make the ‘business units’ economically viable in line with earlier 
IMF/WB policy advice. The unbundling process saw the creation of the Zimbabwe 
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Power Company and the opening up of the generation sector to allow independent 
power producers to produce power for sale. The Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission 
Company was established on the transmission side as the single buyer, being 
mandated to plan, construct and operate the transmission grid. The Zimbabwe Power 
Company was also given the responsibility of buying power from local and external 
generation entities and performing the system operations functions. The distribution 
and retail business was given to the Zimbabwe Electricity Distribution Company.  
 
The Economic Structural Adjustment Program marked the turning point of 
government policy towards liberalisation in the energy sector. However, despite 
opening up the space for private players, no new private players entered the space due 
the capital-intensive nature of the electricity generation industry against governments’ 
unpredictable policies, especially in the late 1990s. For example, the RioZim 
electricity generation project was reportedly expected to cost close to US$3 billion, a 
significant amount (ZimMetro, 18, March 2014). Only two independent power 
producers were producing to supplement their internal demand, Hippo Valley Estates 
and Triangle Sugar Limited. In addition, the government retained the control of prices 
below the production cost, as the sole buyer and distributor. According to the 
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, the cost of electricity generation in 2010 
stood at US16 c/KWh. After factoring in the cost of transmission the electricity tariff 
came to US20 c/KWh, while the parastatal was charging US7.5 c/KWh. The 
government interventionist price policies sought to appease a growing discontented 
mass whose allegiance was shifting towards the opposition.  
 
As the legitimacy of the ruling party deteriorated, following increasing 
revelations of corruption scandals and growing hardship for the masses bred discontent, 
the state pursued a patronage driven rural electrification programme to appease the 
rural voters in a bid to regain popular support. The rural electrification programme 
was a major policy shift to expand access to electricity to households and indigenous 
small to medium enterprises in rural townships by the state under pressure to rekindle 
waning support base. Ironically in this instance state-driven patronage programmes 
served more than simply to dispense patronage as the expanded access facilitated 
greater indigenous economic participation. The rural electrification programme 
supported development indigenous small to medium indigenous entrepreneurs. 
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Typical services provided by these small and medium scale enterprises included 
automotive, electrical, electronic, and general repairs, welding and spray-painting, 
milling, carpentry, secretarial services and general retail sales of hardware, groceries, 
meat and alcoholic beverages (Mapako and Prasad, Undated). However, there was no 
significant investment in internal electricity generation capacity, at a time when the 
demand for electricity was expanding, estimated at an average annual rate of 2.5 per 
cent. As a result, by the 2000s, Zimbabwe was struggling to meet its energy 
requirements for its productive sectors. 
 
The Hwange Colliery, the country’s largest coal producer, struggled to 
maintain generation let alone pay its workers. Billy Rautenbach, Vice President 
Emmerson Mnagagwa’s perceived business ally, secured shareholding through 
clandestine dealings with ZANU-PF (The Herald, 31 March 2014). According to The 
Zimbabwean (01 November 2013), Hwange colliery is owned by the government of 
Zimbabwe, which controls 37 per cent, and top ZANU-PF politicians, including 
financial backers, Nicholas Van Hoogstraten and Billy Rautenbach. Hwange provides 
Zimbabwe’s energy needs, with 72 per cent of the coal mined from its coalfields 
going directly towards the generation of electricity at Hwange Power Station. In early 
2014, Temba Mliswa, ZANU-PF Mashonaland West chairperson and Member of 
Parliament, claimed a US$165 million ‘facilitation fee’ for aiding Billy to set-up the 
Chisumbanje ethanol plant, buy platinum reserves held by Unki Platinum Mine, and 
shareholding at Hwange Colliery (The Herald, April 2 2014). Such practices 
epitomise the use of personal networks and corruption for business opportunities in 
predatory settings.  
 
Meanwhile, by orchestrating the collapse of the rule of law during the land 
reform in the 2000s and intensifying the economic indigenisation rhetoric, the state 
negatively impacted on the country’s investment risk profile and potential to attract 
international capital – a key source of investment. Contributing to a parliamentary 
debate on the energy situation in the country, Mr. Eddie Cross, opposition Bulawayo 
South Member of Parliament told the house:  
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Mr. Speaker, the Sengwa [power] project has been on the books for some 
time, promoted by a major international company based in London, Rio Tinto. 
There is no question of any kind of restrictions on Rio Tinto regarding this 
investment. Rio Tinto is not proceeding with this investment simply because 
of the risk profile of Zimbabwe. Part of that risk profile is indigenisation. 
There is no investor in the world that is going to put a dollar on the table and 
have fifty-one cents taken by ZANU-PF. For that reason, Sengwa has not 
proceeded. The same applies to Binga. Plans for the thermal station are being 
funded by the French. Again, there is no question of any restrictions on the 
financiers of this; it is the risk profile of Zimbabwe that is impeding these 
investments, (The Insider, 28 November 2013). 
 
It is important to clarify that the ‘taken over by ZANU-PF’ that is implied here 
is not the literal sense of the indigenisation law but rather an investor is forced to cede 
51 per cent to a predominantly ZANU-PF linked business elite through sale of shares, 
employee and community share ownership schemes. For instance, the implementation 
of the indigenisation law in the mining sector has largely benefitted ZANU-PF 
politically connected elites (see chapter six on mining).  Meanwhile, the state failed to 
expand and let alone maintain the ageing electricity generation infrastructure to 
support economic production. In the 2000s, Zimbabwe was experiencing chronic 
power shortages to meet both the domestic and industry demands as often 
characterised by incessant power outages and blackouts, while limited generation 
capacity was cited as the reason for the extensive load shedding programme. In 2010 
electricity demand stood at 2100 Mega Watts (MW) against the available capacity of 
1,310 MW leaving a shortfall of 790 MW. Table 8.4 shows how the available 
capacity is distributed among the major power stations and how these power stations 
have been performing between 2000 and 2010. 
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Table 8.4: Electricity distribution patterns in Zimbabwe in comparison to installed 
capacity 2000 - 2010 
Category 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Installed capacity (MW) 
Hwange 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 
Kariba 694 722 736 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Small 
Thermals 
290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 
Total 1904 1932 1946 1960 1960 1960 1960 1960 1960 1960 1 960 
Available Capacity 
Hwange 496 716 659 498 583 579 435 421 388 287 500 
Kariba 511 531 588 701 723 725 711 727 747 746 750 
Small 
Thermals 
133 105 101 43 110 42 26 26 34 13 60 
Total 1140 1352 1348 1242 1416 1346 1172 1174 1169 1046 1 310 
Per cent of 
installed 
capacity 
59.9 70 69.3 63.4 72.2 68.7 59.8 59.9 59.6 53.4 66.8 
Peak 
demand 
1986 2013 2028 2007 2069 2066 1904 1758 1429 1403 2 100 
Supply 
Deficit 
(846) (661) (680) (765) (653) (720) (732) (584) (260) (357) (790) 
Source: African Development Bank (AfDB), 2010: 169 
 
The ruling elite driven patronage impacted negatively the viability of the state 
owned parastatal which failed to service its debt from the Hydro Caborra Bassa of 
Mozambique. As at end of December 2013, the country’s Hydro Caborra Bassa debt 
had risen to US$80 million (Nehanda Radio, 16 March 2012). Ironically, ahead of the 
2013 national elections in the same year, the ruling elites were aggressively pushing 
for the slashing of utility bills ostensibly to relieve citizens of the debt burden accrued 
during the hyperinflation era. By July 2013 a few days leading to the elections, the 
state scrapped local authority utility debts. Notably, senior ZANU-PF and military 
elites were highly indebted and hence were the major beneficiaries of the populist 
policy programmes meant to drum up ruling party support. ZANU-PF ministers and 
senior military elites were not paying for electricity bills for their extensive business 
empires and private homes.  
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An investigation by the Daily News in 2011 revealed that senior government 
officials who cumulatively owed the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority huge 
electricity bills included, President Mugabe and his close associates, former Defence 
Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa (Vice President), Minister of State in the President’s 
Office Didymus Mutasa, State Security Minister Sydney Sekeramayi, Information and 
Publicity Minister Webster Shamu, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment 
minister Saviour Kasukuwere, Higher Education Minister Stan Mudenge, Mugabe’s 
deputy John Nkomo, presidential spokesperson George Charamba, Zimbabwe 
Defence Forces commander Constantine Chiwenga, Air Force commander Air 
Marshall Perrance Shiri and Central Intelligence Organisation director-general 
Happyton Bonyongwe. President Mugabe and the first family cumulatively owed the 
parastatal over US$350,000.00 in unpaid utility bills (Nehanda Radio, 16 March 
2012). Table 8.5 below shows some names and positions of senior government 
officials and amounts owed to ZESA as at 31 December 2011. 
 
Table 8.5: Names and positions of senior government officials and amounts owed to 
ZESA as at 31 December 2011 
Name and Position Properties Amount owed (US$) 
Robert Mugabe  
President 
Foyle Farm plus a cottage and 
Gushungo Dairy Estates 
$143 667,33 
Gwebi Woodlot 1st Farm $24 901,05 
Sigaro Farm 1st PO, 2nd PO, 
3rd PO and 4th PO 
$78 218,71 
Grace Mugabe  
First Lady 
Iron Mask Cottage, Iron Mask 
2nd POIN, Iron Mask 3rd 
POIN, Mazowe Wholesalers, 
Annant Cottage, Iron Mask 
Farm 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th 
$98 306,60 
Emmerson Mnangagwa  
Cabinet Minister 
Various businesses $240 824,03 
Nicholas Goche 
Cabinet Minister 
Ceres Farm and businesses that 
include grinding mills, a farm 
store and a service station 
$158 245,52 
Happyton Bonyongwe, CIO 
Director General 
Various businesses $350 989,48 
Perrance Shiri 
Air Marshall 
Hopdale Farm $26 947,70 
Augustine Chihuri,  
Police Commissioner General 
Inyika Farm $106 778,25 
Source: Daily News in 2011 
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Cumulatively, senior military and ZANU-PF political elites owed the 
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority a total of US$1,122,100.42.  Meanwhile the 
parastatal was struggling to service its monthly debt obligations and maintenance 
work at the Kariba power plant to meet economic and domestic electricity demands. 
The subordination of national interests by personal interests as the ruling elite enjoyed 
unpaid electricity while the parastatal was struggling with a debt overhang and failing 
to meet the national energy demands impacted on the both the capability enhancing 
social and economic sectors. Socially, many academic institutions and hospitals 
suffered load shedding, which impacted on academic performance and public health 
delivery respectively. The economic costs include reduction in capacity utilisation and 
output. In a study by the International Energy Agency, energy was included in the 
production functions of some developing countries for 1981–2000 period and it was 
concluded that energy played the important role in economic growth compared to 
other variables, which take part in the production function in countries, which are at 
intermediate stages of economic development (Erbaykal, 2008:1). According to CZI, 
(2010), the falling capacity utilisation levels and the sluggish response to the 
improvements in the economy can be attributed to erratic power supplies amongst 
other factors. Electricity shortage was the major factor behind capacity under-
utilisation in Zimbabwe’s productive sectors in the post 2000s. 
 
Meanwhile the liquid fuels industry is constrained by lack of crude oil 
reserves. The settler colonial state invested in the Feruka pipeline in 1966 that 
conveyed fuel imports through Mozambique’s Beira corridor, using the 408 km long 
pipeline to Msasa Depot in the capital, Harare (Financial Gazette, September 25, 
2014). In the post-independence period, the state maintained the strategic role of sole 
importer of liquid fuels through a government wholly owned parastatal, the National 
Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM). The state owned parastatal remained the sole 
authority charged with the procurement and distribution of petroleum products to 
marketing companies in Zimbabwe.  
 
However, similar to the fate of other parastatals, state control of the strategic 
oil parastatal facilitated unfettered access to fuel by the ruling ZANU-PF executive 
members, government ministers and members of parliament. The parastatal was run 
down by grand corruption cases involving most senior government officials. For 
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example, in 1999, senior government officials misappropriated Z$1,4 billion meant 
for fuel procurement through corruption in what became known as the ‘NOCZIM 
scandal’ (UNDP, 2000). One of the managers allegedly prejudiced National Oil 
Company of Zimbabwe of Z$802 million whilst the Permanent Secretary for the 
Ministry of Transport was implicated to the tune of Z$642 million. The two Vice-
Presidents and a parliamentarian, Phillip Chiyangwa (Mugabe’s nephew) were also 
implicated in the scandal. The state also dispensed patronage through providing 
ZANU-PF cabinet ministers access to fuel from the state parastatal at subsidized 
prices and then selling it at the parallel market at higher prices. Among those alleged 
to have diverted fuel to the black market included government ministers, Mike 
Nyambuya and Oppah Muchinguri, Manicaland Governor Tinaye Chigudu, ZANU-
PF legislator Enock Porusingazi, ZANU-PF party's Central Committee Member Esau 
Mupfumi, and Mutare businessman and Member of Parliament for Mutare South Fred 
Kanzama. Although the government investigated the scandal, the investigations were 
largely window-dressing as no one was arrested nor the report made public. Those 
responsible were never brought to account for the brazen looting of state resources. 
Corruption scandals were reduced to mere rhetoric without any serious attempts at 
censor and instead constitute part of the reward system to various ZANU-PF party 
and officials in governmental positions. 
 
In the 2000s, the country faced serious fuel shortages, which tremendously 
affected economic activities. The state failed to maintain the ageing Feruka pipeline, 
thus all fuel imports were done by road.  Between 2000 and 2003, the state attempted 
to mobilise international lines of credit to alleviate the precarious fuel situation 
including deals with ‘friendly country investors’:  Kuwait-based Independent 
Petroleum Group (IPG), Libya, and the ‘Look East’ policy which saw the country 
entering into at least 15 deals worth millions of dollars with the Chinese, Iranians and 
other Asians, mostly on fuel, mining, electricity and communications. The 
arrangements however quickly collapsed following repeated failure by the 
government to honour its obligated contributions due to foreign currency shortages. In 
2003, the state deregulated the fuel industry to allow private participation by 
companies in the liquid fuels sector. This saw the entrance of some indigenous 
companies such FSI, Exor, Comoil, Royal Oil, Country Petroleum, Redan Petroleum, 
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Sakunda Energy and others. The opening up of private participation mobilised private 
indigenous capital leading to an improvement in the fuel supplies on the market. 
 
However, similar to other sectors, the opening of private participation in the 
liquid fuels opened space for expanding patronage accumulation avenues. In 2008, the 
government through the state-owned parastatal Agriculture Rural Development 
Association (ARDA) initiated an ethanol project, Green Fuels under a joint venture 
arrangement with two private companies, Ratings and Macdom, (Daily News, 31 
March 2014). The project was valued at US$2 billion, the largest investment in 
Zimbabwe over a decade, and seen as one of Africa’s largest ethanol projects. At its 
peak the project will have capacity to produce 100 million litres of ethanol per year, 
enough to supplement 50 per cent of Zimbabwe’s petroleum needs and alleviate the 
country’s import bill. As a renewable source of energy (bio-fuel) the project is a 
major milestone since the country’s independence towards development of 
sustainable and green energy. The project employs over 9,000 workers and upon 
completion by 2020 is expected to employ 35,000 workers and will have the capacity 
to generate 86 Mega Watts of electricity energy to supplement the country’s 
electricity. 
 
However, the project was embroiled in controversy for disempowering the 
surrounding communities by grabbing over 40,000 hectares of land without 
compensation through the assistance of ZANU-PF politicians. Furthermore, the 
ownership of the project was also subject to intense debate in both parliament and 
cabinet after it emerged that the government owned a trivial shareholding. At its 
inception the government appointed a Cabinet Committee headed by Deputy Prime 
Minister Arthur Mutambara to recommend the operational modalities. The committee 
recommended 51 per cent government shareholding in line with the indigenisation 
law. Government equity would be backed by 40,000 hectares of land, equipment, and 
value-enhancing instruments such as mandatory blending. However, despite the 51 
per cent minimum indigenisation thresholds and committee recommendations, it later 
turned out that government owned an inconsequential 10 per cent shareholding. A 90 
per cent controlling stake was owned by a network of private players with political 
connections including, Billy Rautenbach through Green Fuels. The project was 
granted an unparalleled market advantage through initially 10 per cent (later increased 
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to 15 per cent) mandatory blending license issued by the government as provided 
under Statutory Instrument (SI) 17 of 2013 to guarantee profitability. 
 
The 15 per cent mandatory blending legislated by government was seen as 
granting monopoly power for the ethanol project to guarantee returns to ZANU-PF’s 
patronage network. In December 2013, a Zimbabwean citizen, Thabani Mpofu, 
represented by Tendai Biti, took the government to the constitutional court arguing 
that the monopoly and blending ratios do not promote fair competition and are not in 
the interest of motorists after it emerged that the 15 per cent mandatory blending was 
not advisable for Nissan run engine cars. Mpofu also argued that, ‘There was also 
further prejudice in the pricing of the anhydrous ethanol blended fuel. Whereas the 
international process of the anhydrous ethanol is generally $0,60, the respondent 
(Green fuels) was selling its fuel for $0,95 per litre’ (Radio VOP, 27 December 2013). 
However, the application had not been finalised and by 2014 government was pushing 
for mandatory 20 per cent blending. This followed information revealed after disputes 
over mandatory bending between the then opposition Energy Minister, Elton 
Mangona and the Agricultural Rural Development Authority spilled in the public 
domain. It emerged that the project had produced ethanol in excess of the company’s 
storage capacity, thus it was desperate to dispose the product (Daily News, 9 
December 2013). 
 
In early 2014, the state also concluded a major deal with a South African-
owned Mining, Oil and Gas Services Company142 over the construction of a second 
fuel pipeline from Beira to Harare valued at US$1 billion. The pipeline will have the 
capacity to move 500 million litres of fuel a month. The plan, according to project 
documents, entails building connecting pipelines to Malawi, Zambia, Botswana and 
the DRC. Under the proposed deal, the government and Pipeline Empowerment 
Consortium, an indigenous business vehicle, are set to get a 50 per cent stake (The 
Sunday Mail, 05 January 2014). The Zimbabwe Defense Forces was also given 
interests for the provision of security during the construction of the pipeline due to 
Renamo disturbances in Mozambique (Daily News, 31 January 2014). Affirmative 
Actions Group, a ZANU-PF linked empowerment lobby including ZANU-PF heavy 
                                                        
142 Mining, Oil and Gas Services Company is a subsidiary of Royal Bafokeng 
Holdings with a net asset value of about US$5 billion. 
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weights, David Chapfika and Philip Chiyangwa, were the other leading shareholders 
of Pipeline Empowerment Consortium. In Mozambique, the project will work with a 
company called COGS, which is jointly owned by Mining, Oil and Gas Services 
Company and its Mozambican partners. It is chaired by former president Joaquim 
Chissano.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The pre-independence colonial state actively pursued a state capitalism that 
saw nationalisation and heavy investments in the transport and energy sectors 
regarded as the economic enablers. The state sought to promote the interests of a 
white class coalition, which included agrarian and mining capital. The state through 
inwardly oriented development strategy supported industrial transformation through 
expansionary public work programmes. At independence in 1980, the state inherited a 
developed transport and energy infrastructure. The ruling elite initially maintained 
developmental interventionism in the strategic sectors of the economy and forged an 
alliance with domestic and international white capital. Most indigenous blacks 
remained largely excluded from economic participating in the energy and commercial 
transport sectors. However, as the economy slowed down in the late 1990s, state 
parastatals failed to maintain and expand economic enabling infrastructure in the 
transport and energy sectors. In response to loss of popular support in the late 1990s, 
the state deepened predatory behaviour, rewarding military elites with strategic 
positions in state parastatals in return for loyalty and support. One might also argue 
that the shift towards neoliberalism instigated widespread disgruntlement that 
triggered predatory behaviour. The consequences of this patronage route were 
grievous as the infrastructure in the strategic sectors gravely deteriorated. In the 
2000s, the railway service collapsed and the national airliner was grounded, while in 
the energy sectors the country failed to meet the energy and fuel demands to support 
economic activities.  
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Chapter Nine:  
Conclusion 
 
Introduction  
 
The study examines the modes of accumulation of the power elite across the 
key sectors of the economy to help explain the anti-developmental outcomes in 
Zimbabwe. Contrary to developmental state conceptions in terms of its core 
characteristics - bureaucratic coherence and capacity; embedded autonomy; 
disciplinary capacity; democratic and accountable governance - the state in Zimbabwe 
and its relations with business and society can be best understood by the logic of the 
predatory state. However, despite a number of earlier contributions (e.g. Bayart, Ellis 
and Hibou 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Evans 1989, 1995; and Bratton, 2014), the 
study points to gaps in terms of understanding the core characteristics of the predatory 
state and how it functions. The thesis builds on the developmental state theories, 
earlier studies of the concept of the predatory state as well as relevant post-colonial 
state literatures in order to contribute knowledge on the characteristics of a predatory 
state. Using Zimbabwe as my case, I suggest a more systematic analysis of the 
predatory state by focusing on relations among the state, military, and business.  In 
this chapter I discuss the characteristics of the predatory state developed in light of the 
Zimbabwean example.  
 
The analysis developed in this study goes beyond earlier characterisations that 
view a predatory state as simply the ‘opposite of a developmental state’ (Evans, 1989; 
1995). The burdens of this thesis have thus been to both develop building on earlier 
contributions on the notion of the predatory state and empirical work on Zimbabwe 
which examines the nature of the state, military and business relationship over a range 
of economic sectors and time. In this study, the number of economic sectors - land 
and agriculture, mining, transport and energy, and banking and finance - provide a 
wide spectrum to make generalisations, while the historical analysis of the colonial 
era enables us to grasp the changing logics of the nature of the state and business 
relationship over time. I argue that the colonial state exhibited more, albeit 
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authoritarian and racialised developmental features than the post-independence state 
and the further away from independence, the less developmental the state became.  
 
The failure to discover the second ‘Rand’ led to the development of an 
interventionist state to support the diversification of economic activities, notably 
agriculture and manufacturing. However, by subjugating indigenous blacks into cheap 
labour and restricting growth of indigenous capital, the colonial mode of development 
lacked a necessary internal dynamic to sustain economic development. In order to 
generate demand, the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the 
Second World War proved vital for Rhodesian mining and manufacturing output. In 
addition, the war of liberation conspired to galvanise ‘national mobilisation’ between 
the state keen to protect white interests, domestic white capital fearing the dismantling 
of colonially bequeathed privileges and international capital trapped in the colony. 
The pact effected a developmental ‘triple alliance’ that defied international sanctions 
against the Rhodesian regime. The Rhodesian economy grew phenomenally at an 
average of 7 per cent between 1965 and 1973 until the economy eventually began to 
deteriorate under the effects of the war (Hull (1978: 35). 
 
At independence, Zimbabwe inherited a fairly institutionalised state and a 
diversified economy albeit constrained by legacies of the colonial mode of 
development.  The state undertook a number of social and economic tasks with 
incredible success including expansion of the health and education sectors and 
provision of incentives to boost mining and agricultural production. Yet, the manner 
in which the transition was delivered ushered critical compromises during the first 10 
years of independence, especially property rights that insulated whites against 
arbitrary takeover, particularly of land. Meanwhile fearing white capital flight and 
lacking the skills to manage the economy, the new political elites forged an alliance 
with white agrarian and international capital while indigenous black capital remained 
marginalised. In the agriculture and mining sectors operations remained dominated by 
domestic white and international capital respectively. The economy thus failed to 
transform the colonial mode of economic accumulation for example, through the 
expansion of black entrepreneurship into the mainstream economy. The ruling elite 
feared the development of an autonomous indigenous class, which could pose a 
political threat to its political ambitions. 
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By the 1990s, following declining growth and rising budget deficits, the state 
undertook an ‘economic structural adjustment programme’ under the aegis of the IMF 
and World Bank. Yet, the growing unemployment, poverty, increasing cases of 
corruption in government and frustrations over the worsening economic situation 
triggered demonstrations in 1997. These were initially the workers protesting against 
job losses and increasing costs of basic commodities, followed by the war veterans 
over abuse of the compensation fund. State policies turned capricious to appease 
restive constituencies for political support and sustain patronage. The omnipresence 
of the military in both the economic and political arenas was unparalleled.  The 
intervention in the DRC and the violent land takeovers epitomised the use of violence 
and coercion in patronage based accumulation and political consolidation. The guise 
of the indigenisation and black economic empowerment programmes has served the 
narrow parasitic interests of the power elite. The ruling elite opened opportunities for 
parasitic accumulation from one sector to another across land, banking, mining, 
transport and energy sectors. Because the class of ruling military-political elite and its 
associated businessmen was parasitic, most acquired business interests did not 
succeed. 
 
The consequences were devastating: the collapse of indigenously owned banks 
triggered by hyperinflation and parasitic tendencies dented confidence in the financial 
system; in the mining sectors indigenisation opened up opportunities for ‘trusted’ 
regional and international investors in association with the military and a politically 
connected local business class whose operations lacked transparency; the 
manufacturing sector suffered chronic under-capacity utilisation due to lack of both 
domestic and foreign investment as investors feared compulsory take-over of their 
investments through the indigenisation and empowerment regulations; the transport 
and energy sectors deteriorated gravely due to under-funding and corruption and the 
once towering agriculture sector degenerated from a net exporter to a perennial 
importer in order to meet national food requirements.  
 
Four points are worthy stressing. Firstly, the manufacturing sector is 
conspicuously absent. This points to the rentier nature of the predatory state, i.e. it is 
based on resource extraction as opposed to manufacturing. The changing structure of 
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the economy, away from the significance of the manufacturing sector pre-
independence, to the dominance of resource based extraction post-independence, is 
associated with this predatory shift. To be sure, the manufacturing sector is estimated 
to have lost a cumulative 92 per cent by 2008. Secondly, the implications of the 
absence of the manufacturing sector illuminate the deficiency of production strategies, 
a uniform feature across the desperate sectors. In fact, the main aim of policy (such as 
indigenisation and empowerment programmes) is to channel rents to members of the 
ruling elite. Thirdly, each sector reveals a different kind of extraction (form asset 
stripping in state parastatals to expropriation of white owned farms), the benefits of 
which accrue to the military-political elite. Finally, the state needs cooperation with 
foreign capital (in this case, Chinese and South African) to generate foreign exchange 
and tax revenue to support essential government functions. Therefore, foreign capital 
is allowed to participate in the sharing of resource rents.   
 
The development of Zimbabwe’s predatory state can be characterised in terms 
of four distinct phases. The state during the colonial period 1890 to 1980 exhibited 
features of a racialised authoritarian ‘developmental state.’ This is followed by a 
‘nascent inclusive developmental state’ in the immediate post-independence, albeit 
with signs of predatory characteristics. The period 1990 to 1997 can be viewed as a 
period of transition from nascent developmentalism towards a full blown predatory 
state. Finally the post-1997 marked the major turning point into outright predatory 
shift and consolidation in the post-2000. In the remaining part of the conclusion I 
discuss the predatory state under three overlapping and complimentary characteristics 
(1) the nature of the state focussing on the party and military relationship, (2) the state 
and business relationship shaped by embedded domination and capture, and (3) state-
society relations shaped by embedded authoritarianism. 
 
Party-State and Military Dominance  
 
 It is no wonder that traditional political economy approaches such as neo-
patrimonialism on the complexion of the state in Africa show their limitations in 
explaining Zimbabwe’s trajectory. Unlike then Zaire and Nigeria for example, where 
a system of indirect rule relied on very lean state structures tailor-made to facilitate 
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extraction of resources, settler colonial capitalist development in Rhodesia accounted 
for the development of an emerging bureaucratic apparatus and non-primary 
commodity sectors such as agro-industry and manufacturing, as in South Africa. 
However, in the post-independence era, ruling class accumulation and the political 
reproduction project relies on patronage and personalistic relations that account for 
the rapid erosion of nascent bureaucratic norms. The political party provides 
‘legitimate’ access to the state, while reliance on violence to accumulate and to 
control opposition places the military at the centre of politics and economy. The 
attendant political economy has thus produced at the very top a predatory power elite, 
composed of the ruling ZANU-PF political elites, military elites and politically linked 
parasitic businessmen and, at the bottom, a dependent social base sustained by 
patronage and a civil society sustained by donors.  
 
Two major ways in which the party and military dominate the state stand out: 
(1) political deployment aimed at control of key state institutions and (2) the use of 
military force to accumulate personal wealth. 
  
 Political deployment is not unique to Africa, neither is it unique to 
authoritarian states as it also occurs in modern democracies (Southall, 2013). What 
distinguishes political deployment in a predatory state setting is that political party 
credentials or personal relations take precedence over professional competencies and 
very often deployees put the party business or interests of the ruling elite above the 
state. This logic runs against ‘Weberian’ bureaucratic rationality, which emphasises 
meritocratic-based recruitments and bureaucratic insulation from particularistic 
interests. Yet, the imperative of civil service transformation143 in post-independence 
Africa via political deployment of party cadres to all key state institutions enabled 
control of the levers of power for political and personal advantages for the ruling elite 
and their associates. Southall (2013: 135) has summarised the developmental 
implications of civil service transformation in South Africa: 
  
 The outcome of deployment has been: subordination of supposedly 
 constitutionally independent institutions to the African National Congress 
 (ANC); preference for political disposition over competence regarding 
                                                        
143 Transformation of the civil service was recognised as a political imperative to 
transform the civil service to service the broader needs of society. 
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 appointments to a wide range of bodies, ranging from parastatals to hospitals 
 to local government, resulting in inefficiency and failures of  ‘service 
 delivery’; a turnover of top positions in the public service and parastatals 
 leading to perpetual crises of leadership. 
 
 
 Zimbabwe reflects more grievous and far-reaching consequences: notably, 
post 2000, military and party based deployments to key organs - electoral 
management bodies, the judiciary, prison services and key parastatals such as the 
Grain marketing Board, National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, National Railways of 
Zimbabwe, National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board and military-
style operations such as ‘Dzikisai mitengo’ (Reduce Prices) and ‘Murambastiva’ 
(Restore Order) - served the ruling elite’s political reproduction objective and 
personal accumulation interests. By rewarding party cadres, serving and retired 
military personnel with access to parastatal jobs and state resources, the state created 
patronage opportunities leading to the failure of several State Owned Enterprises. The 
ruling party ‘deployees’ were able to manipulate supposedly collective goods to 
reward key political constituencies. The pursuit of dirigiste policies and redistribution 
has served to legitimate the ruling elite and patronage based accumulation rather than 
state claimed developmental and empowerment goals.  
 
Meanwhile, the control of security and justice organs enabled the ruling elite 
to deploy violence toward political opposition with impunity. Yet, in a modern 
democracy the role of the military is conceived as that of protecting a country against 
foreign threat or foreign intervention. However, practice also diverges significantly 
across the globe and historically the military has also played a significant role in 
economic development.144 However, in Africa, unlike the use of the military in the 
classic Asian developmental states to repress domestic labour or the ‘American 
military business complex’145 where the military plays a key role in the provision of 
                                                        
144 For instance it was in the army that the ancients first developed a complete wages 
system, so too was the use of machinery on a larger scale. Even the special value of 
metals and their use as money appears to have been originally based on their military 
significance (Marx to Engels, 25 September 1857. Selected correspondence, pp. 98-
9). 
145 In the US, the interests of the political elites converge with military and economic 
elites and encourage continuous expansion of military spending rising to what 
President Eisenhower termed the rising dominance of the ‘American military-
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stimulus demand, the use of the military in both domestic and international contexts 
predominantly reflects predatory logic and cold war politics.  
 
In their quest to preserve power, the ruling elites have turned to the military to 
prey on society. The military elites are rewarded by numerous business opportunities 
to retain their loyalty and support. The Angolan case is illustrative. During the civil 
war in Angola, the MPLA government rewarded its generals with the opportunity to 
purchase interests in mining ventures. The Partnership Africa Canada (2007:6) 
observed that in Angola the generals were participating in the mining joint ventures 
through private Angolan partners and owned shares in private security companies. In 
Egypt, similarly, to consolidate his power, President Hosni Mubarak granted military 
licenses to establish companies, building new factories and cultivating vast farms that 
had untaxed, unaudited special autonomous status (Springborg, 1989). The last ten 
years of Mubarak’s reign saw army officers, especially retired generals and colonels, 
occupying high administrative positions in the bureaucracy and the public sector and 
further expanding their profitable military businesses. President Mubarak was toppled 
in 2010 by popular protests following poor economic performance, growing poverty 
and unemployment.  
 
In the international context, the use of the military reflects an extension of 
cold war patron-client relations particularly before 1989 and predatory accumulation 
logic. Indeed, the thesis about ‘criminalisation’ of the state in Africa turns on the 
importance within Africa of a growing number of international mafia-type operations 
in the guise of international interventions and peacekeeping missions. Attempts to 
reduce civil conflicts under the guise of African intervention forces have opened up 
new opportunities for predatory accumulation in the context of depleting domestic 
patronage resources.  The involvement of African peacekeeping forces in countries 
like Sierra Leone and Liberia has led to claims that some foreign contingents, such as 
the Nigerian, have facilitated the internationalisation of illicit trade or criminal 
activities (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:89). Zimbabwe’s military intervention in the DRC 
in the 1990s (discussed in chapter six) raised similar claims.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
industrial complex’ (Baran and Sweezy, 1966) and according to Mills (1956: 212), 
converge in a ‘power elite.’ 
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However, both the ‘Criminalisation of the State in Africa’ (Bayart, Ellis and 
Hibou, 1999) and ‘Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument’ (Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999) theses emphasise the importance of central authority. These approaches 
have mostly focussed on the collapse of the central authority such as then in Zaire, 
Sudan Central African Republic, Burundi Angola and Sierra Leone or rather the ‘poor 
sedimentation of the post-colonial political order’ to explain the instrumentalisation of 
conflict (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 82). What is rather striking for Zimbabwe is that 
though it was popular and common in the post 2000s to refer to the country as a failed 
state,146 central authority did not collapse. Between 2000 and 2008, the state was 
confronted with arguably one of the worst economic crises in history. It would 
suggest that the Zimbabwe’s predatory state is therefore more robust and resilient. In 
fact, the state never lost the monopoly of organised violence but rather still managed 
to instrumentalise military force to further the accumulation needs of the ruling elite 
and its emerging class of party linked entrepreneurs.  
 
The use of military force and coercion both domestically associated with the 
land reform and the diamonds in Eastern Zimbabwe and regionally associated with 
the intervention in the DRC has been a distinct phenomenon in the power elite 
accumulation project. High-ranking serving and retired military officers and senior 
members of the ruling party benefitted with multiple farms in return for loyalty and 
support in contrast to the state claimed one-person-one-farm policy. In the DRC 
intervention, the deployment of state resources towards war at a time when the 
economy was ebbing in the late 1990s epitomised the subordination of the imperative 
of peace and priority investment in growth enhancing investments towards a narrow 
ruling elite interest accumulation project.  
  
 Two features stand out for the predatory state more generally in terms of the 
nature of the state. The party and military dominate the state.  Political deployments 
to the state subvert ‘Weberian’ notions of bureaucratic autonomy and rationality. 
Rather than distinction, there is no separation between the ruling political party and 
the state. To be sure, bureaucracy, state policy formulation and implementation are 
                                                        
146 This term is associated with the late Professor Masipula Sithole (1990:452) and 
was an elaboration of Larry W. Bowman’s thesis that white Rhodesian settler political 
conflict took place ‘within a democratic process.’ 
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subordinated to the imperatives of ruling party political and accumulation interests. 
The canons of political deployments also enable the ruling party to deploy the military 
force to control opposition and broad society. The state invests in the hyper-
development of repressive apparatuses as the dominant political force. This gives rise 
to military omnipresence, driven both by idiosyncratic and institutional interests. The 
coalition between the political and military elites is mutually symbiotic: political 
elites gain support from the coalition to maintain their power while the military elites 
gain prestige, influence and material rewards. 
State and Business Relationship Shaped by Domination and Capture 
 
 
The ‘developmental state’ model associated with the East Asian and some 
African countries has emphasised state disciplinary capacity supplied by a strong 
Weberian bureaucracy and close collaboration between the state and capital as 
essential building blocks for economic transformation and development. Such state 
business coalitions play an instrumental role in both uniting the various public and 
private actors in defining development priorities and mobilising resources and support 
towards national priorities for achieving development goals. Yet in a predatory 
setting, the absence of a Weberian bureaucracy has been ‘profitable for the ruling 
elite’ in that it has allowed the elites to take advantage of state structures to further 
their personal accumulation goals (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 14). Meanwhile any 
semblance of disciplinary capacity often harbours political persecution of autonomous 
business rather than directed at inducing productive behaviours from capital. Narrow 
political and personalistic relations as opposed to institutional norms define state and 
business relations.  
 
In Business and the State in Southern Africa, Taylor (2007) observes that 
state-business relations in Southern Africa have emerged and thrived as long as the 
ruling elites found political benefit. However, these coalitions, when they have 
thrived such as in Zimbabwe (1980 to 2000), Namibia (to date) and South Africa 
(presently declining), have served to preserve the status quo more than to manage 
structural economic transformation (Taylor, 2007: 2003). Indeed, the ruling elite in 
post-independence Zimbabwe forged an alliance with white agrarian and international 
capital until the late 1990s when political pressure increased the costs of the pact with 
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white agrarian capital. The coalition collapsed as the state orchestrated violent land 
seizure ostensibly to redistribute land to the masses. The collapse of collaborative 
relationships with white capital was substituted by state relationships with a class of 
military, political and parasitic ruling party linked businessmen that undermined 
national development.  
 
To be sure, contrary to state proclaimed broad-based empowerment goals, a 
small indigenous ruling elite in collaboration with ‘trusted’ international capital -
notably Chinese and South African investors - who did not challenge the regime’s 
questionable democratic and accountability credentials are the major winners. These 
alliances were involved in opaque operations characterised by lack of revenue 
transparency and declarations to the treasury, notably in the Marange diamond mining 
syndicates. The state official coffers were gravely constrained while the military and 
ZANU-PF political elites involved in these syndicates demonstrated suspicious 
ostentation and lavish spending.147  Meanwhile indigenous business elites falling out 
of favour with the ruling elite were persecuted and their investments taken over by the 
state. Raftopolous and Compagnon (2004:20) argue that the Zimbabwean state feared 
that an autonomous black private sector would provide alternative power bases. Thus 
far, the attack on autonomous independent capital 148  in Zimbabwe not only 
constrained domestic resource mobilisation potential but also negatively impacted on 
the country’s investment climate. Notably, with the exception of mining investments 
                                                        
147 Robert Mhlanga, chairperson of Mbada Diamonds one of the biggest diamond 
mining companies spent R185 million in cash acquiring prime real estate on the 
Durban north coast and in one of the plushest areas of Sandton in Johannesburg as 
well as a R200-million mansion on a hillside overlooking the prestigious Zimbali golf 
estate in Ballito, KwaZulu-Natal within two years. In the preceding 18 months he 
bought three properties for a combined R60-million, including a penthouse suite in 
Umhlanga Rocks, a pair of mansions almost opposite one another in Hyde Park, 
Sandton and another sprawling property on the Umhlanga beachfront for R25-million 
(Mail and Guardian, 12 July 2012). Also discussed in chapter six, former Minister of 
Mines and Mining development Obert Mpofu bought the Zimbabwe Allied Banking 
Group (ZABG) for $27,8 million in cash. 
148 In the banking sector, as observed by an Interview Respondent, the RBZ instigated 
closures of the Royal Bank, Trust Bank, National Merchant Bank, Century Bank and 
Intermarket Bank were all politically motivated. Mutumwa Mawere, a Zimbabwean 
businessman’s mining empire also suffered the same fate after he fell out with the 
ruling ZANU-PF party. His business was taken over by the state in 2004, after he was 
accused for various crimes and labelled a ‘sell-out’ by the ruling party (discussed in 
chapter six). 
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driven by the commodity boom in the post 2000s, investment in other sectors of the 
economy such as manufacturing declined. The repression of autonomous business 
also exposes the irony and limitation of the state driven economic indigenisation and 
empowerment approaches in the 2000s. As Peter Evans (1979) suggests, one of the 
roles of the ‘triple alliance’ of the state, international and local elites was to provide a 
source of capital in the successful industrialisation of Brazil. 
 
However in predatory states Weberian bureaucratic norms do not exist, but 
rather capital relations are characterised by personal rather than institutional relations 
for security and access to state policy incentives. The case of the Intermarket Bank 
discussed in chapter seven where the financial institution banked its security through 
funding Retired General Mujuru’s shareholding in Willdale Investments Limited and 
the granting of market advantages through mandatory ethanol blending to ruling 
ZANU-PF linked businessman Billy Rautenbach’s Green Fuels are illustrative. Evans 
(1995: 47) concludes that when personalism dominates relations rather than ones 
which are predictable, rule governed bureaucratic behaviour, the development of a 
bourgeoisie oriented towards long-term productive investment is almost an 
impossibility. Both cases highlighted in the thesis demonstrate this point. The 
Intermarket bank in Zimbabwe later collapsed while the Green Fuels was embroiled 
in controversy over land dispossessions with surrounding communities. Meanwhile, 
the future of the company’s monopoly privileges hung in the balance after court 
challenges over contravening fair competition. 
 
In terms of state relationship with capital: the predatory state shares features of 
embeddedness with business albeit characterised by domination and capture. The 
marginal zones of autonomy with business exist but largely as an arena for powerful 
international capital regarded as strategic for state survival. In fact the ‘developmental 
state embeddedness’ is unnecessary, if not undesirable. The goal of the predatory state 
is not to facilitate economic transformation and development. Rather, the ruling 
political-military class is concerned with personal wealth accumulation and political 
reproduction as its essential goals. The state dominates business through suppression 
and dispossession of autonomous indigenous capital; meanwhile capital security is 
largely secured through personal and political connections with the ruling elite. The 
party provides access to the state and incentives. In return, business channels some of 
198 
 
the rents it accesses through the state back to the ruling party to guarantee security 
and continued access to incentives. This route undermines economic growth and 
development. Firstly, the power elite has a short-term perspective as opposed to 
‘rational profit making,’ which allows for long-term investment. Secondly, the 
mutually corrupt relationship between the ruling elite and business undermines state 
capacity to discipline business and encourage productive activities. Meanwhile, by 
suppressing the growth of indigenous capital the predatory state also undermines the 
potential role of domestic driven investment and resource mobilisation including the 
contribution to the country’s fiscus. In the end, the predatory state can undermine its 
own capacity leading to its eventual implosion.  
 
State Society Relations Shaped by Violence and Patronage   
 
  The emphasis on democracy both as a goal and principal means of achieving 
development is underscored by Armatya Sen (1999). To place emphasis on 
democracy is to stress the point that development is co-produced and co-owned by the 
society for whom it is meant to serve. In that way the development process gains 
societal legitimacy and its outcomes sustainable. Evans (2014: 223) therefore argues 
that: 
 
 The septic kind of ‘embeddedness’ or ‘state-society synergy’ that was crucial 
 to the twentieth century industrial transformation – dense networks of ties 
 connecting the state to industrial elites – will have to be replaced by much 
 more ‘bottom up’ set of state society ties to secure development success in the 
 21st century.  
 
 Therefore, just as involvement of private elites in determining investment 
priorities and implementation of development projects is recognised as key for higher 
rates of accumulation and economic transformation, so too and even more so, the 
involvement of society is vital in the ‘efficient allocation of expanding investments’ 
(Evans, 2014: 233) and joint implementation. However, as Evans (2014) further 
notes, the information required for the task of capability expansion is gathered from 
constituencies that are numerous and less organised than business.  Such a task would 
require democratic political institutions and a dense state-society interaction to guide 
and facilitate successful outcomes. Williams (2014: 14) therefore suggests that the 
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strengthening of participatory and representative forms of democracy should be 
recognised as vital in order to provide enabling institutions that structure state-society 
relations towards the realisation of such goals. 
 
 Yet, in Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State, Larry 
Diamond (2008) warns of creeping democratic recession, and the rise of predatory 
states, threatening both nascent and established democracies. Zimbabwe’s story is 
characteristic, where the use of force to control citizens and electoral manipulation149 
have extinguished even the basic form of electoral democracy that should enable 
citizens to choose their would-be political representatives. The concept of citizenship 
appears relegated; citizens are only ‘citizens’ in name, deprived of the very minimum 
channels for political representation. To be sure, citizens are clients of the ruling elite, 
which dispenses patronage resources in return for loyalty and political support 
(Mamdani, 1996). Even when such resources are dispensed, insecurity for example 
lack of title on allocated land, is instrumentalised to ensure continued dependency and 
loyalty.  The use of land redistribution and informal small-scale gold mining to 
further patronage goals in Zimbabwe is typical. Beneficiaries can be easily disposed 
as soon as they shift political allegiance or subordinated to the interests of some 
individual(s) in higher political office.  
 
The nature of the predatory state accumulation logic necessarily results in 
economic failure, which triggers strong political opposition to the ruling elite. The 
deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy in the late 1990s, and consequent 
unemployment triggered social unrest culminating in the formation of a broad 
political coalition in 1999 to confront the ruling party. In response the ruling elite 
intensified patronage and violence to sustain its political regeneration. As the state 
coffers became depleted, the ruling elite turned to short-term programmes to dispense 
patronage for political support. Typically the various short-term quasi-fiscal 
operations by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and coercive operations targeted at 
reducing prices of basic commodities at a time when the economy suffered record 
hyperinflation demonstrate this motive as beyond any measure of developmental 
rationality. In addition the state pursued redistribution rhetoric to appease the masses 
                                                        
149 The use of this term with reference to Zimbabwe is associated with Eldred V. 
Masunungure (2014: 96)  
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even though such programmes rarely benefit the broader society beyond the ruling 
party elite and its social base. 
  
When opposition parties emerge to challenge the worsening social and 
economic conditions - growing inequality and injustices, - the state is viciously 
deployed violence to control citizens and destroy the opposition. Scholars fear that 
indeed even nascent democracies such as South Africa and Namibia (Southall, 2013) 
and Ghana (Diamond, 2008) may follow the same road as Zimbabwe. In Namibia, 
civil society groupings are too weak, mostly constrained by dependence and lack of 
funds and when they have differed with the government they have been denounced by 
the ruling SWAPO as unpatriotic and marginalised (Southall, 2013: 185). In South 
Africa too, the upsurge of social protests and often heavy-handed state response that 
epitomised its repression when protesting mine workers were killed during the 
Marikana massacre150 paints a gloomy picture for the future of democracy.  
 
Often when the predatory state is under fire it appropriates what Claude Ake 
(1998) termed ‘defensive radicalism,’ branding the opposition as an enemy of the 
state and masses, hindering the economic and social transformation programmes of 
the state. The instrumentalisation of derogatory language labelling the opposition as 
‘sell outs’ or ‘puppets of the west’ often dominates the narrative and justification for 
exclusion and the use of military force, ostensibly to defend the state against foreign 
interests.  The use of violence to crush political opposition is well demonstrated in 
chapter four; the orchestrated campaign of terror against the MDC in the 2008 is the 
worst form of electoral violence witnessed in Zimbabwe, outside of the Gukurahundi 
in the early 1980s. Such practices are consistent with predatory rule elsewhere. For 
instance, in 2002, the Nigerian government under Obasanjo accused organised labour 
under the umbrella of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), ‘of running a parallel 
government,’ when the labour body called out its members for general strike and 
protest against the increase in petroleum products and proposed removal of subsidies 
(Omoyibho, 2012: 31). The effect of the violence is to exclude and marginalise 
important constituencies in the country’s development process.  
                                                        
150 The Marikana massacre is considered the single most lethal use of force by South 
African security forces in the post apartheid era against civilians. It resulted in the 
deaths of 34 striking miners. 
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Finally, in terms of the relationship with broader society more generally, the 
predatory state exhibits characteristics of a deeply embedded form of authoritarianism 
characterised by use of violence and patronage. The state penetrates deep in society to 
control citizens and opposition. The use of violence and patronage are the main forms 
of ensuring control over society and the opposition. Elections are only held to give a 
veneer of legitimacy. Electoral manipulation techniques include: change of electoral 
laws to favour the ruling party; partisan influence in state media coverage; partisan 
application of the law targeting opposition campaigns; intimidation of opposition 
supporters; manipulation of voter education; registration to favour ruling party 
constituencies; and vote buying. Typically patronage manifest in short-term 
programmes meant to drum up political support irrespective of the impact on the 
economy. Citizens lack independence of thought and action as they are trapped in 
vertical chains of dependency. Meanwhile, the symbiotic relationship between the 
ruling and military elites reinforces the deployment of violence to ward off opposition 
challenge. The opposition and civil society spaces that could provide alternative 
spaces to challenge the excesses of the power elite are persecuted and suppressed.   
 
Developmental Versus Predatory States 
 
Whereas the difference between the twentieth century developmental state and 
the predatory state has been subject of considerable attention in this study, the 
distinction between the twenty-first century developmental state151 and the predatory 
state deserves clarification. How do we distinguish between the version of the 
twentieth century developmental state and a predatory state in terms of state structure 
and relationship with society to make sense of the structural variations with 
developmental trajectories? I would argue that in terms of characteristics both the 
early version of the developmental state and the predatory state demonstrate 
                                                        
151 The early version of the developmental state is associated with countries such as 
South Korea under Park Chung Hee (1962 – 1979) and Brazil under Estado Novo 
(1937-1945) and the military dictatorship (1964-1985) displayed more authoritarian 
politics and greater penetration of state authority. 
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substantial authoritarian tendencies and powerful role of personal networks. 152  
However, they differ substantially in terms of relationship with business actors and 
the nature of the relations with the military.  
 
The twentieth century developmental state combined the use of disciplinary 
capacity with incentives to foster productive alliances with business while predatory 
state relations with business are parasitic rather than production oriented, hence they 
achieve opposite developmental outcomes.  The nature of the relations with the 
military is also divergent in that the use of the military in the twentieth century 
developmental state was oriented towards a national project rather than personal 
accumulation. For instance, in the ‘Asian classical developmental states model’, the 
military played an effective role to control and repress the domestic labour to keep the 
costs of production low to attain industry competitiveness. Yet under a predatory 
state, the use of the military violence mirrors personalistic accumulation interests of 
the power elite. Table 9.1 below summarises the characteristics of the twenty-fist 
century developmental state and the predatory state. 
 
  
                                                        
152 During South Korea’s high growth industrialization, Park Chung Hee for example 
enjoyed closer personal ties with two of the most important leading largest businesses, 
Hyundai and Daewoo, thus Kohli (2004: 97) finds it difficult to disentangle the role of 
state defined public purpose of growth from the role of private profit motives and of 
crony capitalism. However, the state was always in command; it never lost its 
disciplinary capacity. For instance when businesses failed to meet set target, they 
were punished through withdrawal of incentives. The state’s compulsions were 
pervasive and real (Kohli, 2004: 97). 
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Table 9 1: Developmental versus predatory state characteristics 
Characteristics Twenty-first century 
developmental state 
Predatory state  
1. Nature of the 
state 
Weberian bureaucratic 
rationality: meritocratic-
based recruitment and 
promotion, impersonality 
and rational decision-
making processes. 
Party and military dominance in 
the state: political deployments 
aimed at controlling key state 
institutions (including the 
military) to facilitate access to 
personal wealth and power. 
2. State 
relationship 
with broader 
society 
Embedded autonomy: state-
society relations are shaped 
by democratic and 
participatory forms of 
governance. The state 
provides institutions that 
facilitate and mobilise 
citizen participation to 
galvanise development. 
Violence and patronage: state-
society relations are shaped by 
authoritarianism and patronage. 
Citizens live under insecurity, 
fear and dependency, which 
robs them autonomy of thought 
and action.  
3. Forms of 
control over 
society 
The state secures 
legitimacy through the rule 
of law and citizen 
participation. 
The ruling class deploys short-
term programmes for political 
support and uses of violence to 
control citizens and opposition. 
4. State 
relationship 
with business 
Embedded autonomy: the 
state collaborates with 
capital yet retaining 
autonomy to formulate and 
pursue developmental 
goals. The deployment of 
incentives is supported by 
disciplinary capacity to 
ensure a competitive 
market based economy that 
drives national 
development priorities. 
Domination and capture: the 
state is captured by the ruling 
class, which preys on 
autonomous capital and civil 
society fearing centres of 
power, which can challenge the 
ruling class veracity. The state 
substitutes the market, deploys 
of violence and incentives to 
facilitate ruling elite 
accumulation interests.  
5. Forms of 
control over 
capital 
Capital security ensured by 
bureaucratic impartiality 
that provides predictable 
enforcement of contracts. 
Capital security relies on 
political and personal relations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has engaged the debate on the construction and reproduction of the 
predatory state, its core characteristics and how it functions.  It argues that predatory 
state cannot be understood simply as the opposite of a developmental state or a 
product of poor state institutionalisation as proffered by scholars of the ‘post-colonial 
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state,’ ‘neo-patrimonialism’ or ‘criminalisation.’  Instead, I argue that the predatory 
state is a ruling class anti-developmental accumulation and reproduction project that 
relies on violence and patronage to control society. 
 
In response to declining economic performance and growing political threats, 
the Zimbabwean state increasingly assumed predatory characteristics. The combined 
dominance of the ruling party and military in the state facilitated pervasive anti-
developmental accumulation that undermined the development potential, leading to 
popular discontentment. Facing serious challenges from the political opposition, the 
state dispensed patronage driven short-term programmes that further weakened the 
economy. At the same time, the state fostered alliance with politically connected class 
of parasitic businessmen entangled into regional and international networks of crime. 
Meanwhile, the state repressed the development of civil society and autonomous 
capital, which could provide alternative power bases to challenge the anti-
developmental excesses. The increasing political threats gave way to the growing 
power and influence of the military, which deployed violence in order to control the 
opposition and society. The military received political rewards in the form of business 
opportunities, parastatal jobs and access to state resources in return for political 
support and loyalty. Therefore, rather than absence, the predatory state manifests a 
strong central authority and institutionalised regime of control and anti-developmental 
accumulation.  
 
However, a fundamental question emerges as to whether the modes of 
accumulation of the predatory state undermine its own capacity to continue its 
predatory practices. The parasitic nature of accumulation is oriented towards 
opportunistic short-term rather than long-term production, often leading to implosion 
of the predatory state. There is a strong argument to make that the predatory state 
requires an economy which continues to function at a minimum level in order to 
allow the elite to engage in predatory practices, that is, a predatory state has to be 
‘sustainable.’ The alternative is that the elite simply loot the economy until it becomes 
unsustainable.  It would suggest that (1) the predatory state accumulation model is 
inherently unsustainable and (2) once unsustainability is reached the elite undermine 
the capacity of the economy to continue to function at a minimum level as resources 
dry-out. As patronage resources shrink, the political elite coalesce around a smaller 
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set of actors. The process may not be smooth, but often mediated by acrimonious 
infighting within the ruling class. In Zimbabwe, the party elite and military coalition 
coalesced over the years excluding key business constituencies and civil society. 
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Appendices   
 
Appendix 1: Military Officers Deployed for ZANU-PF Campaign in the 2008 
Elections 
Zone Name 
1. Harare Metropolitan  AVM Michael Karakadzai. 
2. Bulawayo Province Col. C. Sibanda 
3. Bulawayo Central Maj. J. Ndlovu and Maj. J. Ncube 
4. Manicaland Brig. Tarumbwa 
5. Buhera Central Col. M. Mzilikazi (MID) 
6. Buhera North Maj. L. M. Svosve 
7. Buhera South Maj. D Muchena 
8. Buhera West Lt. Col. Kamonge, Major Nhachi 
9. Chimanimani East Lt. Col Murecherwa 
10. Chimanimani West Maj. Mabvuu 
11. Headlands Col. Mutsvunguma 
12. Makoni North Maj. V. Chisuko 
13. Makoni South Wing Commander Mandeya 
14. Mutare Central Lt. Col. Tsodzai, Lt. Col. Sedze, Mandi Chimene 
15. Mutare West Lt. Col. B. Kashiri 
16. Masvingo Lt. Col. Takavingofa 
17. Mwenezi West Lt. Col. Muchono, -Maj. R. Kwenda 
18. Mash West Province Brig. Gen. Sigauke, Col Gwekwerere 
19. Chegutu East Lt. Colonel W. Tutisa 
20. Hurungwe East Lt. Col. B. Mahambe 
21. Mhondoro Mubaira Col. C. T. Gurira 
22. Zvimba North Cpt. T. Majongwe 
23. Mashonaland East Brig. Gen. D. Nyikayaramba, Rtd Brig Gen Rungani 
24. Chikomba Central Lt. Col. Marara 
25. Goromonzi North Lt. Col. Mudzimba, Maj. F. Mbewe 
26. Marondera Central Maj. Gen. Chedondo (COSG), Lt. Col. B. Kashiri 
27. Marondera West Squadron Leader U. Chitauro 
28. Murehwa South Maj. Gurure 
29. Murehwa North Col. Mukurazhizha, Lt. Col. Chinete 
30. Mutare North Lt. Col. Chizengwe, Lt. Col. Mazaiwana 
31. Mashonaland Central Brig.Gen. Shungu 
32. Bindura South Col. Chipwere 
33. Bindura North Lt. Col. Parwada 
34. Muzarabani North Lt. Col. Kazaza 
35. Muzarabani South Maj. H. Maziri 
36. Rushinga Col. F Mhonda, Lt. Col. Betheuni 
37. Shamva North Lt. Col. Dzuda 
38. Shamva South Makumire 
39. Midlands AVM Muchena, Brig. Gen. S. B. Moyo, Lt Col. 
Kuhuni 
40. Chirumanzu South Maj T. Tsvangirai 
41. Mberengwa East Col. B. Mavire 
42. Mberengwa West Maj. T. Marufu 
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Zone Name 
43. Matebeleland South AVM Abu Basutu 
44. Beitbridge East Group Cpt. Mayera, Rtd. Maj. Mbedzi, Lt. Col. B. 
Moyo 
45. Gwanda South Maj. J. D. Moyo 
46. Gwanda Central Maj. B. Tshuma 
47. Matopo North Lt. Col. Maphosa 
48. Matebeleland North Brig. Gen. Khumalo 
49. Binga North Maj. E. S. Matonga 
50. Lupane East Lt. Col. Mkwananzi 
51. Lupane West Lt. Col. Mabhena 
52. Tsholotsho Lt. Col. Mlalazi 
53. Hwange Central Lt. Col. P. Ndhlovu 
54. Bikita West Maj. B. R. Murwira 
55. Chiredzi Central Col. G. Mashava 
56. Chiredzi West Maj. E. Gono 
57. Masvingo Province Maj. Gen. E. A. Rugeje, Rtd. Maj. Gen. Gibson 
Mashingaidze, Rtd. Brig. General Rangwani 
Gutu South Maj. Chimedza (Medical Doctor), AVM Muchena 
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011:14. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Map of Marange Diamond Mining Area and Mining Claims 
Distribution  
 
Source: Global Witness, 2012: 3 
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Appendix 3: Special Mining Grant from Zimbabwe Mining Development 
Corporation to Anjin Investments  
 
Global Witness, 2012: 5 
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Appendix 4: Application of a Diamond Mining Concession by Commissioner 
General of Police Augustine Chihuri  
 
Global Witness, 2012 
 
 
 
 
